

MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMMITTEE

REPORTER'S ONLINE UPDATE

Updated November 3, 2017

Introduction

The Committee intends to publish annual updates to the model jury instructions. During the periods between these formal publications, the Committee's Reporter will maintain a "Reporter's Online Update," which will include developments in case law relevant to the instructions. The update may also include substantive changes to instructions that the Committee has formally approved but that have yet to appear in the most recent edition.

Although the Committee expects that the Reporter's Online Update will be a valuable research tool, the Committee emphasizes that it will be an informal publication that is not subject to review by the Committee. Thus, users should not assume that the Committee will make modifications based on information that appears in the Reporter's Online Update.

The Reporter's summaries are purely descriptive; they do not include recommendations for how (or whether) to draft jury instructions based on the authorities that are summarized. Although each summary appears beneath a caption that corresponds to the most relevant model instruction(s), irrespective of whether the summarized authority refers to the model instruction(s), the use of this organizational structure here should not be construed as an indication that the Committee intends to modify an instruction, or a Comment.

The Committee encourages users to alert the Reporter of any errors at: mcjic@judicial.state.co.us.

I. Decisions of the United States Supreme Court

G2:05 CONSPIRACY

Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1432 (2016) (“In order to establish the existence of a conspiracy to violate the [federal law prohibiting extortion], the Government has no obligation to demonstrate that each conspirator agreed personally to commit—or was even capable of committing—the substantive offense of . . . extortion. It is sufficient to prove that the conspirators agreed that the underlying crime *be committed* by a member of the conspiracy who was capable of committing it. In other words, each conspirator must have specifically intended that *some conspirator* commit each element of the substantive offense.”).

II. Decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court

B:01 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, JUROR QUALIFICATIONS, AND JURY SELECTION

People v. Clemens, 2017 CO 89, ¶ 2, 401 P.3d 525, 526 (“[A] prospective juror’s silence in response to rehabilitative questioning constitutes evidence sufficient to support a trial court’s conclusion that the juror has been rehabilitated when, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the context of that silence indicates that the juror will render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial.”).

B:06 ADMONITION ABOUT CONDUCT DURING TRIAL

People v. Jacobson, 2017 CO 28, ¶ 1, 393 P.3d 548, 549 (“Because the trial court gave repeated, specific admonitions—including on the day of the newscast—to jurors to avoid ‘newscasts’ and ‘newspaper sites,’ and these were the only places on which the prejudicial report was available, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to poll jurors.”).

E:01 DUTIES OF JUDGE AND JURY

People v. Jefferson, 2017 CO 35, ¶ 2, 393 P.3d 493, 495 (“[T]he trial court did not employ the requisite caution to ensure that [a] DVD would not be used in such a manner as to create a likelihood that the jury would accord it undue weight or emphasis. . . . [B]ecause the nature of the DVD and its importance to the case’s resolution leave us with grave doubts as to the effect that unfettered access had on the verdict and the fairness of the proceedings, we cannot deem the error harmless.”).

People v. Rael, 2017 CO 67, ¶ 2, 395 P.3d 772, 773 (“[T]he jury was entitled to access the non-testimonial crime scene video because that video did not present the same risk of undue emphasis as do videos documenting witnesses’ out-of-court, testimonial statements We likewise conclude, based on the longstanding rule that a defendant’s confession is not subject to the same limitations during deliberations as the out-of-court statements of other witnesses, that the jury was entitled to access the interview video.”).

E:14 LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSES

Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, ¶ 64, 390 P.3d 816, 826 (adopting the test from *Schmuck v. United States*, 489 U.S. 705 (1989), and holding that “an offense is a lesser included offense of another offense if the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the greater offense, such that the lesser offense contains only elements that are also included in the elements of the greater offense”).

People v. Rock, 2017 CO 84, ¶¶ 15–20, 402 P.3d 472, 477–79 (recognizing that the court in *Reyna-Abarca v. People* was “not confronted with a lesser offense admitting of alternative methods of commission,” and—now squarely confronting that issue—holding as follows: (1) “an offense the commission of which is necessarily established by establishing the elements of a greater offense must also be included in that greater offense”; (2) “any set of elements sufficient for commission of that lesser offense that is necessarily established by establishing the statutory elements of a greater offense constitutes an included offense; (3) “a defendant can be entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense only if the act or conduct with which the defendant was charged supports conviction of that offense”; and (4) second-degree criminal trespass is a lesser-included offense of second-degree burglary because “the commission of second degree criminal trespass requires no more than knowingly and unlawfully entering or remaining in the dwelling of another, a subset of the statutory elements of second degree burglary”).

Page v. People, 2017 CO 88, ¶¶ 13, 19, 402 P.3d 468, 471–72 (“[U]nder the statutory elements test a lesser offense is included in a greater if establishing the commission of the greater necessarily establishes commission of the lesser [E]stablishing the elements of sexual assault by means of penetration necessarily establishes the elements of unlawful sexual contact. . . . Thus, unlawful sexual contact is a lesser included offense of sexual assault”).

**H:11 USE OF NON-DEADLY PHYSICAL FORCE (DEFENSE OF PERSON) and
H:12 USE OF DEADLY PHYSICAL FORCE (DEFENSE OF PERSON)**

People v. Opana, 2017 CO 56, ¶ 17, 395 P.3d 757, 762 (holding that, because there was “no evidence from which the jury could have found that the defendant’s use of physical force upon the victim was anything other than deadly physical force,” the defendant “was clearly not entitled to a self-defense instruction premised on the use of any physical force other than deadly physical force”).

Roberts v. People, 2017 CO 76, ¶ 28, 399 P.3d 702, 706 (holding that *People v. Pickering*, 276 P.3d 553 (Colo. 2011), “does not require a trial court to give a self-defense affirmative defense instruction in every case requiring intent, knowledge, or willfulness”).

