

Colorado Courthouse Security Resource Guide

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Preface

Beginning in 2002, the State Court Administrator's Office (SCAO) has undertaken a broad review of court security and preparedness issues on behalf of the Colorado Court system. A major goal of these efforts has been to promote cooperation and communication among the courts, court staff, county officials, and law enforcement, recognizing their respective roles in assuring that courts are safe and prepared for potential disruptions in their daily operations.

This *Resource Guide* is intended to be part of a flexible framework to guide courts' participation in county-level efforts regarding court security and preparedness. It has been written in full recognition of the diverse needs and circumstances that exist in counties across Colorado. Its purpose is to equip judges, law enforcement, county commissioners, court administrators, clerks of court, and other local officials with information that will help them customize comprehensive safety and security plans for their courts.

The material contained in this Resource Guide is intended to foster a positive and responsive dialogue between the courts and their partners in the other branches of government. The Resource Guide is also a valuable tool and resource. While it is not intended to circumvent existing policies and the processes by which they have been adopted, the Resource Guide does offer information that will help county policy makers customize comprehensive safety, security and preparedness policies and procedures for courts and guide court officials in their participation in such policies' creation.

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Introduction

Courthouse security is a fundamental court management activity for judges and court administrators. Every judge and employee of the Judicial Branch of government in Colorado has a role in assuring that the public is safe and secure at our courthouses. Further, courthouse security must serve the objectives of the judicial process, not dominate them. It is imperative that the people see courthouses in Colorado as places where problems are resolved. The court system can ill afford to convey a message of fear from fortress-like facilities. In every chapter this Resource Guide stresses personal responsibility and awareness. Sound perimeter screening, up-to-date security technology, and proper and effective security design of courthouses all contribute substantially to the safety of persons within the courthouse. However, this issue is significantly and critically a people issue. Everyone who works at a courthouse must know without exception their daily responsibility to the public and themselves.

To help counties develop and maintain a comprehensive courthouse security program, the *Colorado Courthouse Security Resource Guide* contains both general and specific information on a number of areas believed essential to establishing a model court security program. It is meant to be used by court security committees to enhance court security.

The Colorado Courthouse Security Resource Guide was written by a group of individuals knowledgeable about and concerned with courthouse security. It was written with an understanding that all of the Courthouses across Colorado are unique in their structure and that each locale has varying degrees of financial resources, and manpower available, and community priorities to maintain accessibility. With this in mind, this Resource Guide was drafted in an effort to provoke thought in those who are also interested in and concerned about courthouse security. The Resource Guide is not nor should it be considered a mandatory set of procedures. Rather, the Resource Guide should be used as a resource by those local county commissioners, law enforcement agencies, and courthouse staff members who desire to implement any portion contained therein.”

Effective courthouse security requires a strong partnership between the courts and law enforcement. It is incumbent upon state and local government to implement these practical standards for a safe and secure courthouse environment for the public, employees, and officials, and to augment this collaborative effort by involving the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government.

Specific security requirements inevitably will vary from location to location due to local conditions and changing circumstances. This Resource Guide is designed to enumerate options that are available to all courthouses without prescribing a particular security solution for any individual county’s courthouse. Ultimately, judges, court staff, and law enforcement officials serve as the protectors of citizens who use our court system.

Chapter 1: Mission

A fundamental principle in the development of any court security program is that all actions taken are designed to achieve deterrence, detection, and prevention. These actions are designed to reduce the opportunity for individuals to commit crimes within a courthouse or on courthouse grounds.

Unlike traditional law enforcement, which can be classified as *re-active*, court security should be considered a *proactive* measure. This means that court security is driven by the elements of deterring and preventing criminal and/or prohibited incidents. A court security program that effectively utilizes *pro-active* measures will undoubtedly realize a substantial increase in both security and safety levels.

The objectives of deterrence, prevention, and detection can be met by:

- involving key individuals in security planning;
- determining appropriate basic responses (which should take the form of official policies and procedures); and
- routine training for all personnel.

Court security plans should also take into consideration reasonableness and resource realities. Thus the court security mission statement for the Colorado Court System is to:

Provide reasonable safety and security for the public, victims, witnesses, jurors, and litigants, as well as for county offices, court staff, and judges.

Management

Being responsible for courthouse security requires a thorough understanding of the inter-relationships, effects, and societal impacts of the following:

- implementing a security program;
- reviewing site-specific factors with an emphasis on the elements of reasonableness and practicality;
- considering security and safety vulnerabilities addressed in facility surveys and threat and risk assessments; and
- addressing issues brought forward by court security committees.

Court Security & Facilities Committees

When implementing a courthouse security plan, a court security and facilities committee should determine the reasonable and practical safety and security needs of the facility, based on facility surveys, risk assessments, financial ability, and community desires to retain accessibility. To develop and maintain a comprehensive courthouse security plan, a county/courts facility should establish a court security and facilities committee. Local court security committees should be composed of, at a minimum:

- the presiding judge judge;
- the chairperson of the county commission;
- the county sheriff; and
- the district administrator.

The committee may add members as local conditions warrant. By convening an inter-disciplinary committee, response procedures for both routine and emergency situations may reflect each agency's needs and can be consistently communicated to all staff, not just court security personnel.

The responsibilities of the committee should include but are not limited to:

- develop security policies and procedures;
- develop and deliver routine site appropriate security awareness training; and
- assure the proper dissemination of court security information.

Chapter 2: The Courthouse

A thorough understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the courthouse is necessary in order to develop and manage a comprehensive courthouse safety and security plan. A physical security survey or assessment is often used to develop this information. An example of a physical security survey appears in Appendix A.

Effective Perimeter Screening is the Foundation

One key factor to improve courthouse physical security is an effective perimeter security system. When physical security assessments are conducted it should be remembered that the weakest part of a physical security system is as strong as the overall security program will be until improvements are made.

Ideally, the physical security survey should be conducted by a team comprised of employees and individuals with expertise in the fields of physical security, court policies, risk and safety, and facilities management. The process should be a collaborative effort by team members and should focus on the following:

- **Protecting People.** The most valuable resources within a courthouse are people. The judicial system must also be concerned about the safety of the public. It is critical that the public be kept advised of the court system's plans to make them safe at any court facility.
- **Protecting Property.** The judicial system's buildings and equipment represent a major investment. The judicial system must consider how different emergency or disaster scenarios could potentially render these buildings and equipment wholly or partially unusable. Have arrangements been made to conduct business at an alternative site? Who will decide if damaged equipment will be repaired or replaced?
- **Protecting Information.** Record keeping is a central function of any court. The information maintained by the courts is critical to the functioning of an orderly society. Courts must maintain the ability to restore information while simultaneously creating new records as part of any disaster recovery plan.

Protecting People

With regard to personal safety, courthouse safety and security efforts have typically focused on protecting judges and controlling prisoners who are appearing in court for trial. The concern must be much broader. Every individual who has business before a court, whether voluntarily or under court order, is entitled to feel safe. The courthouse must be a safe place for litigants and their families, jurors, witnesses, victims of crime, and the general public to conduct their business.

Protecting Property

Protecting the court system and assuring its viability involves two interrelated but separate concepts: *court system safety* and *court system security*. Safety refers to protection of persons from injury or loss. Security refers to the ability to maintain business continuity. Both require two types of planning: *emergency planning* and *contingency planning*. Emergency planning means being prepared to take immediate action due to a traumatic event. It is aimed at stabilizing the situation to mitigate damage. Contingency planning means having options for different possible

future events. It is aimed at moving forward once things have been stabilized. Specific security needs inevitably will vary from location to location due to local conditions and changing circumstances.

Protecting Information

The goal of emergency preparation and continuity of operations planning to protect information is to provide facilities with procedures to continue system operations as soon as possible after normal operations are interrupted. Most courts depend heavily on technology and automated systems, and their disruption for even a few days could cause severe financial loss and threaten the fundamental mission of the courts. The continued operations of the court system depend upon the development of a plan to minimize disruptions of critical functions and the capability to recover operations expediently and successfully.

Chapter 3: Daily Security Procedures

Every judge and employee of the court system **must** adhere to the security policies and procedures in place at their courthouse. Judges and court staff should be overly familiar with specific features of the daily activities undertaken to prevent injury or damage to property. This chapter identifies recommendations and considerations for the handling of mail, visitor screening, trial security, juror safety, prisoner security, and other routine tasks.

Security Screening

Courthouses are commonly perceived as having a high potential for acts of violence, therefore, consideration should be given to establishing a “clean environment” (the level of which should be ultimately decided by the local security committee). The term clean environment has a twofold meaning: first, no visitor or employee is allowed in the courthouse with a firearm (which may include plainclothes and uniformed officers, but should exclude court security officers) and second, every visitor and employee should be screened before entering the building interior (may exclude judges if they use the entrance designated for their use). The rationale for a clean environment is that employees and visitors entering a courthouse (including police officers, attorneys, and other officers of the court) are still people with human frailties that are subject to varying degrees of stress. Depending on the individual capacity to cope with stress, which is variable, stress can cause one person to respond with behavior that eclipses expected professional conduct, while another is able to maintain his or her composure and resist an irrational response. With a reasonably clean environment, the availability of lethal weapons to persons experiencing irrational behavior is largely eliminated.

Security personnel assigned to a security screening system and all court security officers should be trained and certified on specific screening aspects. To counter the significant factors and limits of fatigue, complacency, and patience, schedules for court security officers should be carefully thought out.

Court security officer demeanor at all screening locations should be highly professional at all times.

- Officers will be aware of activities occurring adjacent to the screening location. The screening location should be situated, to the extent possible, to provide personnel with unobstructed sight lines (assessment and reactionary zones) of persons entering the building/area. This gives personnel an opportunity to observe, assess, and appropriately respond to a suspicious person(s) exhibiting threatening behavioral characteristics prior to their actually being screened.
- Screening operations and general explanations of policies and procedures required to facilitate screening should be done courteously but firmly. Any requests for further detailed information should be directed to the attention of the sheriff or security director, or his/her designee. Court security officers should not state their professional or personal opinions on the courts, sheriff's or security department's policies and procedures to any member of the public, media, or government.

Types of Screening Equipment

Fluoroscopes (x-ray machines): All fluoroscopes should be tested and calibrated each day. Brightness and contrast controls should also be adjusted on a daily basis.

Deliveries should be screened: Court security committees should adopt policies to discourage the delivery of non-court business packages to the courthouse. All packages brought in by the public, couriers, and special delivery personnel be thoroughly screened (x-ray, metal detector, and/or visual inspection) by court security officer personnel. Even if a delivery person is known to a court security officer and has been arriving at the courthouse at the same time with the exact same delivery for years, the individual and the packages should be screened. This includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- purses
- backpacks
- briefcases
- bags
- boxes
- laptop computers
- CD/cassette players
- cellular telephones
- pagers
- radios

Walk-Thru Metal Detectors (magnetometers): Magnetometers are designed to detect those objects consisting entirely or partially of metal which persons may be carrying. As a general practice, persons will be asked to empty their pockets prior to passing through the magnetometer. If the magnetometer alarm is triggered, the person will be required to pass through for a second time. If the alarm continues after a person has passed through for a second time, the hand-held metal detector should be used to determine the source of the alarm. If anyone refuses to allow the search of their belongings and/or pass through security screening, they should be denied entrance into the courthouse.

Exterior Security Systems

In most cases, active barriers are hydraulically operated devices that are designed to stop a vehicle from penetrating an entrance. They can be of a bollard-type construction, surface mounted, or wedge-type. Courthouse barrier specification levels should be able to stop a 4,000-pound vehicle traveling at 30 miles per hour.

Passive barriers are fixed-in-place and designed to restrict vehicles or pedestrian access in close proximity to the courthouse. Typical structures include concrete planters, bollards, and fences. When possible, a minimum setback of 50 feet should be maintained. For new courthouse design and construction, a setback of 100 feet is recommended as a standard. Passive barriers can be counted or measured in linear feet for fences or quantities for bollards or planters.

Entrances & Exits

The number of public entrances to courthouses should be kept to the minimum number practical to provide for court and other government operations. A single entrance is preferred.

Considerations include, but are not limited to, the following:

- security Screening Systems
- mail and delivery screening programs;
- door locking hardware;
- intrusion-detection systems;

- controlled-access systems;
- ADA requirements;
- life safety regulations;
- courthouse historical design features; (see Chapter 10)
- courthouse and agency operations;
- demonstrations;
- building management;
- civil disturbances, protests;
- judicial and employee entrances and exits;
- courthouse security personnel;
- threat and risk assessments;
- high-threat/profile trials criminal statistics; and
- building signs and directories

Discovered Weapons

Following are **suggested** procedures to be followed upon the discovery of weapons during screening:

Firearms: When a firearm is detected and the person carrying the firearms does not have a recognized permit to carry, the weapon should be immediately seized and the suspect detained. Court security officers will then contact their supervisor and promptly and securely bring the suspect and firearm to the sheriff's or security office for appropriate disposition.

Knives and other dangerous weapons: Knives and other dangerous instruments shall not be allowed into courthouses.

Switchblades and spring-loaded knives: Such weapons should be seized immediately regardless of blade length. Court security officers will then contact their supervisor and promptly and securely bring the weapon to the sheriff's office.

Signage

When security-screening equipment is to be used appropriate signage should be placed in public locations, starting in parking areas stating that persons entering the courthouse are subject to search. This signage should be developed and presented in a manner that assures that this warning is accessible and understood by all persons entering the courthouse (i.e. Braille and foreign languages). This signage should be prominently displayed in all public areas of the courthouse. Additionally, signs should be placed at each courthouse entrance that state:

“Weapons of any type are prohibited in this courthouse without the prior approval of this court and sheriff’s office. Violators will be subject to immediate arrest.”

Duress Alarm Operation

Courthouse personnel should be overly familiar with duress alarm use or procedures, including the location of office and courthouse duress alarms, and with public, employee, and emergency entrances, exits, elevators, and stairwells. Duress alarms should be used whenever a situation has escalated to the point where the public or court staff feels threatened.

Mail Screening

Depending upon the available resources, a mail screening program should be implemented for courthouses. It is a current assumption that in a majority of Colorado courthouses fluoroscopes (x-ray machines) are not readily available to screen courthouse mail and deliveries. The following poster, available from the United States Postal Service, should be placed in all locations where mail is received or packages are delivered.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

SUSPICIOUS MAIL ALERT

If you receive a suspicious letter or package:

1 Handle with care. Don't shake or bump.

2 Isolate it immediately

3 Don't open, smell, touch or taste.

4 Treat it as suspect. Call local law enforcement authorities

If a parcel is open and/or a threat is identified . . .

<p>For a Bomb: Evacuate Immediately Call Police Contact Postal Inspectors Call Local Fire Department/HAZMAT Unit</p>	<p>For Radiological: Limit Exposure - Don't Handle Evacuate Area Shield Yourself From Object Call Police Contact Postal Inspectors Call Local Fire Department/HAZMAT Unit</p>	<p>For Biological or Chemical: Isolate - Don't Handle Evacuate Immediate Area Wash Your Hands With Soap and Warm Water Call Police Contact Postal Inspectors Call Local Fire Department/HAZMAT Unit</p>
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Due consideration should also be given to having a central receiving mail station where agencies would pick up their mail. The main advantage to this is the person assigned to mail station duties could be thoroughly trained to identify and handle suspicious packages and letters. All suspicious mail should be given to the court security officer for inspection.

Daily Inspections of Buildings and Grounds is Critical

This is a key practice for every courthouse. It is a low cost way to greatly improve safety and security for the public and court staff. A security plan **should** include daily and weekly inspections of the interior and exterior of the building(s), as well as grounds and parking areas.

Court security officers should correct items discovered during roving patrols when that can easily be done. Court security supervisors should report all mechanical problems, unlocked utility closets, penthouse and roof access doors, system malfunctions, etc. to the attention of the sheriff or security director. Court security officers should question suspicious persons detected in secure or sensitive areas, as well as contractors not displaying recognized temporary building identification.

Perimeter: A thorough search of the courthouse exterior, to include all common areas, parking lots, landscaping, dumpsters, etc. Emergency exit and employee entrance doors should always be secured. Anything out of the ordinary should be directly reported to the court security supervisor for documentation and immediate notification to the sheriff or security director.

Courthouse Floors: A thorough search of each court floor and main public entrances should be conducted daily.

Garage Area: A thorough search of the courthouse garage area, if applicable, to include all common areas, doors, stairwells, elevator bays, etc. Employee entrance and judicial elevator doors should always be secured. Court security officers will maintain a visible position near the garage entrance when not actually engaged in garage roving duties.

Key Registration

Key entry including swipe card access into courthouses should be tightly controlled. All persons issued courthouse keys should be listed in documentation registers and noted in building contingency plans. Concentrated efforts should be made to confirm the return of these keys immediately upon the transfer, retirement, or termination of any courthouse employee.

Badging System

Local circumstances may necessitate that an employee identification or badging system be implemented for courthouse employees. Courthouse identification badges provide a uniform way to identify court employees and judicial officers. A distinct advantage of a badging system is that it is easy for the public to identify a courthouse employee who can assist them.

Reports & Record

Information regarding security incidents is required as part of the SCAO reporting requirement. SCAO distributes forms in January and July of each year to all county security and facilities committees for completion. Committees should develop a method, consistent with local procedures, to report all security incidents. The maintenance of logbooks will assist in providing an accurate report to the SCAO.

Firearms Policies

All local court security committees should take steps to reduce the number of firearms entering any court facility. If the local court security committee decides that law enforcement officers will be permitted to possess firearms in their court facilities they should develop a written policy as to whom, why, where, and how firearms may be carried by law enforcement officers in court facilities.

All non-law enforcement courthouse personnel, including judges and staff, should be strongly discouraged from bringing firearms into court facilities. It is further recommended that should judges decide to carry a firearm in a court facility that they be required to receive and verify that they have received adequate training in weapons handling and use.

No law enforcement officer should be permitted to carry a firearm while appearing at a court facility on their personal business, e.g., family case, lawsuit, protection from abuse hearing. This policy should be posted at all points of entry into the court facility.

Secured and Controlled Parking

The perimeter of the courthouse begins in the parking areas at or around the courthouse.

Where feasible, courthouse-assigned parking spaces may be both secured and controlled. If assigned parking spaces are designated, numeric plates should be used instead of titles and names. This will reduce opportunities for attacks targeted at an individual.

Secured parking: Security coverage based on an integrated system of closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras, panic or call stations, monitors, security personnel, intrusion detection devices, emergency and standard lighting, loop detectors, etc.

Controlled parking: Controlling access into the parking facility through space design and layout, door and stairwell locking hardware and contacts, passive and active vehicle and pedestrian ground barriers, card key access, etc. Contract parking can be considered an initial step in documenting and controlling access into a parking facility.

In order to reach the highest level of parking ramp security both secured and controlled parking considerations need to be implemented.

Open Courthouse Parking Lot Considerations

- Control access into the parking lot.
- Designate separate parking areas for the public.
- Assure that there is adequate lighting.
- Maintain the ability to provide security presence.
- Install site-appropriate security systems such as CCTV.
- Establish policies and procedures for the immediate removal of unauthorized vehicles.
- Promote employee security awareness.

Courthouse Adjacent Parking Considerations

Assessing the threat probability of an improvised explosive device (IED) or vehicle bomb and whether to restrict or eliminate street-side parking adjacent to the courthouse can be addressed by considering these questions:

- Should street-side parking be restricted?
- What is ultimately gained or lost by the elimination or continuance of street-side parking?
- Does the close proximity to parked vehicles to prisoner entrances/exits increase the real potential of prisoner escapes?
- Does contiguous street-side parking conceal criminal activity?
- Where are the secured parking areas of the facility, if any?
- Does the proximity of street-side parking provide an opportunity for planned attacks?
- How far is the courthouse offset from adjacent streets?
- Are there skyway and/or tunnel connections?

- Does the physical security survey support added security measures?
- Do after-hours security concerns for employees and the public increase with street-side parking?

Chapter 4: Procedures to Protect the Public and Court Staff

Court security officers or trained staff member should secure each courtroom prior to that day's proceedings and after court has adjourned for the day. A thorough check under benches, tables, and chairs is essential to securing each courtroom. There are a number of inspection mirrors that can speed up this activity. Courtrooms and adjacent offices or conference rooms should be locked when not in use.

Once any court proceeding begins, it is the court security officer's responsibility to assure courtroom decorum is being maintained. The court security officer will quickly address any disturbance from the gallery. Appropriate court security officer responses range from a simple warning, "Be Quiet," to requesting the offending person to please come with the court security officer into the hallway. This is done for two specific reasons:

- to allow the court security officer to fully explain why the person was removed from court. At this point, the person may either be allowed back into court or instructed he/she will not be allowed back in, without further disturbing the court.
- to avoid any potential confrontation from occurring in the courtroom if the person is being removed from the proceeding.

Court security officers will use discretion and professional familiarity with the presiding judicial officer prior when removing any person permanently from a courtroom. The sheriff or his/her designee will be immediately notified of any incident resulting in a person being removed or banned from a courtroom.

Juror, Witness, & Party Safety

The first contact most citizens have with the court is as a juror, witness, or party to a suit. The court can make this a positive experience by providing a safe and comfortable environment. This process begins with the first communication trial participants receive--the summons, subpoena, or trial setting document. This document should include a paragraph regarding parking instructions for jurors, special needs request they might have, and can include information on trial safety and courthouse security measures.

Threats to jurors, witnesses, or parties to a suit, especially in domestic matters, often occur in hallways before entering the court or during breaks. These threats can be eliminated, or greatly reduced, by providing separate areas for in-custody defendants, jurors, witnesses for prosecution, and defense witnesses. These areas should be carefully examined before use and kept locked when not in use.

Juror safety can also be assured by controlling access to the jury list and the information contained on the list.

Written instructions and training for handling juries, under normal circumstances and when sequestered, should be developed. These instructions should be available to court security officers, designated court staff, and judicial officers. If jurors need to be evacuated during a court session, the bailiff and or Clerk in charge of juror management in the courtroom should move them to a predetermined location where they should remain until ordered to return to the court or moved to another safe location. During this time, advise jurors not to discuss the case or speculate on why they were evacuated.

Courts that provide jurors with notebooks should consider the following information as part of the notebook. At a minimum the trial judge or court staff should verbally address these points during juror orientation:

- discuss general measures to ensure jury security;
- emergency evacuation routes and types of building alarms;
- who will direct jurors in an emergency situation;
- discuss how to proceed in the event of an illness or personal emergency; and
- discuss how to proceed in the event of bad weather or building closures.

The type of trial and the amount of publicity will dictate security considerations for jurors. Jurors should be kept out of public hallways and gathering areas to keep them separate from parties, witnesses, and the media. Jurors should be kept together and should take breaks in secure areas not accessible to the general public. Jurors should use secure hallways from the courtroom to the deliberation room. Jurors should never use a hallway that is in the process of being used for transporting prisoners or custodial witnesses. For trials where the threat level is greatest, personal escorts should be used to accompany jurors to and from their cars, or they should be escorted by van from a remote assembly site where they may park away from the courthouse and the media.

Injunction Hearings

A secure waiting room close to the courtroom where an injunction hearing will be held should be reserved for victims. This will reduce opportunities for contact between victims and respondents. Pre-hearing contact puts the petitioner at immediate risk of harm and increases the likelihood of violence after the hearing. Because numerous hearings are often scheduled for the same time, the protective resources of the court security officer may be stretched. Therefore, careful planning and management before the hearing will help prevent potential problems.

It is also important for the judicial officer to control the courtroom setting during an injunction hearing to prevent intimidation.

After an injunction hearing, the judge or commissioner should prevent the respondent from making any contact with the petitioner and alert the respondent that such contact is a violation of the restraining order. The respondent may also be instructed to remain in the courtroom for a set period of time to allow the petitioner to leave the courthouse first. A more costly alternative is to have the bailiff accompany the petitioner to his/her vehicle.

Prisoner Transportation and Security

Policies regarding where and when prisoner restraints are used in a courthouse should be jointly developed by the judge(s) and sheriff's department.

Prisoner movement within a courthouse requires communication and cooperation between the judge(s) and sheriff's department. Law enforcement officers assigned to control prisoners should not be armed when they are in a courtroom or holding cell area.

This lessens the possibility of a prisoner acquiring a firearm while being escorted by the deputy or during any type of disturbance or escape attempt. This allows efforts to be concentrated on regaining control of the prisoner, preventing the escape, curtailing the disturbance, etc.