3-1:02 MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE (FELONY MURDER)

People v. Doubleday, 2016 CO 3, ¶¶ 8, 26, 27, 364 P.3d 193, 195, 197–98 (“[The trial court] instructed the jury that the affirmative defense of duress applied to the charge of attempted aggravated robbery but not to the charge of felony murder. . . . [W]e hold that in order to establish that a defendant has committed or attempted to commit a predicate offense so as to support a felony murder conviction, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of that predicate offense, including the inapplicability of any properly asserted affirmative defense. . . . [Here], we thus conclude that (1) the prosecution did not prove all of the requisite elements of the predicate offense of attempted aggravated robbery; (2) as a result, the prosecution did not establish that Doubleday committed the crime of attempted aggravated robbery, which was an essential element of the felony murder charge; and (3) therefore, Doubleday’s felony murder conviction cannot stand.”).

Esquivel-Castillo v. People, 2016 CO 7, ¶ 20, 364 P.3d 885, 890 (“Because the felony murder charge in this case effectively tracked the language of the felony murder statute, including the allegation that the defendant committed or attempted to commit ‘kidnapping,’ such charge was clearly not substantively defective and provided the defendant with adequate notice of the charge against him. As such, instructing the jury, for purposes of the felony murder charge, on all statutory forms of kidnapping did not amount to instructing on an additional or different crime from the one charged and, therefore, did not constitute a constructive amendment.”).

3-1:04 MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE (EXTREME INDIFFERENCE)

Montoya v. People, 2017 CO 40, ¶ 16, 394 P.3d 676, 683 (“[C]onduct practically certain to cause the death of another is the equivalent of conduct creating a

grave risk of death to another. It therefore follows that knowingly engaging in the latter conduct and thereby causing the death of a person or persons is the equivalent of knowingly causing the death of another. While conviction of extreme indifference murder therefore requires proof that the defendant was practically certain his conduct would cause death, or in other words, that he was knowingly engaging in conduct creating a grave risk of death to another, proof that Montoya knowingly caused death was not required where the jury returned a guilty verdict of only *attempted* extreme indifference murder.”).

**3-4:01 SEXUAL ASSAULT (SUBMISSION AGAINST WILL) and 3-4:09
SEXUAL ASSAULT (PHYSICALLY HELPLESS)**

Schneider v. People, 2016 CO 70, ¶ 19, 382 P.3d 835, 840–41 (“Inflicting sexual penetration upon someone who the actor knows is helpless, which definitionally entails acting with knowledge of an absence of resistance, on the one hand, and causing that person to submit to sexual penetration by means calculated to cause her submission against her will, on the other, clearly involve different conduct. Whether the victim’s regaining consciousness is more appropriately characterized as an intervening event, or the defendant’s choice to force her to submit, upon her regaining consciousness, as a volitional departure, or perhaps in some other way altogether, these additional factors clearly evidence a change in circumstances from one alternative means of committing sexual assault to another.”).

5-9:01 IDENTITY THEFT (USE)

People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12, ¶¶ 14, 22, 367 P.3d 695, 699, 700 (“[T]he plain meaning of our identity-theft statute suggests that ‘knowingly’ applies to the use of the identifying information of another. . . . [T]he prosecution must prove that an offender knowingly used personal identifying information and knew that the information belonged to another person.”).

6-4:01 CHILD ABUSE (KNOWINGLY OR RECKLESSLY)

People v. Marsh, 2017 CO 10M, ¶¶ 28–29, 389 P.3d 100, 107 (holding that “for purposes of section 18-6-403(3), knowingly seeking out and viewing child pornography on the internet constitutes knowingly possessing or controlling it under the statute” (plurality), and concluding that “cache images can constitute evidence that the defendant knowingly possessed the images when he viewed them online”).

9-1:33 HARASSMENT (PHYSICAL CONTACT)

Roberts v. People, 2017 CO 76, ¶ 28, 399 P.3d 702, 706 (holding that *People v. Pickering*, 276 P.3d 553 (Colo. 2011), “does not require a trial court to give a self-defense affirmative defense instruction in every case requiring intent, knowledge, or willfulness”).

13:56 SMUGGLING OF HUMANS

Fuentes-Espinoza v. People, 2017 CO 98, ¶ 67, __ P.3d __ (holding that the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2017), preempts section 18-13-128, C.R.S., Colorado’s statute criminalizing human smuggling).

18:18 PROCESSING OR MANUFACTURING MARIJUANA OR MARIJUANA CONCENTRATE

People v. Lente, 2017 CO 74, ¶ 27, __ P.3d __ (holding that “making hash oil by extraction is manufacturing, not processing,” meaning prosecution for such extraction is not foreclosed by Amendment 64, Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16(3)(b)).

42:09 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE

Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, ¶ 69, 390 P.3d 816, 827 (“[W]e conclude that DUI is a lesser included offense of vehicular assault-DUI and vehicular homicide-DUI . . .”).

III. Final Decisions of the Colorado Court of Appeals

E:03 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, BURDEN OF PROOF, AND REASONABLE DOUBT

People v. Boyd, 2015 COA 109, ¶¶ 8, 12, 395 P.3d 1128, 1131 (holding that, where the trial court stated during voir dire that “if the District Attorney doesn’t prove [defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt], find her not guilty, which, again, doesn’t mean she’s innocent anymore [sic] than any of us is innocent, in the sense of a newborn baby,” the court “should have avoided any comment during voir dire that implied that the presumption of innocence allows guilty defendants to avoid conviction” but that such error was not “egregious or prejudicial” (alterations in original)), *aff’d on other grounds*, 2017 CO 2.

People v. Waller, 2016 COA 115, ¶¶ 52, 77, __ P.3d __ (holding that, where the trial court’s general burden-of-proof instruction told the jury that it “will” find the defendant guilty if the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt—rather than “should” find—the instruction did not improperly “abolish[] the jury’s power to nullify [or] essentially constitute[] a directed verdict for the State”).

E:05 CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

People v. Manyik, 2016 COA 42, ¶¶ 62, 71, 383 P.3d 77, 88, 90 (rejecting the defendant’s tendered instruction that the jury “may consider the physical and psychological environment of the interrogation when determining the credibility and accuracy of his statements,” holding that “[t]he tendered instruction emphasized only selective evidence that was favorable to [the defendant], and thus it was improper”).

People v. Singley, 2015 COA 78M, ¶ 41, __ P.3d __ (“The [Colorado] supreme court has consistently held that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to give jury instructions warning of the unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony so long as it gives the pattern jury instructions on credibility and assessment of evidence.” (citing various Colorado Supreme Court cases)).

People v. Theus-Roberts, 2015 COA 32, ¶¶ 19, 21, 378 P.3d 750, 755–56 (“The Colorado Supreme Court has consistently held that it is not error for a trial court to refuse tendered *Telfaire* instructions when the jury receives a general instruction on the credibility of witnesses. . . . Although Theus–Roberts contends that ‘scientific advancements demonstrate the general credibility instruction does not suffice in cases in which eyewitness identification is a material, disputed issue,’ we do not view this case as warranting a departure from controlling Colorado Supreme Court precedent”); *see also id.* at ¶ 47 (Berger, J., specially concurring) (“[W]hile I recognize that we are bound by the supreme court’s prior decisions on this issue, I believe it is important to note how much time has elapsed since the supreme court last visited this subject. The supreme court’s earlier cases do not analyze in depth the scientific, judicial, and scholarly work that casts doubt on the reliability of certain eyewitness identifications because much of this body of work did not exist at the time the court addressed this issue.”).

E:09 QUESTIONS DURING DELIBERATIONS

People v. Johnson, 2016 COA 15, ¶ 39, 381 P.3d 348, 356 (finding no error where, when the court gave the jury “unfettered access” to the victim’s videotaped interview, “the court ordered that the jury could access the

videotape only upon a request to the bailiff . . . and, if such request were made, the jury was required to watch the video all the way through, to avoid emphasis on any one portion of the interview”).

E:18 SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION—WHEN JURORS FAIL TO AGREE

People v. Payne, 2014 COA 81, ¶ 18, 361 P.3d 1040, 1044 (“We agree with the federal authority cited herein, and conclude that a defendant has a right to be present when a modified *Allen* instruction is read to the jury because of the psychological influence his absence or presence may have on the jury.”).

F:81 (DEFINING “CUNNILINGUS”) and F:343 (DEFINING “SEXUAL PENETRATION”)

People v. Morales, 2014 COA 129, ¶¶ 37–44, 356 P.3d 972, 981–82 (holding that the trial court did not commit plain error by using the definition of “cunnilingus” from the prostitution statute, section 18-7-201(2)(b), C.R.S . 2014, to define “sexual penetration” for purposes of sexual assault because: (1) the definition in the prostitution statute is practically identical to the dictionary definition; (2) both COLJI-Crim. F(238) (2008) and COLJI-Crim. F:343 (2014) reference the definition of “cunnilingus” in the prostitution statute for purposes of defining “sexual penetration”; and (3) the definition of “sexual penetration” can be read as requiring some degree of penetration, “however slight,” even if the act at issue is cunnilingus).

F:128 (DEFINING “EROTIC NUILITY”) and 6-4:19 SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF A CHILD (POSSESSION OR CONTROL)

People v. Henley, 2017 COA 76, ¶¶ 21–22, __ P.3d __ (concluding that the statutory definition of “erotic nudity” “focuses on the purpose for which the image is displayed, not the subjective purpose of a particular viewer,” meaning that “the particular viewer’s purpose in looking at the image is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the image is ‘erotic nudity’”).

F:303 (DEFINING “PUBLIC PLACE”)

People v. Naranjo, 2015 COA 56, ¶ 17, __ P.3d __ (for purposes of the definition of a “public place” in section 18-1-901(3)(n), “the method of transportation a person uses on a highway—whether walking, biking, driving, or some other type of transport—does not alter the fact that the person is on a highway, and therefore in a public place”), *rev’d on other grounds*, 2017 CO 87, 401 P.3d 534.

F:337 (DEFINING “SEXUAL CONTACT”)

People v. Lovato, 2014 COA 113, ¶¶ 26, 32, 357 P.3d 212, 221, 223 (“[W]e conclude that ‘sexual’ modifies ‘abuse’ in the definition of ‘sexual contact’ contained in section 18-3-401(4). . . . Even in deciding that the term ‘abuse’ in section 18-3-401(4) means ‘sexual abuse,’ and accepting that ‘abuse’ means pain, injury, or discomfort, we nonetheless discern no statutory requirement of a ‘sexual motivation’ on the part of a perpetrator under this definition.”).

G2:05 CONSPIRACY

People v. Lucero, 2016 COA 105, ¶ 8, 381 P.3d 436, 438 (“[A] mere buyer-seller relationship does not constitute a drug distribution conspiracy Colorado’s general conspiracy law . . . punishes conspirators who have agreed on a common illicit purpose (e.g., to distribute drugs). Such commonality is absent where, as here, the evidence shows that the transferor intended only to distribute the drugs and the transferee intended only to possess them for personal use.”).

CHAPTER H: DEFENSES

People v. Marks, 2015 COA 173, ¶¶ 52, 57, 374 P.3d 518, 527–28 (holding that, where the defendant refused a “theory of defense” instruction, the trial court properly rejected his tendered “alternate suspect instruction [because it] merely highlighted the prosecution’s duty to establish that it was actually he, and not a third person, who committed the crime with which he was charged”).

H:11 USE OF NON-DEADLY PHYSICAL FORCE (DEFENSE OF PERSON) and H:12 USE OF DEADLY PHYSICAL FORCE (DEFENSE OF PERSON)

People v. Newell, 2017 COA 27, ¶¶ 27–28, 395 P.3d 1203, 1208 (“[A] defendant need not disprove that he was the initial aggressor in order to benefit from a self-defense instruction when any evidence—even slight, unreasonable, or improbable evidence—supports his theory of self-defense. Instead, it is the prosecution’s burden to prove an exception to self-defense. . . . Once the defendant offers a scintilla of evidence of self-defense, and the prosecution has offered evidence that the defendant was the initial aggressor, the jury should be provided with the self-defense instruction, including the initial aggressor exception, and be permitted to weigh the evidence to decide whether self-defense has been disproved.” (citation omitted)).