Department determination will need to be made as to the "Intermediate Weapon" (i.e. stun gun, mace, baton, etc.) that may be issued to sheriff's deputies. Policies, guidelines, and training

governing the usage of the selected intermediate weapon will need to be implemented. (See Below)

The proper placement and positioning of sheriff's personnel in courtrooms is essential when securing prisoners. Considerable attention should be given to this integral component of prisoner security. Deputies assigned to secure prisoners should not only be positioned within direct proximity, but also between the prisoner and any potential target (i.e. escape routes and judges). This will allow personnel to intercept instead of reacting to and pursuing a prisoner's actions. Deputies shall use their own discretion in determining where their proper position is.

Placement of Weapons of Opportunity in the Courtroom

Weapons of opportunity can be found in any courtroom in any courthouse in America. Even the simplest of everyday objects can be turned into lethal weapons. The most important thing to do is to become aware of those items which may become weapons of opportunity and which may be used by someone who wishes to disrupt the proceedings, attempt retribution, effect an escape, or cause injury or death. The proper placement of objects in the courtroom can do more than anything else to minimize or eliminate the threat of their use as weapons of opportunity. Institute training in awareness of weapons of opportunity for all court staff.

Following is a list of common weapons of opportunity and recommendations for their safe use

Weapons of Opportunity	Recommendations for Safe Use
Judge's name plate	Make the judge's nameplate out of cardstock in a tent-fashion, as with seminar nameplates, or affix the nameplate in front of the bench so that it cannot be grabbed and used as a weapon.
Pencil or pen at counsel table	Replace the pen or pencil at counsel table for a criminal defendant with a golf pencil or a high-security pen—100% plastic, flexible construction, which uses water-based ink and contains no metal.
Judge's gavel	Move the gavel so that it is out of reach of someone standing nearby.
Staplers, Scissors, Letter Openers	Keep staplers, scissors, and letter openers in a drawer at all times while not in use.
Sign and holder on counsel table -"Do Not Place Briefcases on Table"	Remove any signs on counsel table. Once the suppression hearing or trial begins, everyone should know the rules about what is and is not permitted on counsel table. Use paper cups for water and keep the pitcher with the clerk so that it is not easily accessible.
Microphones	Install microphones so that they are a permanent fixture and cannot be moved and used as a club.
Microphone and electrical cords	Keep electrical cords concealed. If they must be exposed, consider taping them down with duct tape so that they cannot readily be grabbed to tie or strangle someone.
Large pointed objects such as clothes trees, flag pole eagles, and points	Keep clothes trees out of the well, away from the bar, and place flags behind the bench rather than between the witness stand and jury so that the flagpoles cannot be used as weapons.

Trial Risk Identification

By considering the type of trial and the individuals involved, it is possible to estimate the inherent risks associated with a particular court proceeding. This is done using a two-fold approach of assessment and investigation. The totality of the circumstances and local resources may determine whether these tasks are done concurrently or separately and by one person or a team of people.

For courts in Colorado, the greatest risks are posed by individuals with a grudge against the court system or government in general. These individuals often exhibit obsessive behavior about their cases.

High-Threat & High-Profile Trials

The sheriff's department should be immediately advised of any new arrest, preliminary hearing, and/or trial involving threat groups or any other proceeding that the Judicial Officer feels presents a risk of violence or other problems. This information is essential for preparation of security operational plans, judicial protection, and ensuring building security. Immediate notification allows the sheriff time to plan, gather intelligence, conduct threat and risk assessments, and consult with the judiciary. Law enforcement agencies should be contacted and their cooperation requested to provide the sheriff with timely notification and information on any arrest involving high-profile criminal and civil cases and the following identified threat groups:

- disgruntled litigants;
- prison gangs;
- political extremist groups; (domestic and foreign)
- drug cartels;
- biker gangs;
- street gangs; and
- organized crime.

Operational Plan

To prepare for a high-profile/threat trial, the sheriff's department should consider producing an operational plan that includes detailed information on policies and procedures, individual and team assignments, judicial directives, trial operations, prisoner operations, and emergency response procedures. The purpose of the plan is to provide all security personnel with specific information pertaining to a particular case or court proceeding. This operational plan shall be shared and provided to the presiding judicial officer. The following are suggested documents to include in an operational plan:

- threat source profile;
- threat analysis and assessment;
- intelligence and informational reports;
- daily activity log;
- weapons policy;
- less-than-lethal weapons policies and registers;
- key assignment log;
- media reports and news articles;
- copies of indictments, arrest and search warrants;
- prisoner processing forms and criminal histories;

- defendant photographs;
- area maps and courthouse floor plans;
- aerial photographs of courthouse and adjacent areas;
- primary and alternate prisoner transport routes;
- courtroom space design layout;
- courtroom video and audio recording capabilities and assignments;
- prisoner, media, and visitor courtroom seating assignments;
- key agency emergency contact list; and
- sheriff and court security officer post assignments.

High Threat/Profile Trial: Operational Plan Checklist			
TRIAL SUPERVISOR:		TRIAL DATE:	
V.		JUDGE:	
Judge's signature -		Sheriff's signature -	
INDIVIDUAL TRIAL ASSIGNMENTS	COMPLETED	PENDING	N/A
As Directed - Brief Sheriff and Chief Deputy on Trial Status and Operational Considerations			
Secure and Review all Trial Requests and Information			
Identify/State Trial Objectives - Providing Security Services			
Assess/State Scope of Trial - Significant Influencing Factors			
Identify Trial and Pretrial Prisoner Detention Facilities			
Specify Department and Other Agency Commitments			
List Trial Contacts (Judicial, Attorney, and Law Enforcement)			
Secure and Review Judicial Personnel Profile, Courthouse Contingency and Occupant Emergency Plans			
Review Previous High Threat/Profile Trial Plans			
Assign Personnel - Schedule Shift Assignments			
Conduct Threat and Risk Assessment(s)			
List Primary and Alternate Routes to Jails and Courthouse			
Confirm Separate Status for Defendants and Witnesses			
Determine Special Handling Requirements for Prisoners			
Assess, Propose and Establish Courtroom Seating Assignments and Requirements - Gallery / Well / Defendants			
Identify and List Special Trial Considerations			
Identify and List Trial Specific Emergency/Medical Contacts			
Secure and Review Trial Site Plans, Maps and Photographs			
Identify and List Trial Equipment Requirements			
Prepare High Threat/Profile Trial Operational Plan and Individual Trial Deputy Briefing Packets			
Special Protective Services for Judiciary			

Remove this page to make copies.

Submit to Sheriff and Chief Deputy for Review, Briefing, and Plan Authorization

Individual Roles & Responsibilities

It is important to carefully define the roles and responsibilities of the agencies and individuals participating in a high-risk trial. Following are outlines of assignments. All individuals should be instructed to fulfill these duties in accordance with the policies and procedures of the department's manual and the operational plan. Local conditions may dictate that certain individuals may perform more than one of the functions listed below.

Potential roles and responsibilities for sheriff's department, judge, and clerk of court:

Role	Person Responsible
Liaison to trial judge(s)	Sheriff or designee
Overall responsibility for trial security	Chief deputy sheriff/undersheriff or designee
Brief sheriff and serve as courtroom team leader as necessary	Supervisory deputy sheriff
Responsible for daily operation of operational plan	Deputy courtroom team leader
Overall responsibility for trial	Judge
Security of exhibits and court records	Clerk of court
Liaison to jurors	Jury bailiffs

Recommended Performance Guidelines for Assigned Court Security Officers

Deputies will report to the command post prior to the start of their scheduled shift assignment. The trial supervisor and/or respective team leaders will confirm duty assignments and brief personnel on a daily basis. The trial supervisor will immediately brief all assigned personnel of any changes made to the trial operational plan.

Personnel will remain on duty until properly relieved or instructed to secure their post assignment. At the conclusion of each day, all personnel will report to the command post for the daily debriefing. Specialized equipment will be signed out when scheduled shifts commence and signed back in when shift is completed. There will be no unnecessary display of firearms and/or intermediate weapons.

Trial personnel will either be on post, in the immediate area of the command post, or in designated areas of the courthouse. All other locations are to be authorized by the command post prior to any departure.

A daily activity log will be maintained in the command post for the review and recording of trial shift assignments, revisions, modifications, and operational incidents.

Command Post & Communications

The command post will serve as the central point of contact for the duration of the trial. It should be located in a department or courthouse office as designated by the sheriff.

Chapter 5: Courthouse Staff Security

Security and safety in the courthouse is a matter of taking a few simple steps on a daily basis. While the law enforcement side of court security is primarily the responsibility of the sheriff's department court staff and staff from other offices located in the courthouse play an important role in deterring, preventing, and detecting the occurrence of problem incidents. A major component of any security program is the realization that individuals must assume a degree of personal responsibility to ensure their own safety and security. This section reviews court security issues as they pertain to clerk of courts offices, other court offices, and other county agencies and departments whose offices are located in the same building as the circuit court.

Proper staffing and staff training are keys to a secure court facility. Security equipment is not a substitute for alert and observant staff. Alarm systems are only useful if staff knows how to use them, and a closed circuit camera is of little value if no one is available to monitor it and respond when necessary.

This chapter discusses methods for preventing and handling violence in the workplace and training courthouse staff to appropriately respond to potentially threatening situations. The information on pages may be distributed to all employees that work in a building that also houses circuit court offices and courtrooms.

The chapter concludes with suggestions on implementing an occupant emergency plan, which is intended to supplement the operational and contingency plans of the sheriff's department.

Prepare Staff for Safety & Security

For courthouse security programs to be successful, it is essential that they be supplemented with tabletop exercises, drills, and in-service training. For every potentially dangerous situation, employees should be overly familiar with what is required of them. This can be accomplished through:

- regular security awareness training;
- occupant emergency plans;
- fire/evacuation drills;
- informational bulletins;
- security pamphlets; and
- training videos.

Security bulletins and pamphlets should clearly identify appropriate actions for specific situations. For example, if a staff person notices an unfamiliar person lingering in the hallway for an extended period of time they may be instructed to contact the sheriff's department. All circumstances that present a potential danger should be linked to an appropriate action, as follows:

- no action required;
- report suspicious activities;
- duress alarm activation; and
- building evacuation.

It is recommended that pre-employment background investigations be conducted on courthouse custodial and maintenance staff personnel. They usually have unrestricted facility access and, appropriately, should undergo investigations similar to law enforcement officers. All courthouse contractors should be issued and identified by courthouse-specific identification cards. These “temporary credentials” are to be prominently displayed for easy recognition by the judiciary, courthouse employees, and security. Courts and counties should carefully consider the benefit of including photographs on temporary identification cards.

The following diagram identifies ways courthouse managers can prevent violence from occurring.

Maintaining a Safe & Secure Workplace

The following information is intended to help court staff deter, prevent, and detect potentially dangerous incidents in the courthouse because optimal courthouse security can only be attained by alert staff trained to handle challenging situations.

Every judge and court employee must know how to respond to:

- bomb threats;
- violence in or near the courthouse;
- courthouse closures;
- bio-hazards; and
- flooding, fire, and weather emergencies

If you have questions regarding any of these areas, ask your supervisor.

Daily Steps to Preventing Security Incidents

One of the simplest no-cost court security improvements is for all courthouse employees to know what cases are on the court’s docket. Based on historical information security incidents are more likely to occur at the courthouse in relation to one of the following events:

- at the appearance of an antagonistic witness or codefendant, especially if gangs are involved;
- when the case involves political issues;
- during prisoner transport;
- at arraignment or sentencing;
- when a commitment is ordered in juvenile court;
- when a decision is rendered in a domestic or small claims court case;
- when parental rights are in dispute; and
- during “last chance” meetings (good-byes).

Tips to Maintain Office Security

- Do not allow visitors into secure areas if you are uncomfortable with the purpose of their visits or there appears to be any problem call your sheriff’s office immediately.
- Do not allow persons visiting one office to have access to other secure offices or areas.
- Immediately report persons who appear unannounced in your work area or who say they “opened the wrong office door” or were “looking for another office.”

- Do not admit unexpected repairpersons or delivery persons without checking with your officer manager to verify that they have a right to be in the work area.
- Ask strangers in your work area for identification or promptly call the sheriff's office. Write down a description and where you last saw them.
- Devise a simple code system to alert others in your office that there is a problem
- Keep all security doors locked at all times, especially those leading from public areas into secure areas.
- Always keep important files in locked cabinets.
- Be alert for strange objects and packages. Packages can be discovered more easily if offices are kept neat and orderly.
- Never touch or disturb a strange package or briefcase found in your work area. Call the security officer at once.
- Avoid routines. If your job entails handling or depositing funds, vary the times of day and days of the week that you perform these tasks. Funds held overnight and on weekends should, at a minimum, be secured in a Class III, fire-rated file safe.
- Keep all valuables in locked drawers or cabinets. Never leave wallets, handbags, cash, or credit cards on your desk or unsecured in other parts of your work area. Experience has shown that office theft declines sharply if valuables are locked away.