H:34 INTOXICATION (VOLUNTARY)

People v. Garner, 2015 COA 174, ¶ 72, 381 P.3d 320, 333 (“[V]oluntary intoxication is not, in and of itself, a defense to first degree murder. It is only ‘a partial defense that, *under appropriate circumstances*, negates the specific intent necessary to carry out certain offenses.” (quoting *Brown v. People*, 239 P.3d 764, 769 (Colo. 2010)) (emphasis added by court of appeals)).

3-2:27 VEHICULAR ASSAULT (UNDER THE INFLUENCE)

People v. Smoots, 2013 COA 152, ¶ 7, 396 P.3d 53, 55 (holding that the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that “[f]or the purposes of the strict liability crime of Vehicular Assault, ‘proximate cause’ is established by the voluntary act of driving under the influence of alcohol”), *aff’d sub nom. Reyna-Abarca v. People*, 2017 CO 15, ¶ 64, 390 P.3d 816.

3-4:26 UNLAWFUL SEXUAL CONTACT (UNDER EIGHTEEN)

People v. Johnson, 2016 COA 15, ¶ 18, 381 P.3d 348, 352–53 (“[A] person cannot have unlawful sexual contact while he or she is asleep and unaware of the contact. . . . [B]ecause [the defendant] was asleep and could not have voluntarily or consciously touched [the victim], he did not have unlawful sexual contact with her.”).

3-4:30.INT UNLAWFUL SEXUAL CONTACT—INTERROGATORY (AT-RISK VICTIM)

People v. Nardine, 2016 COA 85, ¶ 26, __ P.3d __ (“[W]e do not discern from the legislative purpose that the at-risk juvenile enhancer necessarily involves a ‘knowingly’ mens rea as to the victim’s at-risk juvenile status.”).

3-4:36.INT SEXUAL ASSAULT ON A CHILD—INTERROGATORY (PATTERN)

People v. Johnson, 2016 COA 15, ¶¶ 15, 23, 381 P.3d 348, 352, 353–54 (“Because the court provided the required [pattern] instruction, it did not err in allowing the jury to identify an incident of sexual contact other than those listed on the special interrogatory. . . . [But] only one of the two incidents of sexual contact found by the jury was supported by sufficient evidence. And since the pattern of sexual abuse sentence enhancer requires a finding of at least two distinct incidents of sexual contact, there was insufficient evidence to support this conviction.”).

3-4:41.INT SEXUAL ASSAULT ON A CHILD BY ONE IN A POSITION OF TRUST—INTERROGATORY (UNDER FIFTEEN)

People v. Ewing, 2017 COA 10, ¶¶ 12, 24, __ P.3d __ (holding that the trial court’s failure to require the jury to find that the victims were under fifteen constituted a *Blakely* error, but that the error was not plain).

3-4:46 INTERNET SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF A CHILD (EXPOSE OR TOUCH)

People v. Helms, 2016 COA 90, ¶¶ 52, 53, 396 P.3d 1133, 1146 (“The child exploitation statute does not require that the actor be in Colorado at the time of the criminal communication [D]efendant did not ask [the supposed 14-year-old girl] to expose or touch her own or another person’s intimate parts, an essential element of the offense. A request to send a picture taken previously is not equivalent to such conduct. And asking a child to send a photograph showing such conduct would not constitute an attempt to persuade the child to engage in such conduct ‘while communicating’ with the actor, another essential element of the offense.” (citation omitted)).

3-4:47 INTERNET SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF A CHILD (OBSERVE)

People v. Heywood, 2014 COA 99, ¶ 28, 357 P.3d 201, 207 (holding that section 18-3-405.4(1)(b) “prohibits an actor from actively and affirmatively importuning, inviting, or enticing a person to view the actor’s intimate parts, *while the actor knows or believes* that the person is less than fifteen years old and at least four years younger than the actor” (emphasis added)).

3-4:63 FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER (LOCAL AGENCY)

People v. Jones, 2017 COA 116, ¶¶ 21, 29, __ P.3d __ (“[T]he most reasonable interpretation of the phrase ‘changing an address’ is moving from a fixed residence at one place to a fixed residence at another place. . . . [A] violation of the duty to register in section 16-22-108(3)(i) must be charged under the catchall provision in section 18-3-412.5(1),” not under section 18-3-412.5(1)(g).).

5-1:103 FORGERY (LEGAL RIGHT, INTEREST, OBLIGATION, OR STATUS) and 5-1:10 SECOND DEGREE FORGERY

People v. Riley, 2015 COA 152, ¶ 14, 380 P.3d 157, 161 (“By omitting the term ‘not’ before the phrase ‘was purported to be . . . an instrument which does or may . . . affect a legal right, interest, obligation, or status,’ the court mistakenly

instructed the jury on the elements of felony forgery under section 18-5-102, rather than second degree forgery under section 18-5-104.” (omissions in original)).

5-9:01 IDENTITY THEFT (USE)

People v. Campos, 2015 COA 47, ¶ 15 n.3, 351 P.3d 553, 556 n.3 (“[E]ven under the narrower interpretation set forth in [*People v. Beck*, 187 P.3d 1125, 1128–29 (Colo. App. 2008)], employment is a ‘thing of value’ for purposes of identity theft.”).

5.5:02 COMPUTER CRIME (DEFRAUD)

People v. Galang, 2016 COA 68, ¶ 38, 382 P.3d 1241, 1249 (“We acknowledge that section 18-5.5-102(3)(a) appears to tie the penalties for computer crime to concepts of loss, damage, or value. But in our view, any interpretation of the provision as requiring, as the predicate of a penalty, a showing of actual rather than merely contemplated injury undermines the very purpose of sections 18-5.5-102(1)(a), (b), and (f): to preserve the use of computers for legitimate ends.”).

5.5:05 COMPUTER CRIME (ALTERATION OR DAMAGE)

People v. Stotz, 2016 COA 16, ¶ 47, 381 P.3d 357, 366 (“We conclude that the plain language of section 18-5.5-102(1)(e) prohibits, with sufficient clarity, an employee’s knowing deletion of the only electronic copies of thousands of computer documents, when the employee knows that such deletion is not authorized by the employer.”).

6-4:01 CHILD ABUSE (KNOWINGLY OR RECKLESSLY)

People v. Weeks, 2015 COA 77, ¶¶ 79–80, 369 P.3d 699, 712 (“[W]e conclude that the last phrase ‘ultimately results in the death of a child or serious bodily injury to a child’ in section 18-6-401(1)(a) applies to only the last enumerated pattern of abuse (‘an accumulation of injuries’). The other enumerated patterns of abuse do not require a showing that they resulted in death or serious bodily injury. [Footnote 11: To the extent that this interpretation differs from that in *People v. Friend*, 2014 COA 123M, we decline to follow *Friend*.] Thus, under section 18-6-401(1)(a), the prosecution needed to prove only that defendant engaged in a pattern of conduct resulting in . . . cruel punishment or mistreatment of [the child victim]. To enhance the sentence for the crime, though, the People had to separately prove that one or more acts underlying that pattern resulted in death or injury to the child.”).

6-8:01.INT TRIGGERING MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE—INTERROGATORY (HABITUAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDER)

People v. Heisler, 2017 COA 58, ¶ 24, __ P.3d __ (rejecting the defendant’s argument that “the trial court should have instructed the jury to determine whether [his] offense included an act of domestic violence and that the court erred in denying his request for that instruction”).

6-8:02 VIOLATION OF A PROTECTION ORDER (PROHIBITED CONDUCT)

People v. Serra, 2015 COA 130, ¶¶ 51, 53, 361 P.3d 1122, 1133 (“We conclude that the term ‘contact,’ as used in sections 18-8-212 and 18-6-803.5, has a commonly accepted and understood meaning and thus a further clarifying definition was not required to inform the jury of the governing law. . . . The trial court therefore was not required to define ‘contact’ for the jury, although it had discretion to provide a definitional instruction that properly stated the law. The court’s definition of contact as ‘includes [a] variety of conduct and is not limited to physical touching,’ however, was not a proper definitional instruction because it did not correspond with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term.” (alteration in original)).

Hotsenpiller v. Morris, 2017 COA 95, ¶¶ 48, 56, __ P.3d __ (holding that consent of victim is not an affirmative defense to violation of a protection order because “[a] protected person simply cannot ‘consent,’ under section 18-1-505, to another person’s violation of a court order,” and because “the harm or evil sought to be prevented by a [protection order] . . . is not mere contact with the protected person . . . but preventing the societal harms of violence, domestic abuse, and serious harm or death”).

8-3:09 ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE A PUBLIC SERVANT

People v. Riley, 2015 COA 152, ¶ 29, 380 P.3d 157, 164 (“There is no criminal offense in Colorado law of ‘influencing a public servant.’ It thus would be incorrect to define the term ‘attempt’ in the attempt to influence a public servant statute as ‘engag[ing] in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the offense’ of influencing a public servant. If the term ‘attempt’ in section 18-8-306 were to be defined by reference to section 18-2-101, the term would have to be defined as ‘engag[ing] in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the offense’ of attempt to influence a public servant. This construction makes no sense” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).

People v. Sena, 2016 COA 161, ¶ 12, 395 P.3d 1148, 1151 (“The plain language of the statute reveals that a police officer, as an employee of the government, is a public servant.”).

**9-2:01 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (PROHIBITED ACTS) and 9-2:04
AGGRAVATED CRUELTY TO ANIMALS**

People v. Harris, 2016 COA 159, ¶¶ 96, 99, __ P.3d __ (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred when it failed to define the terms “needlessly killed,” “proper protection from weather conditions,” “proper drink,” “proper food,” and “necessary sustenance,” and holding instead that “all of the undefined terms are common words the jury was capable of understanding, and there is no indication that the jury was confused by these terms”).

12-1:01 POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON

People v. Sandoval, 2016 COA 14, ¶ 25, __ P.3d __ (“We conclude that article II, section 13 [of the Colorado Constitution] does not protect an individual’s right to possess a short shotgun for self-defense because the state’s prohibition of short shotguns is a reasonable exercise of its police power.”).

12-1:16 POSSESSION OF A WEAPON BY A PREVIOUS OFFENDER

People in the Interest of A.B., 2016 COA 170, ¶ 54, __ P.3d __ (“[B]ecause the plain language of section 18-12-108(3) refers only to a prior ‘adjudication,’ the prosecutor’s evidence of [the juvenile’s] deferred adjudication did not prove his adjudication under this section.”).

**18:43.INT ANY FELONY CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE CONVICTION UNDER
PART 4—INTERROGATORY (DEADLY WEAPON OR FIREARM)**

People v. Cisneros, 2014 COA 49, ¶ 51, 356 P.3d 877, 890 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the defendant’s tendered instruction concerning the constitutional right to bear arms because, “[e]ven if the use of the gun for self-defense would ordinarily be constitutionally protected, the simultaneous use of the gun to protect drugs is punishable through an enhanced sentence for drug possession with the intent to distribute”). [Note: The events of this case occurred prior to the 2010 recodification, at a time when the relevant provision was located in section 18-18-407(1)(f).]

42:04.SP DRIVING UNDER RESTRAINT—SPECIAL INSTRUCTION (NOTICE)

People v. Boulden, 2016 COA 109, ¶¶ 16–17, 381 P.3d 454, 457 (“[T]he only evidence in the record of this case bearing on the driving under restraint charge is (1) the driving record, indicating only that defendant’s license had been suspended on September 9, 2013, and not reinstated; and (2) the verification of mailing, showing that a single notice of that suspension had been mailed to his last known address on file. The prosecution presented no evidence that defendant had ever seen or was aware of either document or of the suspension of his license. Accordingly . . . we conclude that no reasonable jury could have found that the prosecution proved the knowledge element of driving under restraint.”).