Computers

Consider the following measures to protect computers from illicit activity, vandalism, and accidental damage:

- Restrict access to areas housing computers, network equipment and computer servers.
- Purchase a backup power supply (also known as an uninterruptible power supply UPS).
- Define an orderly, automated, emergency shut-off plan for computers to minimize data loss.
- Require that computer back-up files be kept in the courthouse and off-site in a fireproof site.
- Restrict access by using passwords that change at least every 90 days.
- Strict adherence to policies concerning the use of court computers for personal business.
- Require computers to run an automatic virus detection program on a daily basis.
- Computer users log-out of the systems when they are away from the workstations.

Personal Security

- Office money for coffee, gift, and flower funds should always be kept in locked cabinets. Place coat racks in center of work area and not next to doors leading to hallways. Never leave items of value in pockets of garments on coat racks.
- Park in an area that will be well lit after dark.
- If working after hours, keep all doors locked, even in secure areas. Never advertise that you will be working alone. Assailants often hide in women's restrooms. Look into corners before fully entering the restroom.
- Check stalls if possible. After hours, women should always go to restrooms in pairs, if possible. If alone, use the restroom while other employees are still in the office.
- Radios and other personnel items should be placed in a locked container at the end of a workday.

- Employees should not bring personal items of substantial value to the office.
- If your purse or wallet is stolen, DO NOT provide PIN numbers to telephone callers who may say they are officials of your bank or the local police department.
- Keep a low profile. Do not openly talk about your job or volunteer information when you are around strangers.
- Pay attention to vehicle security (lock gas caps/hoods, utilize mobile telephone and car alarms).

Suspicious Packages

Suspicious packages may arrive in the mail or may be abandoned on courthouse premises. Precaution should be taken to determine the potential volatility of their contents before they are opened.

Courthouse staff should be trained in identifying and responding to the discovery of a suspicious package. The following list includes some characteristics of a letter or package that indicates the contents may be dangerous:

- foreign mail, air mail, and special delivery;
- restrictive markings such as confidential, personal, etc.;
- excessive or no postage;
- handwritten or poorly typed address;
- incorrect titles with name;
- title with no name;
- misspellings of common words;
- oily stains or discoloration;
- no return address;
- excessive weight;
- rigid or bulky envelope;
- lopsided or uneven package/envelope;
- protruding wires or tinfoil;
- excessive securing material such as masking tape, string, etc.;
- visual distractions;
- strange odor;
- evidence of opening and resealing; or
- thickness greater than one inch.

Evacuations

Familiarize yourself with the courthouse evacuation plan. Know who has the authority to order an evacuation, how the evacuation will be announced, what your responsibility is during an evacuation, where you should report, and what system will be used to signal that it is safe to return to the building.

Hostage Situations

Court security staff should be prepared to handle a hostage situation. If a situation occurs, staff should contact a predetermined local law enforcement agency with a trained negotiator on staff. The first 20 or 30 minutes are the most critical in a hostage situation. During this time, employees should limit the dialogue with the hostage taker and prevent an overreaction from occurring by withholding the use of firearms or any overt action that threatens the hostage taker or endangers the hostage. When the response team arrives, employees should be prepared to

tell them the exact number of hostages and hostage takers, the exact location of the incident, and the content of any communications with the hostage taker.

Bomb Threat

Evacuation is not recommended as the immediate response to a bomb threat. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the nature of the threat and current courthouse security concerns must be taken into account. Designated court staff are needed to assist with building searches. Although it may be impossible to detect every bomb, court staff may be able to uncover all but the most sophisticated bombs with the proper training and equipment.

It is an unnerving experience for anyone to receive a telephoned threat. But there are ways to minimize personal fear and still concentrate on gathering information that may help law enforcement personnel identify the person making the threat. The first step is to realize that virtually any courthouse employee could receive such a call. The second step is to be aware that careful procedures have been developed to counter such threats and to arrest and convict the callers.

If you receive a threat, follow these procedures:

- Pay careful attention to the caller's references to names of those threatened, time or nature of threatened assault, locations of purported bombs and times of detonation, and names of those whom the caller intends to harm with the bomb.
- If the caller appears ready to hang up without giving vital information, the employee should try gently, but persuasively, to obtain it. The employee should encourage the caller to continue talking and not to hang up the phone.
- The employee should write down certain information while on the phone, including the time, the caller's exact words, background noises, gender of caller, tone of voice (calm or excited), probable mental state, age, accent, and speech impediments.
- Try to get the caller to identify the location of the bomb and the time the event will occur.

What Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's) Look Like

The photos below show the components of IED's and the method by which they are carried. Court security officers and court employees should be watchful for combinations of bomb components, i.e. timers, batteries, duct or electrical tape.





Conducting Room Searches for IED's:

Courtroom Searches for IED's

- Stop, look, and listen;
- Divide room by height for search;
- Search room by height and assigned area - overlap for thorough coverage;
- Also search internal public areas – rest rooms, elevators, lobby, stairwells, and office reception areas;
- Search internal court staff areas - utilize employee familiarity in locating/clearing out-of-place items; and
- Search outside areas - landscaping, trash receptacles, vehicles, abandoned items, signs, windows, doorways, and building facade, etc.

Occupant Emergency Plans

It is desirable that each county maintain a Facility Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP). This plan is developed in order to minimize the danger to life and property arising from the effects of attack, fire, flood, explosion, serious weather conditions, demonstrations, and other disasters affecting courthouses. The OEP is primarily a life safety plan that supplements sheriff and/or police prepared operational and contingency plans.

It is imperative that the court security and facility committee has a fundamental grasp of information contained in their local OEP. The prescribed policies, procedures, and methods for the establishment of an OEP by agencies in court-controlled space should be implemented in accordance with recognized state and local property management regulations. A management employee of the county can be assigned responsibility for approving the development of the

OEP, to include conducting test drills for natural disasters, fires, and weather emergencies. The sheriff and/or police department responsible for courthouse security should be listed as a technical advisor for courthouse OEP. Sheriff and/or police officials should make themselves available to assist with the coordination and design of a site comprehensive OEP.

The OEP should be distributed to all offices located in the courthouse, as well as the sheriff and police department.

A courthouse OEP should include the following:

- courthouse emergency information;
- descriptions of the duties and responsibilities of agencies and individuals;
- an OEP organizational chart, including succession of command;
- warning, signal, and emergency instructions;
- evacuation routes procedures;
- employee bomb threat action plan;
- employee fire action plan;
- employee medical action plan;
- floor plans;
- courthouse utilities diagram; and
- listing of additional resources.

The sheriff's department can use the following form to gather pertinent information when an emergency incident is reported.

Chapter 6: Security of Exhibits

While the presiding judge has the overall responsibility for the trial, the clerk of court or court reporter is the custodian of court records and exhibits. As such they have primary responsibility for the control and security of courtroom exhibits.

Storage of Exhibits During Trial

Store exhibits during trial using the following procedures:

- Keep exhibits in a secured area in the courtroom during the trial.
- If a secured storage cabinet/vault is not available in the courtroom, place drugs, weapons, money, valuables, or sensitive material in the clerk of courts vault each night.
- Oversized exhibits, except for sensitive or dangerous items, may be stored in the courtroom, if the courtroom is kept locked.

Managing & Disposing of Exhibits

Standard policies and procedures for managing exhibits after trial must be established and applied in a routine systematic manner. Handle exhibits after trial using the following procedures:

- Drugs, weapons, and ammunition should be returned to by law enforcement agencies after trial. Storage at law enforcement agencies is more secure and access better controlled.
- When transferring the custody of exhibits to law enforcement, a receipt acknowledging transfer to their custody should be obtained and filed in the case file.
- After conviction, and after appeal and retention periods have passed, weapons and all remaining exhibits should be transferred to the DA's office for retention or destruction.

Security of Firearms as Exhibits

The following checklist for handling firearms and weapons offered as exhibits will not only ensure a safer environment for all participants, but will also allow counsel all methods of prosecution or defense essential to their case, thus assuring a fair trial.

Treat Every Firearm As If It Were Loaded

Check the firearm each time it is touched unless a mechanical block is in place. A firearm must be checked every time it is handled, whether it has been offered as an exhibit or is merely being identified during foundation prior to its being offered, and regardless of who is handling it. Even a firearm that is checked each time is susceptible to being grabbed and loaded quickly; thus, a mechanical block is recommended.

Always Point the Firearm Away from People

Extra care must be taken that a weapon is not pointed at jurors, spectators, parties, and court personnel. A firearm may be demonstrated safely, but only if the handler knows how to operate

or hold it safely. Often sworn officers are so used to working with firearms that in the somewhat stressed setting of the courtroom they may not be as attentive to the handling of a firearm.

Know How to Handle and Hold Firearms

Firearms should always be held with fingers **OUTSIDE** the trigger and trigger guard unless counsel is demonstrating or directing a witness to do so. The natural tendency is to grip a firearm with the index finger inside the trigger guard and on the trigger.

The safest way to transfer a firearm is to place it, action open, on a table and let the other person pick it up. A witness should be instructed to point the weapon at the ceiling or floor and not put a finger inside the trigger guard or on the trigger unless it is necessary as part of a demonstration, and then only if the firearm has been just checked, cleared, or a mechanical block is in place.

Establish Rules for Firearm Transportation to Courthouse

It is recommended that the court security and facility committee require counsel to notify the sheriff of intent to transport a weapon into a courthouse complex for use as a demonstrative exhibit. Procedures should also be developed for convicted spousal abusers to safely turn in the firearms.

Establish Rules for the Security of the Firearm

Establish a written policy or clear oral order understood by counsel, clerk of court, court reporter, bailiffs, and the sheriff's department regarding how weapons are to be secured and who is responsible for their security during trial, morning and afternoon breaks, as well as noon and overnight recesses.

Establish Rules for Placement of Weapons in the Courtroom

Placement of a firearm or other weapon is as important as any consideration when handling firearms as exhibits in the courtroom. Counsel may want to place a firearm or other weapon on counsel table or in front of a defendant on the witness stand in an attempt to see the reaction of that defendant. It may be permissible, but consider requiring counsel to clear it with the sheriff's department so that there are no surprises for court security officers, the judge, or for either counsel.

Precautions should be taken when self-represented defendants participate in a trial. Self-represented defendants should be instructed in the rules of decorum and rules of evidence, including rules that the defendant will not be allowed to approach the bench, participate in chamber's conferences, approach the witness stand, or handle weapons.

Use a Mechanical Block Whenever Possible

There are a number of different types of mechanical blocks that may be used with varying degrees of effectiveness to keep firearms safe and secure in court.

Keep Ammunition Separate from Firearms

Ammunition and firearms should be kept separate in the jury room and in the courtroom as well. Plans must be made to coordinate with the sheriff and secure the ammunition in a separate room outside the courtroom and away from the firearms.

Use Caution When Allowing Demonstrations Using Firearms

A demonstration could be conducted in the courtroom by a range master, firearms instructor, criminalist, or other qualified individual. It is important that all courtroom participants are fully aware of the procedure for this type of demonstration. All building occupants must also be notified of the date and time of the demonstration to prevent mistaken reports of violence in the courthouse.

Clearing Long Guns Requires Extra Caution

It is not enough to work the action several times with lever-action, pump-action or semi-automatic rifles, and shotguns. Cases have been reported where a round became lodged, crimped, or stuck at the far end of the magazine tube and was not jarred loose until working the action over a dozen times. With long guns of this nature, it is absolutely necessary to remove the tube and follower and visually check for any plug or other obstruction. Continually racking the slide or working the lever action will not assure that the long gun is loaded.

Security of Non-Firearm Weapons as Exhibits

- Knives: All knives should be kept in their sheath. If there is no sheath, consider having counsel or a court security officer fabricate a multi-layer cardboard sheath using strapping or duct tape. Butterfly or gravity knives may be secured in the closed position with heavy tape or, if the handle has holes, by electrician's straps, flex cuffs, cable ties, or wire.
- Razors, box cutters, and other sharp instruments: These should be kept in heat-sealed pouches that are used in evidence collection by criminalists, double-layered, to guard against puncture of the pouch by the item.
- Bombs, bomb components, blasting caps, and fuses: Consider photographs in lieu of actual devices, unless they can be made inert and can be secured and stored safely. No live bombs should ever be allowed in the courtroom. Contact the U.S. Marshals Service; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms of the U.S. Treasury Department; and your local bomb squad or explosive ordinance disposal team for additional recommendations.

Security of Other Sensitive Exhibits

- Money and other valuables should be secured in a file cabinet during court recesses, lunch hours, and at times when exhibits would otherwise be left unattended. Money that is the proceeds of a crime or of drug sales must be forfeited to the state and/or county.
- Stolen money and other stolen property should be turned over to the district attorney for return to the rightful owner.

- Other money found in exhibits or kept as exhibits should be forfeited to the county treasurer by order of the trial judge.

Drugs

Drugs are especially attractive to theft. Drugs should be secured in a locked courtroom closet during court recesses, lunch hours, and at times when they would otherwise be left unattended. Drugs should be transferred to the confiscating agency or sheriff's office for storage during the retention period and destruction when applicable.

Attorneys must submit exhibit list prior to trial and have exhibits pre-marked with exhibit number, case number and police agency number listed on exhibit sticker.

Exhibits Maintained by the Court Reporter

Exhibits normally submitted to the Court of Appeals must be maintained by the court reporter.

Any original documents should be substituted with a copy at the conclusion of the hearing.

At the conclusion of criminal, traffic and juvenile trials if there is an acquittal, the parties submitting the exhibits shall sign an evidence receipt listing the exhibits and remove the exhibits immediately. If there is a conviction, only those exhibits submitted to the Court of Appeals shall be retained. At the conclusion of the trial the DA investigator is responsible for digitally photographing all admitted exhibits released to the DA's office and submitting the photos on disk to be kept with the exhibit list in the reporter's evidence envelope.

These procedures should also be adapted, when applicable, to civil and domestic cases.

1. It will be the responsibility of the Court Reporter to maintain control and security of the courtroom exhibits.
2. Prior to accepting an exhibit the reporter must insure that the exhibit is properly marked with an exhibit sticker and that this sticker is clearly marked with the Court case number.
3. If an exhibit is tendered that is accompanied by a police evidence bag or tag, this bag or tag should remain with the exhibit.
4. It should be the responsibility of the attorney who is submitting evidence in a case to supply the Court Reporter with a list of all exhibits and exhibit numbers for tracking purposes.
5. The Court Reporter should keep all exhibits in a secured area in the courtroom during the trial. If there is not a secure area in the courtroom, exhibits such as drugs, money, weapons, valuables or exhibits of a sensitive nature should be removed from the courtroom and secured in a secured area. Other exhibits can be stored in the courtroom if the courtroom is kept locked.
6. Within three days of the conclusion of the trial the District Attorney's Office will send an Investigator to photograph the exhibits. A copy of these photographs will be given to the Court Reporter.

7. After photographing the exhibits, the DA Investigator will retrieve the People's exhibits and will have them returned to the law enforcement agency the exhibit originally came from. The law enforcement agency will be responsible for maintaining custody of the exhibit until the agency receives approval from the District Attorney's Office or the Court to release or destroy the exhibit.
8. The Defense Attorney will be responsible for photographing and removing any exhibit introduced by the defense. The only exception to this would be if the exhibit was one that had originally been maintained by the evidence custodian of a law enforcement agency. In this case, the DA Investigator would photograph the exhibit and then would return the exhibit to the proper law enforcement agency for safekeeping.
9. If at all possible, instructions should be given regarding the disposition of evidence at the time the DA Investigator returns it to the law enforcement agency. This could include instructions to return the evidence to its owner, destroy the evidence or hold the evidence for appeals.

Chapter 7: Contingency Planning

All agencies and individuals responsible for maintaining the safety and security of the courthouse and its occupants must be prepared to react to emergency and potential-emergency situations like bomb threats, hostage situations, and fires. This preparation will not completely eliminate the period of chaos that is likely to attend an emergent situation; rather these preparations are intended to reduce this chaos period. The critical components of an effective response are that all judges and courthouse staff know from whom they will receive directives and how they are to respond to those directives. This planning must be done in advance of any crisis and made routine by practice and drill.

Following are suggested guidelines and issues to consider when developing contingency security and safety plans.

Contingency Safety & Security Plans

Each court facility should have an individual building security plan that covers all established considerations and features unique to that facility. Building security plans should explicitly cover and provide for the planned and organized responses of law enforcement and emergency personnel to duress alarms, threats, hostage situations, assaults, vandalism, dangerous individuals, and prisoner escapes. Areas of contingency responsibilities (individual and shared) for the sheriff, police department, and building management should be clearly defined and outlined. The courthouse security and facility committee should be knowledgeable about, and coordinate the building security plan with the county property manager and include representatives of all agencies that occupy the courthouse. This is especially important in courthouses that share facilities with non-court agencies.

Realizing that sheriff and/or police department personnel may be called upon to take command (temporarily or permanently) during emergency situations, personnel from both departments should be familiar with the courthouse's design/layout, contingency plan, security systems, and security-related policies and procedures.

In the event of a critical incident and/or crisis situation occurring within a courthouse the sheriff and/or police department should implement the contingency plan which include the following:

- The immediate response (inclusion of those areas of specifically required coverage) to an incident by law enforcement and security personnel. Assignment of an on-site supervisor to coordinate and ensure implementation of the plan.
- Direct critical incident review and assessment.
- Emergency notification telephone numbers of pre-designated officials. Notification itself will be conducted by senior management or personnel previously authorized. In absence of senior management officials, responding personnel must initiate notification procedures.
- Additional emergency notification telephone numbers of State of Colorado and Federal Law Enforcement Agencies. Information stating response times and the provision of specialized emergency services (i.e. SWAT, medical support, urban recovery teams, tactical teams, etc.) is included.
- Activation procedures and operational requirements for security command posts.

- Maps, diagrams, blueprints, and floor plans of all entrances/exits locations for the courthouse.
- Names, addresses, and 24-hour contact numbers of respective facility management, utility, and maintenance personnel. Exact locations of utility, telecommunications, electrical, HVAC, boiler, and maintenance rooms are to be noted on facility blueprints and floor plans.
- Roster containing names, addresses, telephone and pager numbers of all sheriff and/or police officials. Individual emergency locator forms are secured at respective facilities.
- Evacuation procedures, to include designated areas of refuge, for judicial officers, staff, employees, and the general public. Security personnel assignments are contained within this section.
- Photographs (aerial, exterior, and interior) of the courthouse and adjacent grounds.
- Copies of the courthouse OEP.

In addition to the policy and procedural guidelines previously stated in this section, the following are also recommended for plan inclusion:

- videos of courthouse interior and exterior;
Courthouse photographs and videos can be effectively used by law enforcement personnel and emergency responders who have never been inside the courthouse or are unfamiliar with the courthouse design and layout.
- state, city, and county maps;
- description and location of security systems;
- key control registers;
- concurrent interagency jurisdiction agreements;
- courthouse threat and risk assessments;
- courthouse security surveys; and
- emergency medical center locations.

Execution of Contingency Plans

During the execution of a contingency plan the sheriff and/or police officials are primarily responsible for the protection of personnel and property assigned to the judiciary and support staff. They are responsible for all security functions involving the courts and will be in direct control of all forces committed to supporting this plan to the extent of determining specific assignments for operational personnel.

To maintain order during the execution of the contingency plan, it is important that all participants are aware of their duties and responsibilities.

Contingency Plans Based on Specific Situations

Suspicious Packages

Bombs can enter the courthouse in several ways, including the mail, in deliveries, and on individuals. Most mail bombs are set to explode when opened. Staff should be instructed to report all suspicious packages. A mail-screening program should be developed to detect mail bombs. To reduce the possibility of a bomb entering the courthouse, the court may want to purchase a machine that samples the air around a person being checked (these machines can detect the presence of nitrate molecules as small as one part per trillion). In the courthouse,

security staff should search the facility regularly for bombs, especially in sensitive areas, such as the communications room or the power supply room.

Assessing the contents of a suspicious package with a fluoroscope requires that each x-ray image be evaluated and classified in one of four categories:

- **No Threat** - Defined as no identifying monitor image (shape, density, and/or color) that could be part of a weapon or improvised explosive device.
- **Contraband Item** - Defined as a suspicious or confirmed monitor image (shape, density, and/or color) indicating an item as been pre-identified as contraband.
- **Possible Threat** - Defined as a suspicious monitor image (shape, density, and/or color) that indicates a likelihood of weapons or an improvised explosive device.
- **Obvious Threat** - Defined as a confirmed monitor image (shape, density, and/or color) that indicates the presence of weapons or an improvised explosive device.

Shipped items that cannot be screened through a fluoroscope should have the shipping contents verified before the item is allowed into the courthouse. Items that either meet threat profiles or are still deemed suspicious may require the sheriff and/or police department to implement the courthouse bomb-threat response plan.

Sample Response Procedures for Suspicious Packages

The list below is a template that may be used by law enforcement when responding to a suspicious package.

- Dependent upon the threat classification, the court security officer will either immediately notify the sheriff or secure the area and immediately notify the sheriff.
- The court security officer(s) or court staff discovering the suspicious item will directly communicate all known information to responding sheriff's personnel.
- Court security officers will assure any suspicious item is not moved from the location in which it was found. Movement can cause detonation.
- Court security officers will not discuss any aspect surrounding the discovery of a suspicious package except as authorized in performance of official duties or as directed by the sheriff or his/her designee.
- Once a suspicious package is discovered, all radio/ cellular telephone communication should cease.
- Responding sheriff's personnel will determine the number and extent to which other courthouse personnel will be notified of the suspicious package.
- In attempts to confirm a suspicious package's contents, the recipient and sender should be identified, if possible, and contacted by the sheriff. If the suspicious item has not been tampered with, and the recipient and sender are aware the package is being delivered and can verify package contents, the likelihood of the package being an explosive device has effectively been eliminated.
- Sheriff's personnel should utilize the expertise of resident officers and agents (i.e. police department officials, ATF, postal inspectors, etc.) when and where available.
- The sheriff or his/her designee will determine whether and when it is necessary to call in the local bomb squad.
- Unless directed to do so by the sheriff or a designee (i.e. during attempts to verify a packages contents), court security officer personnel will not contact any agency official or employee regarding a suspicious package and the sheriff's response.

- When assigned a post (corridor, stairwell, elevator, etc.) to assist in securing a suspicious package, court security officers will make no specific statements to the public, media, or government employees concerning the assignment.
- The sheriff or a designee will determine whether to request assistance from building management. If requested, their personnel will provide support to the sheriff in technical, mechanical, custodial, and advisory capacities.
- In the event no assistance is requested of building management, the sheriff or a designee will keep building officials informed of incident events as they transpire.
- If a decision is made to evacuate the courthouse, the respective Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) and sheriff's courthouse contingency plan will be utilized. Sheriff's personnel responsible for court and judicial security should be prepared to initiate evacuation procedures for court personnel if the sheriff or his/her designee determines it is in the best interests of safety and security.
- Court security officers will conduct a comprehensive security sweep of court floors to ensure all persons have safely been evacuated from the building. Other than pre-identified judicial officers, all court officials/employees will be directed to exit the building via emergency exits.

When a decision has been made to contact the bomb squad, the sheriff and court security officer (as directed by the sheriff) may be responsible for the following:

- Providing all known information to the bomb squad upon their arrival.
- Confirmation from responding emergency and bomb squad personnel on what they expect and require for support.
- Maintaining a constant presence (appropriate/safe distances from the suspicious package) while responding to authorities on-site.
- Being involved and consulted prior to any decision made to take action on-site.
- Sheriff's personnel should strongly discourage any attempt to open a suspicious package on-site. If there is no other choice, measures must be taken to:
- advise and prepare courthouse occupants for the resulting noise and/or shock;
- determine need for partial (i.e. offices and floors above, below, or adjacent to the suspicious package) or entire courthouse evacuation;
- consider advantages (would potential damage levels be lowered?) and disadvantages (would moving the package cause it to detonate?) in moving the package to a more suitable and preferably off-site location;
- if the package cannot be moved, a decision must be made regarding whether or not to reinforce areas and cover equipment adjacent to the package; and
- preserving evidence for subsequent crime scene investigation.