42:05 DRIVING AFTER REVOCATION PROHIBITED and 42:09 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE

People v. Valdez, 2014 COA 125, ¶ 23 & n.1, __ P.3d __ (“[T]he instruction set forth in [*People v. VanMatre*, 190 P.3d 770 (Colo. App. 2008),] involves an element-negating traverse because, if a defendant establishes that a ‘vehicle may not have been reasonably capable of being operable,’ such evidence would necessarily negate the required elements of ‘driving’ and ‘operating’ a vehicle. [Footnote:] Although the newly promulgated criminal jury instructions for DUI and DARP cite to *VanMatre* in the comments, those comments do not address whether the *VanMatre* instruction is an element-negati[ng] traverse. See COLJI—Crim. 42:05 cmt. 3(DUI), 42:05 cmt. 4 (DARP) (2014).”).

IV. Non-Final Decisions of the Colorado Court of Appeals

E:11 SERIES OF ACTS IN A SINGLE COUNT

People v. Vigil, 2015 COA 88M, ¶ 44, __ P.3d __ (“Because the prosecution presented a single theory of burglary, the jury was not required to unanimously agree on *which* building was burglarized. Instead, the jury only needed to agree that [the defendant] burglarized a building on the charged date at the charged place.”).

Status: Petition for certiorari granted on other grounds. Oral arguments not scheduled as of 11/1/17.

E:20 INSTRUCTION TO DISCHARGED EXTRA JUROR(S)

People v. Riley, 2016 COA 76, ¶ 33, __ P.3d __ (“[T]he presence of other persons, including alternate jurors, in final deliberations is improper.”).

Status: Petition for certiorari pending as of 11/1/17.

F:128 (DEFINING “EROTIC NUILITY”)

People in the Interest of T.B., 2016 COA 151M, ¶¶ 30, 34, __ P.3d __ (rejecting the defendant’s contention that “the reference to ‘persons involved’ in the definition of erotic nudity necessarily means the people who are displayed in the photograph,” and holding instead that, where the defendant encouraged girls to send him sexually suggestive pictures of themselves, “the overt sexual gratification was of the [defendant], who repeatedly asked the girls for the photographs after sending them a picture of his erect penis” (quoting *People v. Batchelor*, 800 P.2d 599, 604 (Colo. 1990))).

Status: Petition for certiorari granted. Oral arguments not scheduled as of 11/1/17.

F:242 (DEFINING “NOTICE”)

People v. Patton, 2016 COA 187, ¶ 13, __ P.3d __ (“We conclude that [section 18-5-702(2)] does not require notice only in person or in writing, because the word ‘includes’ is a word that is meant to extend rather than limit.”).

Status: Petition for certiorari pending as of 11/1/17.

G2:05 (CONSPIRACY)

People v. Davis, 2017 COA 40M, ¶¶ 15, 21, __ P.3d __ (“[C]ommitting a number of crimes, or engaging in a number of noncriminal overt acts, does not necessarily mean there is more than one conspiracy. . . . Though the prosecution alleged numerous overt acts in furtherance of the single conspiracy, that did not require unanimous agreement by the jurors as to the precise overt act [the] defendant committed.”).

Status: Petition for certiorari pending as of 11/1/17.

**H:11 USE OF NON-DEADLY PHYSICAL FORCE (DEFENSE OF PERSON) and
H:12 USE OF DEADLY PHYSICAL FORCE (DEFENSE OF PERSON)**

People v. Castillo, 2014 COA 140, ¶ 32, __ P.3d __ (“[W]e agree with the rationale of [*People v. Manzanares*, 942 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Colo. App. 1996)] and hold that unless a defendant demonstrates the required level of prejudice under a harmless error or plain error standard, the giving of an unsupported instruction on a self-defense exception does not necessarily warrant reversal.

To the extent that [*People v. Silva*, 987 P.2d 909, 914 (Colo. App. 1999)] and [*People v. Beasley*, 778 P.2d 304, 305-06 (Colo. App. 1989)] are inconsistent with this holding, we decline to follow them.”). See also *id.* at ¶ 45 n.3 (“The latest version of the Colorado pattern criminal jury instructions, which was not available at the time of the trial in this case, more explicitly instructs the jury that the jury’s determinations regarding the exceptions to self-defense must be made beyond a reasonable doubt by including language that the prosecution must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not provoke the use of unlawful physical force by the other person and the defendant was not the initial aggressor. COLJI-Crim. H:11, H:12 (2014).”).

Status: Petition for certiorari granted. Oral arguments not scheduled as of 11/1/17.

People v. DeGreat, 2015 COA 101, ¶ 15, __ P.3d __ (holding that, where the defendant was charged with attempted murder, first-degree assault, and aggravated robbery, he was entitled to a self-defense instruction on the aggravated robbery charge as well as the other charges because “the robbery was intertwined with the assault” and that, “under these facts, it is illogical to allow self-defense as an affirmative defense to some of the general intent crimes, but not all of them”).

Status: Petition for certiorari granted. Oral arguments not scheduled as of 11/1/17.

People v. Tardif, 2017 COA 136, ¶¶ 38, 40–41, __ P.3d __ (holding that (1) because “none of the elements of conspiracy require the use of physical force,” self-defense is not an affirmative defense to conspiracy, and (2) “[b]ecause deadly physical force requires death,” the trial court erred when it instructed the jury “on when deadly physical force may be used in self-defense” where the victim did not die).

Status: Mandate not issued as of 11/1/17.

H:76 DRIVING WITH EXCESSIVE ALCOHOL CONTENT—SUBSEQUENT CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL

People v. Jacobson, 2017 COA 92, ¶¶ 18, 21–22, __ P.3d __ (noting that “the statutory characterization of ‘an affirmative defense’ is not dispositive,” and holding that even though subsequent consumption is defined as an affirmative defense by statute, “an affirmative defense instruction need not be given where the defense is only an element-negating traverse”).

Status: Mandate not issued as of 11/1/17.