The following characteristics may indicate the presence of a mail bomb:

- | | |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • foreign mail, air mail, and special delivery; • restrictive markings such as confidential, personal, etc.; • excessive or no postage; handwritten or poorly typed address; • incorrect titles with name; • title with no name; | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • misspellings of common words; • oily stains or discoloration; • no return address; • excessive weight; • rigid or bulky envelope; • lopsided or uneven package/envelope; • protruding wires or tinfoil; |
|--|---|

- excessive securing material such as masking tape, string, etc.;
- visual distractions;
- strange odor;
- evidence of opening and resealing; or
- thickness greater than one inch

Bomb Threat

All courthouse staff should be trained in the procedures for handling a bomb threat.

The following table outlines the contingency plan procedures to undertaken if a bomb threat is received.

Bomb Threat Response Plan	
<p>RECEIPT OF THE THREAT</p> <p><i>Persons likely to receive bomb threats should keep the security incident report form in an accessible location.</i></p>	<p>Obtaining accurate information is vital to deciding upon an appropriate response. The most frequent receipt of bomb threats is via telephone. Persons likely to receive such calls should be briefed and trained in the following procedures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Note caller ID or if number was blocked; ▪ Try to keep the caller on the line long enough to have the call traced and obtain further information; ▪ Write down the exact words the caller used. Ask for the exact location of the improvised explosive device(IED), device type, what it looks like, and time of detonation; ▪ Attempt to determine the sex, age, and mental attitude of the caller – ask why they have placed the IED; and ▪ Note any accent or peculiarity in speech pattern that may help identify the caller, as well as any background noise that may provide a clue to the caller's identity and location.
<p>THREAT EVALUATION</p>	<p>This stage involves assessing the credibility of the message and making the appropriate response. The following are general points of consideration that should be taken into account when conducting the evaluation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Information ascertained from caller; ▪ Threat scope; ▪ Types of court cases being heard; ▪ Threat and risk assessments; ▪ Pre-identified vulnerabilities; ▪ Prior incident activity and response; ▪ Expert opinion gathered during or previous to the situation at hand; ▪ Area(s) of refuge; and ▪ Results of the preliminary search.

<p>FACILITY SEARCH</p>	<p>To search a building before or after it is evacuated is a matter that should be governed by the situation at hand. It is at this stage that the value of information gathered during receipt of the actual bomb threat becomes important. If the information received indicates a definite location, a search can be conducted without evacuation, provided that time is not a factor. Some or all court staff should be directed to perform a cursory search of their work area and offices prior to any decision to evacuate the building.</p> <p>Court staff can be of invaluable assistance to emergency responders who may be unfamiliar with the facility and its design layout. Employees should report all out-of-place items immediately.</p>
<p>FACILITY EVACUATION</p> <p><i>The Threat Assessment and Evaluation Process Plays An Integral Part In Considering and Determining Facility Evacuation.</i></p>	<p>Essentially, there are three alternatives available when deciding if the court facility should be evacuated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ignore the threat; ▪ Evacuate immediately; and ▪ Search and evacuate if warranted. <p>Searching the courthouse and then evacuating it, if warranted, is the most desired approach. However, a general rule to follow if you do not have an established bomb threat response plan is to evacuate. Unfortunately, this action is usually the exact effect a hoax bomber desires.</p> <p>As stated, an evacuation may occur before or after a search has been conducted. However, a search of some type i.e., cursory, general, or inclusive is strongly recommended prior to allowing court staff and the public to resume their regular activities.</p>
<p>REMOVAL and RENDER SAFE</p>	<p>During this stage, only properly trained explosives ordinance disposal personnel should be involved. IED's are limited only by the imagination of their designers and should never be touched or moved by untrained persons.</p> <p>Court security staff and court employees should know:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Who to contact; ▪ How to make contact; ▪ What information they will need to provide concerning the bomb threat/IED; and ▪ How long it will take them to get to the courthouse.

<p style="text-align: center;">GENERAL</p> <p><i>When a local court security committee is developing a bomb threat response plan, they should address and incorporate several other elements:</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Gather telephone contact/notification information for management and command elements to ensure that officials are available to make critical decisions throughout the incident; ▪ Determine what factors will dictate either immediate evacuation, ignoring the threat, or initiating a search and evacuating the courthouse if/when the threat is confirmed; ▪ Identify search personnel and/or floor monitors/wardens; ▪ Establish search protocols; ▪ Consider the possibility of secondary or diversionary devices; ▪ Consider if the threat is a diversion in and of itself; ▪ Establish policies and procedures if/when a device has been located; and ▪ Establish policies for handling employee, public, and news media inquiries.
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Conducting Vehicle Searches in Bomb Threat Situations
Inspecting Vehicles for IED's
<p>Conduct an external search:</p> <p>Check the area around the vehicle. Look for tape, wire, string or fuses. Look for marks on the ground indicating unusual activity. Look for signs of forced entry. Look inside the vehicle through the window for devices, packages, or other suspicious items; Look for loose wires; Inspect top/sides of tires; Inspect exhaust pipe for inserted objects; and Look for pieces of dirt, rust, or other material that may have been dislodged. Locked Vehicles - <i>Check Below</i>: NOTE – Using a mirror to inspect the undercarriage of the vehicle is recommended.</p> <p>Unlocked Vehicles - <i>Check Inside</i>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Look inside the vehicle through the windows and open a door other than the driver's; • Inspect vehicle interior in a logical sequence. Start at the floor and work up; • Check under floor mats; • Check under front and back seats; and • Check door panels for signs of tampering.

ATF	VEHICLE DESCRIPTION	MAXIMUM EXPLOSIVES CAPACITY	LETHAL AIR BLAST RANGE	MINIMUM EVACUATION DISTANCE	FALLING GLASS HAZARD
	COMPACT SEDAN	500 Pounds 227 Kilos <i>(In Trunk)</i>	100 Feet 30 Meters	1,500 Feet 457 Meters	1,250 Feet 381 Meters
	FULL SIZE SEDAN	1,000 Pounds 455 Kilos <i>(In Trunk)</i>	125 Feet 38 Meters	1,750 Feet 534 Meters	1,750 Feet 534 Meters
	PASSENGER VAN OR CARGO VAN	4,000 Pounds 1,818 Kilos	200 Feet 61 Meters	2,750 Feet 838 Meters	2,750 Feet 838 Meters
	SMALL BOX VAN <i>(14 FT BOX)</i>	10,000 Pounds 4,545 Kilos	300 Feet 91 Meters	3,750 Feet 1,143 Meters	3,750 Feet 1,143 Meters
	BOX VAN OR WATER/FUEL TRUCK	30,000 Pounds 13,636 Kilos	450 Feet 137 Meters	6,500 Feet 1,982 Meters	6,500 Feet 1,982 Meters
	SEMI-TRAILER	60,000 Pounds 27,273 Kilos	600 Feet 183 Meters	7,000 Feet 2,134 Meters	7,000 Feet 2,134 Meters

Evacuations

The following items should be included in a contingency plan to deal with evacuations:

- Emergency telephone numbers for fire, police, medical, utilities, and relief agencies.
- Building floor plans.
- A list of personnel and agencies to be notified in case of emergency.
- A list of persons responsible for evacuating and accounting for personnel. Assign floor monitors to each floor. Pre-assign an assembly point and require all floor monitors to report-in to assure the entire building has been evacuated. The assembly point should be far enough away in case of explosion or vehicle traffic. Arrangements must be made to assure that physically challenged persons can get out of the building.
- “All clear” procedures to notify persons when it is appropriate to return to the building.
- Procedures for evacuating jurors and prisoners.
- Procedures for securing evidence.
- A checklist of areas to be secured and persons responsible for safes, vaults, treasurer’s office, clerk’s office, record rooms, and weapon supply.
- Coordination and communication with other law enforcement agencies.
- Instructions for building personnel to remove personal affects and to follow evacuation orders in an orderly manner.

Hostage Situations

It is recommended that hostage situation tabletop exercises be conducted in all courthouses to familiarize police and emergency responders with procedures/and requirements and the courthouses' design and layout.

Upon activation of any duress/panic alarm, an appropriate number of law enforcement and security personnel should be immediately dispatched to investigate and conduct a preliminary assessment. If it is determined that the alarm is real and a hostage situation exists, the following list enumerates tasks that should be carried out by responding security personnel:

- Immediately establish a security perimeter for the affected area. The perimeter should extend in scope to provide for all entrances/exit points (i.e. stairwells, doors, elevators, windows, etc.) that the hostage taker(s) have access to.
- Request the assistance of those agencies and officials responsible for tactical responses and hostage negotiations. Prior contact with these agencies and officials should have been initiated to confirm their assistance during hostage and emergency situations.
- Local court security officers can expect to be utilized as technical advisors for the duration of incident. Consequently, it is the responsibility of all personnel to continually familiarize themselves with their areas of responsibility and layout of all courthouse space. These areas of responsibility include, but are not limited to: (1) court calendars, (2) ability to access background information from computer databases, (3) proficiency on the general design layout of courthouses and facilities housing court components, and (4) knowledge with regard to type, location, and operation of courthouse security systems.
- If necessary, provide for and organize the systematic evacuation of courtrooms, chambers, and other areas within the courthouse. Employees other than those of court agencies may also be affected by decisions to evacuate the building.
- The sheriff and/or police officials may designate call signs or codes to responding personnel. This will provide personnel with a means to confirm identity upon being challenged and/or replaced by responding tactical units. The designated command post is responsible for notifying other agency personnel of these assigned call signs.
- All materials contained within the courthouse contingency plan will be made readily available to responding authorities.

Escape Contingencies

A contingency plan to respond to prisoner escape(s) or attempted escape(s) should include:

- sheriff and/or police response instructions;
- securing entrance and exits;
- systematic utilization of courthouse security systems;
- search and arrest procedures;
- investigation and evidence procedures;
- witness interview and prisoner interrogation procedures;
- notification procedures for other state and federal law enforcement agencies;

- judicial and courthouse employee notification procedures;
- available assistance from resource agencies;
- public announcements and media news releases;
- security and threat advisories; and
- determination and procedures for courthouse evacuation.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Incidents

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency for dealing with Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) incidents and has therefore prepared incident contingency plans for each of these situations. The FBI should be contacted immediate in the event of a NBC incident. The following forms and tables can be used to help identify and respond to NBS incidents. **This section to be updated.**

Chem-Bio: Quick Response Card (CB-QRC) Copyright © 1998 Tempest Publishing	
Chemical Weapon (CW) Indicators	Biological Weapons (BW) Indicators
<p>Suspicious Devices/Packages - unusual metal debris, abandoned spray devices, leaking packages, unexplained munitions</p> <p>Unusual Liquid, Spray or Vapor – droplets, oily film, unexplained odor, low lying clouds, fog unrelated to weather</p> <p>Dying or Dead Animals - lack of insects</p> <p>Unexplained Conditions or Casualties – serious illnesses, nausea, disorientation, difficulty breathing, convulsions, definite casualty patterns, multiple victims</p>	<p>Unusual Liquid, Spray or Vapor – spraying dispensers, suspicious devices or packages</p> <p>Unusual Conditions or Casualties - unusual illness for region/area, definite pattern inconsistent with natural diseases, human casualties</p> <p>Dying or Dead Animals - sick/dying animals or fish</p> <p>Unusual swarms of insects</p>
Incident Response Key Contact Numbers	
INITIAL ACTIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Remain Calm • Don Protective Equipment • Maintain Safe Position - Reassure Victims • Await Properly Equipped Response
NOTIFICATION ESSENTIALS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wind Direction and Weather Conditions • Direction of Cloud or Vapor • Number/Location of Victims - Types of Injuries – Symptoms • Recommended Safe Access Route and Staging Area • Witness Statements and Observations

Anthrax Concerns Card

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It is unlikely that you have been exposed to Anthrax; however, it is important to be alert to possible signs of infection. The following signs are symptoms of Anthrax exposure:

Fever / Malaise / Fatigue / Cough / Mild Chest Discomfort followed by Severe Respiratory Distress

While these are not absolute signs of infection, you should call the below number immediately:
(insert phone number of sheriff and/or police department)

Anthrax Facts Sheet

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- Clothing and other items worn at the time should be placed in plastic bags.
- Upon arriving home, shower with soap and water.
- If medication is prescribed it should be taken until you are instructed otherwise.
- Symptoms usually occur within 1-6 days.
- Initial symptoms are often followed by a short period of improvement (ranging in hours to 2-3 days).
- If severe symptoms are present, seek immediate medical attention.
- Anthrax can be successfully treated
- There have not been any documented cases of human-to-human transmission.