3-1:04 MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE (EXTREME INDIFFERENCE)

People v. Anderson, 2016 COA 47, ¶ 38, __ P.3d __ (“[T]he words ‘a person or persons’ indicate that the defendant may target a particular person or persons. The statute still requires that the defendant exhibit an attitude of universal malice manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life generally, which requires more than one person to be placed at risk by the defendant’s conduct.”).

Status: Petition for certiorari granted. Oral arguments not scheduled as of 11/1/17.

3-1:07 MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE

People v. Archuleta, 2017 COA 9, ¶¶ 40, 45, __ P.3d __ (holding that the trial court did not misstate the law when, in defining “cause” in the context of causing another’s death, it provided that “a defendant must take his victim as he finds him, and it is no defense that the victim was suffering from preexisting physical ailments, illnesses, injuries, conditions or infirmities”).

Status: Petition for certiorari pending as of 11/1/17.

3-1:08.INT MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE—INTERROGATORY (PROVOKED AND SUDDEN HEAT OF PASSION) and 3-2:07.INT ASSAULT IN THE FIRST DEGREE—INTERROGATORY (PROVOKED AND SUDDEN HEAT OF PASSION)

People v. Tardif, 2017 COA 136, ¶¶ 20, 24–25, __ P.3d __ (holding that (1) where the defendant testified that he “didn’t really process anything” but “just more or less acted” in shooting the victim, the evidence supported giving the heat of passion instruction, and (2) the trial court reversibly erred when it “did not properly instruct the jury on the prosecution’s burden to prove the absence of heat of passion provocation beyond a reasonable doubt”).

Status: Mandate not issued as of 11/1/17.

3-2:02 ASSAULT IN THE FIRST DEGREE (PERMANENT DISFIGUREMENT)

People v. Archuleta, 2017 COA 9, ¶¶ 51, 56, __ P.3d __ (holding that, where the trial court did not offset the mental state of “with intent,” any error was not obvious).

Status: Petition for certiorari pending as of 11/1/17.

3-3:05 SECOND DEGREE KIDNAPPING (SEIZED AND CARRIED)

People v. Bondsteel, 2015 COA 165, ¶ 116, __ P.3d __ (“[I]n response to the jury’s question, the trial court properly declined to define “seized and carried” as requiring proof of an increased risk of harm. The division in [*People v. Rogers*, 220 P.3d 931, 936 (Colo. App. 2008)], concluded that defining ‘seizing and carrying’ as ‘any movement, however short in distance’ was not plain error. The trial court’s definition of ‘seized and carried’ in Bondsteel’s case tracked the *Rogers* language.”).

Status: Petition for certiorari granted on other grounds. Oral arguments not scheduled as of 11/1/17.

3-4:01 SEXUAL ASSAULT (SUBMISSION AGAINST WILL)

People v. Garcia, 2017 COA 1, ¶¶ 10–11, __ P.3d __ (“Garcia raises a fair point that offsetting ‘knowingly’ in the jury instructions effectively demonstrates that it applies to every element of the offense. The current Colorado Model Jury Instructions indeed offset ‘knowingly’ as a separate element to indicate that it applies to every other element of the offense. However, the Colorado Model Jury Instructions applicable at the time of Garcia’s trial did not offset ‘knowingly’ from the other elements of the offense. . . . Considering those model jury instructions, we conclude that any error in the jury instructions not defining ‘knowingly’ as a separate element of the offense was not obvious.” (citation omitted)).

Status: Petition for certiorari granted. Oral arguments not scheduled as of 11/1/17.

3-4:25 UNLAWFUL SEXUAL CONTACT (TREATMENT OR EXAMINATION)

People v. McCoy, 2015 COA 76, ¶ 46, __ P.3d __ (“[S]ection 18-3-404(1)(g) is not limited to conduct that occurs within a physician-patient relationship, or to conduct that occurs during medical treatment or a medical examination . . .”).

Status: Petition for certiorari granted. Oral arguments not scheduled as of 11/1/17.

4-1:01 FIRST DEGREE ARSON and 4-5:01 CRIMINAL MISCHIEF

People v. Welborne, 2017 COA 105, ¶ 59, __ P.3d __ (holding that criminal mischief is not a lesser-included offense of first-degree arson).

Status: Mandate not issued as of 11/1/17.

4-2:01 FIRST DEGREE BURGLARY

People v. Howard-Walker, 2017 COA 81, ¶ 109, __ P.3d __ (holding that the trial court’s failure to “identify the underlying crime or define its elements” was not plain error).

Status: Mandate not issued as of 11/1/17.

4-3:01 ROBBERY and 4-4:01 THEFT (INTENT TO PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE)

People v. Delgado, 2016 COA 174, ¶ 17, __ P.3d __ (holding that “the force elements of robbery and theft from the person of another negate each other and, thus, guilty verdicts on both are legally and logically inconsistent”).

Status: Petition for certiorari pending as of 11/1/17.

4-4:14 THEFT (MULTIPLE THEFTS; AGGREGATED AND CHARGED IN THE SAME COUNT)

People v. Ramos, 2017 COA 100, ¶ 18, __ P.3d __ (citing the Committee’s instruction, and concluding that “if the prosecution fails to prove that the defendant committed all ‘the thefts so aggregated and charged,’ it has not met its burden of proving every element of the ‘single offense’ created by section 18-4-401(4)(a)”).

Status: Mandate not issued as of 11/1/17.

4-4:19 AGGRAVATED MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT IN THE FIRST DEGREE (RETAINED)

People v. Stellabotte, 2016 COA 106, ¶¶ 25, 32, __ P.3d __ (approving of the trial court’s instructions where “knowingly” was set off from the remaining elements, and holding that the court did not abuse its discretion when providing the jury with a dictionary definition of “authorization”).

Status: Petition for certiorari granted on other grounds. Oral arguments not scheduled as of 11/1/17.

**5-1:03 FORGERY (LEGAL RIGHT, INTEREST, OBLIGATION, OR STATUS)
and 5-1:10 SECOND DEGREE FORGERY**

People v. Hoggard, 2017 COA 88, ¶ 32, __ P.3d __ (holding that second-degree forgery is a lesser included offense of felony forgery).

Status: Petition for certiorari pending as of 11/1/17.

5-1:04 FORGERY (PUBLIC RECORD OR INSTRUMENT)

People v. Carian, 2017 COA 106, ¶ 26, __ P.3d __ (“[U]nder subsection (1)(d), ‘filed or required by law to be filed or legally fileable in or with a public office or public servant’ refers to those instruments actually delivered to a public office or public servant pursuant to a legal mandate, such as documents that have a specific legal requirement of delivery to a public officer or with a public office for a specific purpose, like income taxes or license applications.”).

Status: Mandate not issued as of 11/1/17.

6-4:01 CHILD ABUSE (KNOWINGLY OR RECKLESSLY)

People v. Friend, 2014 COA 123M, ¶¶ 62–63, __ P.3d __ (holding that, because section 18-6-401 “is structured to set forth a disjunctive series of acts in an extended single sentence, without any attempt to differentiate them by name or an organizational device . . . the child abuse statute is similar to the one interpreted in [*People v. Abiodun*, 111 P.3d 462 (Colo. 2005), where] the court held that a series of acts, with reference to the same controlled substance and governed by a common mens rea, that included acts that were not mutually exclusive but rather overlapping, constituted different ways of committing a single offense”).

Status: Petition for certiorari granted. Oral arguments not scheduled as of 11/1/17.

**6-4:17 SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF A CHILD (EXPLICIT SEXUAL CONDUCT
FOR SEXUALLY EXPLOITATIVE MATERIAL)**

People in the Interest of T.B., 2016 COA 151M, ¶ 41, __ P.3d __ (“The plain and ordinary meaning of ‘sexually exploitative material’ does not require depictions of sexual abuse of a child.”).

Status: Petition for certiorari granted. Oral arguments not scheduled as of 11/1/17.

6-8:02 VIOLATION OF A PROTECTION ORDER (PROHIBITED CONDUCT)

People v. L.C., 2017 COA 82, ¶ 37, __ P.3d __ (“By using the disjunctive ‘or’ in section 18-6-803.5(1)(a), the General Assembly intended to describe alternative ways of committing the offense of violation of a protective order. Thus, violation of a protective order does not in every instance require proof that the accused contacted the protected person.” (citations omitted)).

Status: Petition for certiorari pending as of 11/1/17.

8-3:09 ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE A PUBLIC SERVANT

People v. Hoggard, 2017 COA 88, ¶¶ 40, 46, __ P.3d __ (holding that “the mens rea requirement of ‘intent’ applies to each element of the offense,” meaning the trial court erred when it listed “with the intent” after the elements of “attempted to influence a public servant” and “by means of deceit”).

Status: Petition for certiorari pending as of 11/1/17.

8-4:12 EMBEZZLEMENT OF PUBLIC PROPERTY

People v. Berry, 2017 COA 65, ¶ 30, __ P.3d __ (holding that “‘public moneys or public property’ in section 18-8-407 means (and is limited to) money or property owned by the public (i.e., the state or one of its political subdivisions)”).

Status: Petition for certiorari pending as of 11/1/17.

8-7:08 RETALIATION AGAINST A WITNESS OR VICTIM

People v. Johnson, 2017 COA 11, ¶ 30, __ P.3d __ (“[W]e conclude that section 18-8-706 applies only to retaliation against witnesses or victims because of their relationship to criminal, and not civil, proceedings.”).

Status: Petition for certiorari pending as of 11/1/17.

8-7:10 TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS OR VICTIM (TESTIMONY)

People v. Brooks, 2017 COA 80, ¶ 14, __ P.3d __ (“[T]he concept of attempt is built into the tampering statute—the crime is completed when a defendant ‘intentionally attempts’ to tamper with a victim or witness. . . . We conclude

that no [crime for attempted tampering] exists because it would be illogical to recognize a crime premised on an attempt to attempt”).

Status: Mandate not issued as of 11/1/17.

9-1:10 DISORDERLY CONDUCT (COARSE AND OBVIOUSLY OFFENSIVE)

People in the Interest of R.C., 2016 COA 166, ¶¶ 3, 18, __ P.3d __ (The First Amendment bars the prosecution of a middle school student who drew a picture of an ejaculating penis on the mouth of a classmate’s photo and then showed the drawing to others. “[T]he doctored photo [did not] tend[] to incite an immediate breach of the peace,” as “speech that embarrasses or disgraces another is insufficient to qualify as fighting words. Even vulgar and insulting speech that is likely to arouse animosity or inflame anger, or even to provoke a forceful response from the other person, is not prohibited.”).

Status: Petition for certiorari pending as of 11/1/17.

9-1:36 HARASSMENT (COMMUNICATION)

People in the Interest of R.D., 2016 COA 186, ¶¶ 11, 20, __ P.3d __ (holding that the harassment statute was unconstitutional as applied because (1) “[w]hile the language of [the defendant’s] Tweets was violent and explicit, the context in which the statements were made mitigated their tone,” meaning they were not true threats, and (2) “because [the defendant] was not in close physical proximity to [the recipient] at the time of the incident, his Tweets could not have constituted fighting words”).

Status: Petition for certiorari granted. Oral arguments not scheduled as of 11/1/17.

12-1:05 UNLAWFULLY CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON (KNIFE)

People v. L.C., 2017 COA 82, ¶ 26, __ P.3d __ (“[B]y its plain meaning, ‘about’ necessarily enlarges the area in which a weapon may be concealed, encompassing a space close to, even if not directly on, the person.”).

Status: Petition for certiorari pending as of 11/1/17.

**18:01 UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE and
18:57 UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION OF A PRESCRIBED OR DISPENSED
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE**

People v. Gonzales, 2017 COA 62, ¶ 15, __ P.3d __ (“[W]e are unpersuaded that section 18-18-413 is an affirmative defense to section 18-18-403.5. Rather, section 18-18-413 is itself a separate offense, and the exception for ‘a person acting at the direction of the legal owner of the controlled substance’ is an element the prosecution must disprove when charging someone with a violation of that section.”).

Status: Mandate not issued as of 11/1/17.