Chapter 8: Threats to Judicial Officers

County sheriff's departments, or the local police department if the threat is made outside the judicial building, may be the primary law enforcement agencies in Colorado for investigating threats against members of the judiciary. The sheriff may collaborate with police departments and other local, county, state, and federal law enforcement agencies during investigations. Protocols for investigations should be discussed with these agencies prior to incidents, and mutual aid or joint-power agreements should be prepared as necessary.

Definition of a Threat

"A security threat is an event that has the potential to cause, or has in fact caused, personal injury or property loss."

Definitions of Reportable Threats

The following are definitions of threats that shall be reported:

- A. Attempted or actual acts of violence to persons or property of the court;
- B. Verbal or written threats of future violence; and/or
- C. Conduct or patterns of conduct (inappropriate communication or actions) which cause concern about the possibility of future violence.

Examples of Conduct that Constitutes a Reportable Threat

Common sense is good guidance when making the decision to report a threat. Judges and court employees are encouraged to file a report if they believe such action is prudent. The examples listed below are provided to illustrate reportable inappropriate communications (IC) that should be reported:

1. Any threats, whether direct or specific, veiled ("Now I know why they blew up the courthouse in Oklahoma City."), or conditional (" You had better...or I will.");
2. An **extraordinary** sense of outrage over the handling of a court case;
3. References to a special history or shared destiny with a court official;
4. Suspicious behavior, stalking behavior, or research on the personal affairs of a court official;
5. Admonishments (historical or religious etc.) for a court official to change his/her lifestyle or personal behavior;
6. References to death, violence, or suicide;
7. References to public figures who have been attacked;
8. References to individuals who have attacked public officials; and
9. Belief that a court official owes a debt to the individual.

Assessing the Threat

Upon receipt of an implied or direct threat against a member of the judiciary, a threat assessment should be made to determine the potential risk. Threat assessments and investigations are separate activities (although they may be performed by one individual). Because threats are often repeated occurrences, information on all persons who issue threats should be tracked for future incidents.

Threat assessments differ from risk assessments in that risk assessments are primarily based on site-specific threats. Conversely, threat assessments are based on the assessed totality of: (1) corroborated information and intelligence; (2) investigative actions; and (3) individual and group threat source profiles. Threat propensity levels are subsequently determined through comprehensive analysis of these factors.

To determine the risk associated with a specific threat, an assessment must be made of the suspect’s intent, motive, opportunity, and ability. Intent is a purposeful course of action. Motive is the emotion, desire, psychological need, or similar impulse acting as an incitement to take action. Opportunity is required for the threat to be acted upon. Ability is having the resources and freedom to take action.

Each element should be assessed independently, then in combination with one another. For example, some suspects may be highly motivated but incapable of instigating an attack because they are imprisoned. Other suspects can lack coherent motivation, but truly intend harm. Of most concern are those suspects with strong intent, powerful motive, ample or created opportunities, and considerable ability.

Threat source profiles can assist in conducting a threat analysis and subsequent assessment. The diversity of background information included in these profiles should provide support for assessed correlation between past, present, and anticipated threat incidents.

The following tables present information on the characteristics of violent offenders. This information was gathered from data provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Potential Violent Offender Profile		
White Male	25-40 years of age	Loner
Exhibits Delusions of Grandeur	Experienced Prior Successes	Experienced Recent Setbacks
Has Violent Fantasies	Angry / Paranoid	History of Violence
Religious / Political Expounding	Blames Others For Failures	Abuses Drugs / Alcohol
Unstable Work History	Overt Obsessions	Inappropriate Physical Actions
Low Self-Esteem	Occupation-Based Self-Esteem	Seeks to Control by Intimidation
Perceived / Actual Job Stress	Misperception of Others	Resists Change / New ideas
Prolongs Grievances	Empathy for Violent Persons	Exhibits Suicidal Tendencies
Marital / Financial Problems	Misinterprets Acts of Kindness	Overly-Sensitive to Criticism

The U.S. Marshals Service uses the following rating levels for threat assessments:

LOW THREAT RATING - Indicating a slight probability of risk. It is unlikely that an adverse action will occur.

MODERATE THREAT RATING - An identified and specific threat source has been determined. It is likely that an adverse action will occur without the implementation of recommended agency counter-measures.

HIGH THREAT RATING - An identified and specific threat source has been determined. Adverse action is expected and appropriate agency counter-measures and response plans are being implemented.

The following table describes a number of clues embedded in inappropriate communication that can assist in assessing the risk present.

How was the inappropriate communication (IC) delivered?	Risk Level	Assessment and imminence of action
Written	Generally Low Risk	With the rare exception of mail bombs, suspects who write keep themselves at a safe distance from the people that they are threatening, thereby suggesting a lack of intent to carry out the threat at this time.
Telephone	Generally Low Risk	Suspects who telephone threats also keep themselves at a safe distance from those they are threatening.
Verbal	High Risk Potential	Suspects who deliver IC's in person, either to the target or some known court or law enforcement official, place themselves at some risk of arrest, thus suggesting they intend to carry out the threat at this time.
Suspicious Activity	High Risk Potential	Suspects who engage in suspicious activity, such as stalking, vandalism, unscheduled appearance, or approaching the individual they are threatening, place themselves at some risk of arrest, thus suggesting an intent to carry out the threat at this time.
Informants	Generally Low Risk Informant Credibility Elevates the Risk	Informant threats are out of the control of the suspect. In every informant threat, the credibility and motive of the informant should be assessed first.
Is the individual making the threat known to the judge or court employee?	Risk Level	Suspects also choose whether or not to reveal their identity. Judicial threateners are not seeking notoriety or infamy. Instead, they are contemplating a crime. In thinking like a criminal, they want to escape.
Anonymous	High Risk Potential	Those who preserve their anonymity pose a higher risk than do those who reveal themselves.

Known	Generally Low Risk	Suspects who reveal their identity generally are expressing anger or outrage or are simply, "letting off steam."
Who is the focus of the communication?		Has the individual making the threat made it against an individual (not necessarily by name)?
Direct	Moderate	The statement, "I am going to kill you" is a direct threat, even though there is no name associated with either the "I" or "you." Direct threats are so common they have no strong association with either high or low risk situations.
Veiled-Made against a target	High Risk Potential	The statement, "I'm going to make somebody pay for this," is a veiled-target threat, since it is clear the suspect intends to cause the harm, but not clear who will be harmed. These statements suggest intense frustration with the system of justice and are frequently expressed while the suspect is in the courthouse and, hence, better able to pose a risk.
Veiled-Made saying someone will do something.	Generally Low Risk	The statement, "Somebody's going to make that judge pay" is a veiled-suspect threat because the suspect is saying someone else will cause the harm to a specific target.
What is the immediacy of the risk?		Placing conditions on when or if the harm will occur strongly suggests that the suspect does not intend to cause any harm unless certain conditions are met.
Immediate	Moderate	An immediate threat of harm has no conditions or demands placed upon it.
Deferred By Condition	Generally Low Risk	A deferred-by-condition threat of harm puts a condition on the action, such as, "If you find me guilty, I'll kill you." This suggests the suspect is putting the responsibility on the judge for the next step, thus showing he intends no harm until the condition may be met.
Deferred By Time	Generally Low Risk	A deferred-by-time threat of harm injects a time element delaying action, such as, "When I get out of jail in 10 years, I'm going to kill you." In effect, the suspect is saying she cannot do anything now, but will at some future date.

What is the suspect's motivation?		Knowing what prompted the inappropriate communication helps determine how motivated the suspect is.
Case Related	Indeterminate	Most IC's are related to a particular case.
Hidden Motive	High Risk Potential	When the suspect chooses not to reveal what his/her motivation is, it suggests an effort to hide the suspect's identity and cover tracks, both indications of preparations to commit a crime.
Habitual	Generally Low Risk	A significant but small percentage of IC's come from habitual threateners who have neither the intent nor motive to cause harm.
Irrational	High Risk Potential	Irrational suspects are often highly motivated and less inhibited in carrying out attacks.
Ideological	High Risk Potential	Suspects motivated by some ideology, particularly those whose ideology brought them into court, pose a slightly higher risk than others do.
Is the suspect presently incarcerated?		Knowing if the suspect is incarcerated or not gives insight into the suspect's ability to cause harm.
Incarcerated	Generally Low Risk	Although incarcerated suspects have been known to pose a risk, their in-custody status increases control over their actions.
Not Incarcerated	Indeterminate	Knowing that a suspect is not incarcerated suggests that he/she has the ability, but reveals nothing of motive or intent.
Is the suspect affiliated with a group?		Group affiliation suggests that the risk of harm may come from more than one source. It also suggests stronger ideological or criminal motivation.
Group Member	High Risk Potential	Suspects who belong to a group can be more motivated because of the group's support. They also have others to assist them.
No Group Affiliation	Indeterminate	Most IC's come from lone individuals.

Where was the threat or inappropriate communication received?		Knowing where the inappropriate communication was received can give insight into how much information the suspect has on the individual that he/she is threatening.
Courthouse	Indeterminate	Judicial officials are public officials; it is relatively easy to find information about them.
Residence or Other Location	High Risk Potential	Although many judicial officials make no effort to protect their privacy, delivering an inappropriate communication to the official's residence or some other location strongly suggests stalking or research on the target.

When conducting a threat assessment, the following factors should be considered:

- ♦ Identify and define the threat - Who? What? Why;
- ♦ Research the threat - Where? When? How;
- ♦ Accumulate and corroborate all available information and intelligence obtained from principals, witnesses, informants, and other sources;
- ♦ Prepare or review existing threat source profile;
- ♦ Review findings and form a preliminary synopsis;
- ♦ Consult with colleagues;
- ♦ Use positive and negative responses in revising the preliminary synopsis; and
- ♦ Prepare and present the final threat assessment report. The final threat assessment report should include, at a minimum:
 - ♦ An assigned case number;
 - ♦ Name of individual(s) who prepared assessment;
 - ♦ Name of individual(s) who requested threat assessment;
 - ♦ Subject(s) of threat;
 - ♦ List of those to be notified of the threat assessment;
 - ♦ Date assessment completed;
 - ♦ Threat rating – undetermined, low, moderate, or high;
 - ♦ Synopsis of assessment preparation;
 - ♦ Case overview;
 - ♦ Situational summary;
 - ♦ Case history, if any;
 - ♦ Threat source profile;
 - ♦ Statement of the threat assessed and summary of findings; and
 - ♦ Policies and procedures for agencies and/or personnel to use in responding to and counteracting the identified threat.

The report should also include a bibliography and footnotes if opinions/comments from more than one individual are incorporated and a listing of sources contacted during the analysis process.

The report should also include a bibliography and footnotes if opinions/comments from more than one individual are incorporated and a listing of sources contacted during the analysis process.

Initiating a Threat Investigation

The U.S. Marshals Service has developed a set of criteria or thresholds to use when deciding whether to move from the assessment phase to an active investigation. The most frequent outcome of a threat assessment, after measuring the threat and case circumstances, is that there is low risk to the person being threatened. Still, the assessment should be corroborated. The importance of corroboration cannot be overstated. It is necessary to reduce the probability of erroneous information and intelligence adversely affecting the final assessment.

The following criteria can be used to determine whether or not to open a threat investigation:

- ♦ **The judge or other member of the court staff requires immediate protection** - the inappropriate communication itself is one considered so immediate or threatening that immediate protection is required until the threat source has been reduced or eliminated;
- ♦ **A direct and explicit threat has been received and the district attorney indicates a willingness to prosecute the offender** - at this point the threat investigation will develop into a criminal threat investigation. **NOTE:** As long as there remains the potential of criminal prosecution against the threat source the suspect should be considered a potential risk; or
- ♦ **The threat analysis and assessment of the inappropriate communication indicates a moderate or high-threat rating** - the assessment supports the operational necessity to open an investigation.

If it is decided that a threat investigation is necessary based on the assessed risks, the goal should be to defuse the risk of harm to the judge or member of the court staff. Investigations also may be undertaken with the intent to prosecute, or as a means of gathering additional information in the event of prosecution. The sheriff's office, upon receiving information regarding a threat, may take the following steps:

- ♦ Define the threat and how it affects agency operations;
- ♦ Collect, collate, and analyze data;
- ♦ Investigate;
- ♦ Prepare preliminary assessment;
- ♦ Corroborate;
- ♦ Confirm that the assessment is supported; and
- ♦ Complete assessment report.

Threat Investigation Techniques and Responses

Watch and Wait - Instead of confronting the suspect, the threat investigator closely monitors the situation for any additional threatening action(s). Threat investigators should consider and assess the reasons behind desired and unwanted outcomes that result from confrontations with the suspect.

Security Briefings - Provided to judges and court staff to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to criminal and threatening actions.

Psychiatric or Psychological Professionals - Cooperating Assistance - If the suspect is known to be under psychiatric care (custodial or non-custodial), the attending psychiatrist or psychologist can be contacted to ascertain the suspect's case-relevant mental condition, and determine suspect's treatment and/or prognosis. Patient/client privilege and privacy laws may limit the amount of information you can obtain without a subpoena. **NOTE:** Suspect treatment

should be given due consideration by threat investigators. A number of prior threat investigations have disclosed that the onset of the inappropriate communication was preceded by a change or reduction in the suspect's use of medications. Once the suspect's medications were appropriately readjusted, the inappropriate communications stopped, and the threat was negated.

Interpersonal Communication - The process of interpersonal communication should be recognized and effectively used by the threat investigator during all suspect interviews. This encompasses not only what can be detected from the suspect, but also what messages the investigator might want to convey.

Effective listening skills will assist investigators in evaluating messages and understanding and retaining information. The final dimension of listening requires self-determination of whether a suspect's words should be interpreted at face value or with deeper meaning and intent.

Suspect empathy is the ability to experience the world from the suspect's perspective. Suspect empathy has three dimensions:

- ♦ Perspective-taking;
- ♦ Emotional or sympathetic involvement; and
- ♦ Concern, feigned or real, for the person.

When properly used, these techniques build trust (a necessary element to self-disclosure) that will likely influence the suspect to go along with a threat investigator's desires and/or directives. The following tables identify reasons and alternatives to a suspect's confession:

Reasons for Self-Disclosure or Confession

Catharsis	Self-Clarification	Self-Validation	Reciprocity
Impression Formation	Physical Health	Social Control	Manipulation
Elevated Trust	Relationship Support	Understanding	Conflict Resolution

Alternatives to Self-Disclosure or Confession

Lying	Evasive Behavior	Equivocal Language	Remaining Silent
Deception	Blaming Others	Suspicious Behavior	Refusal to Answer

Mental Health Commitment - Under Colorado law, persons under mental health commitments or holds can be committed or held for a certain number of hours in the case of an emergency. A preliminary psychiatric evaluation will be conducted, and the person may either be released or held, via court order, for further evaluation and/or commitment.

Arrest(s) - Decisions must be made concerning the point at which threat investigators are to arrest suspects. During any investigation, there may be times when the decision to arrest or not to arrest will be made solely at the discretion of the threat investigator. All arrests should be made in adherence to agency policy and procedures.

Restraining Orders - Threat investigators need to determine the case-specific information required to draft an appropriate restraining order. A few examples of these types of considerations include, but are not limited to: duration, locations, provisions, limitations, prohibitions, and enforcement of the order.

Target Transfer - The target transfer, or diversionary technique, transfers suspect focus from the judge or member of the court staff to the threat investigator.

Refocus to Support Groups - Request active support from the suspect's spouse, family, church, peers, and counselors in an attempt to effectively transfer suspect focus away from the judge or member of the court staff. **NOTE:** Threat investigators need to assess any probability of the suspect's becoming agitated or embarrassed, to the point of violent action, before this technique is used.

Caution Notice - As determined by the threat investigator, a caution notice is prepared and disseminated to sheriff's personnel, court security officers, police departments, judge or court staff, the judge's family and/or staff.

Long-Term Monitoring: - Suspect anonymity and means of opportunity are effectively diminished through continual threat investigator-initiated official contacts. Long-term monitoring allows the threat investigator to gather additional intelligence and information, observe patterns of behavior and influences, and as the situation requires, update and reassess suspect's threat potential.

Residential Surveys – Safety at the home is assessed.

Officially advise Law Enforcement and/or Emergency Contacts: Specific (primary place of residence) law enforcement contact information may be listed for each judicial officer in the sheriff's judicial personal information file. Each of the respective law enforcement agencies should be pre-contacted and requested to provide the following upon being advised of a threat: increased marked squad presence, 911 emergency dispatch notification and response, officer briefings, mutual aid, and assistance.

Criminal Statistical Summary - Conducted within a three-block radius of courthouses and judicial residences. Provides crime rates and activity information to assist the threat investigator in assessing any connection of criminal acts to inappropriate communications. Further, criminal statistics assist court security personnel in determining whether crime is increasing to the extent, e.g. atypical to urban, suburban, or rural site locations, where efforts require enhanced law enforcement and security intervention.

The U.S. Secret Services has identified several conditions regarding a suspect that indicate a greater risk of violence against a judge, including:

- ◆ A history of emergency psychiatric admission(s) and/or extremely bizarre behavior;
- ◆ Claims of a personal relationship with the judge;
- ◆ Lack of concern for self-protection;
- ◆ Concern on the part of significant others for subject's behavior;
- ◆ Fixed ideas, obsessions, or compulsions;
- ◆ Extreme or seemingly senseless but focused hostility;
- ◆ Repeated threats of violence and/or past offenses of violent behavior;
- ◆ Episodic or binge drinking and/or alcoholic blackouts;
- ◆ Involvement with violent groups;
- ◆ History of unemployment and/or situational stress;
- ◆ Lack of permanent residence –(nomadic lifestyle);
- ◆ Absence of social supports, family, church, or friends;
- ◆ Paranoid feelings on being cheated, abused, and concerned with world issues; and
- ◆ Collecting and preoccupation with weapons.

- ♦ The following table identifies types of suspects, potential methods of threat or violence, and possible motives for these actions:

AGENT	MEANS	MOTIVE
Insider (employee, contractor, visitor)	Conventional Arms: Firearms	Act of Opportunity Act of Recognition
Protester/Demonstrator	Edged Weapons	Employee/Public Threat
Anarchist	Improvised Explosive Devices	Conception
Vandal(s)	Incendiary Devices	Escalated
Criminal(s)		Monetary Gain
Prisoner(s)	Unconventional Arms: Nuclear Device	Diversionsary Tactic
Organized Crime	Biological Agent	Aid and Abet Prisoner
Dangerous/Deranged Individuals	Chemical Agent	Escape(s)
Pre-Identified Threat Source	Military Weapons	Undermine Confidence in Government/Court System
Domestic Terrorists	LAWs Rockets	Revenge / Malice
International Terrorists	RF Weapons	Domestic/Sexual Abuse
Unknown Individual(s)	Cyber Intrusion	Political Manipulation
Gangs (street, prison, motorcycle, skinhead, militant)	Threat of Attack: Bomb Scare NBC Hoax Symbolic Dates and Anniversaries Inappropriate Communications Prior Terrorist Acts	Terrorism Ideology Occupational Related Personal Adversity Self-Importance
	Threat Type: Hostage Situation Shooting Bombing Knifing Physical/Assaults Vandalism	

Courthouse Dimensions of Threat Space. From: "Behavioral Science and the Secret Service; Toward the Prevention of Assassination," Committee of the Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences:

A recommended listing of sections to incorporate within protective service detail operational plans and summaries include, but are not limited to, the following:

- ♦ Department and security detail chain of command;
- ♦ Personnel information;
- ♦ Assignments, duties, and responsibilities;
- ♦ Contact names and numbers;
- ♦ Sheriff's and police department's contact names and numbers;
- ♦ Threat intelligence;
- ♦ Media and general public issues;
- ♦ Emergency evacuation sites and procedures;
- ♦ Arrest considerations; and
- ♦ Closing and after-action reports.

Chapter 9: Security Equipment

Security Equipment

<p>BALLISTIC GLAZING</p>	<p>Ballistic glazing is designed to stop, dependant on rated levels, ballistic rounds from completely penetrating its layered shell. A glazing's rating level will indicate which ballistic rounds it is designed for. Rating levels and ballistic test requirements are set forth by Underwriters Laboratories (UL) and the National Institute of Justice. At the minimum, level UL 3 should be used. Bullet resistant glazing and detention type glazing is available in several different configurations. Laminated glass glazing can weigh between 2.5 lbs. and 26.0 lbs. per square foot. Tinting, wire, and one-way mirrors may be incorporated into glazing materials.</p> <p>Fiberglass ballistic resistant glazing (a fiberglass woven reinforced plastic) materials are used to fortify judges benches, witness stands, jury boxes, walls, doors, counters, or virtually any surface area requiring a relatively lightweight ballistic resistant material.</p>
<p>CARD KEY READERS <i>Bio-Metrics</i></p>	<p>Readers allow security doors to be accessed via use of an authorized card key. Either pass through or proximity type readers are currently available. Bio-Metric (retina, thumb, hand, etc.) scanners are recent technical advances.</p>
<p>CCTV CAMERAS <i>Closed-Circuit Television</i></p>	<p>CCTVs provide security with an operationally inherent ability to visually monitor pre-identified areas of coverage. CCTVs have a number of different available features that include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fixed (set field of coverage) Video Imaging • PTZ (pan, tilt, and zoom) Capabilities • Fixed Lenses (non-adjustable focal points) • Variable Lenses (adjustable focal points) • Fixed (indoor use) Iris Lenses • Auto (exterior or extreme lighting conditions) Iris Lenses • Black and White or Color (higher clarity) Imaging <p>CCTVs can provide video to a central location or multiple monitors and locations. They can also be set up for "point-to-point" coverage (one CCTV interfaced to a single location). CCTV video signals are relayed via coaxial cable connection or wireless technology. Power to a CCTV is supplied through a separate power source or coaxial cable connection.</p>

<p align="center">CCTV HOUSINGS <i>Enclosures</i></p>	<p>Housings/enclosures are designed to secure CCTVs and provide a certain degree of equipment protection from adverse environmental conditions, vandalism, or tampering. They are also designed and often intended to provide CCTVs with operationally enhanced and/or aesthetically unobtrusive concealment. There are numerous types of housings and enclosures available from which to meet your specific application and operational requirements. They include: corner, quarter and half domes, ceiling wedge, environmental ceiling recessed pressurized, surface mounted mini-dome, suspended pendant domes, tamper proof, institutional, scanner impact resistant, pan-tilt, liquid cooled, and infrared illuminator.</p>
<p align="center">CCTV MOUNTS</p>	<p>In lieu of housing or enclosure, CCTV mounts secure a CCTV to a fixed location. Different types include: wall, ceiling, column, universal, and pedestal.</p>
<p align="center">CCTV BACKUP/ STORAGE</p>	<p>Continual recording of the CCTV cameras is a critical factor in the development of a CCTV system. These recordings may become critical pieces of evidence in the investigation of a possible crime. Analogue and Digital backup/storage devices are currently available. Analogue uses conventional VCR tapes, and requires continual monitoring of tape quality and tape exchange to be effective. Digital is much more sophisticated, and offers increased length of taping and enhancement capabilities. The location of such devices is critical as they should be well protected and accessed by only a few individuals.</p>
<p align="center">DOOR VIEWERS</p>	<p>Door viewers, or peepholes, allow observation of pre-identified areas prior to entering. Some optical instruments provide a 180-degree viewing angle with exceptional visual clarity. Door scopes allow persons to stand up to seven feet away and see a wide-angle visual image with little distortion. Door scopes are larger than door viewers and their use should be examined when aesthetics are a consideration.</p>
<p align="center">DURESS ALARMS <i>Panic Devices</i></p>	<p>Duress alarms register (via simultaneous relay) a silent, non-visual signal from the point-of-origin to a central monitoring station where an audio/visual alarm is sounded.</p>

<p>ELECTRIC STRIKES</p>	<p>Enables security doors in controlled access systems to be electronically released. The release action can be controlled remotely by a strike release, use of a reader, or entering a numeric code into the electronic pin pad. Electric strikes are designed to be installed in doorframes. In reference to new construction: final decisions to use electric strikes should be made early in the design phase so door frames can be “prepped” prior to their being installed</p>
<p>ELECTRIC STRIKE RELEASES</p>	<p>Individual remote and/or local release buttons or readers that activate the release of an electric strike allowing access through a specific door that has been equipped with controlled access.</p>
<p>ELECTRIFIED MORTISE LOCKS</p>	<p>The door hardware itself (lever, internal mechanisms, and latch) is wired electronically for access control. Access is controlled by electronic pin pads, readers, and release buttons.</p>
<p>FLUOROSCOPES <i>X-ray Machines</i></p>	<p>A fluoroscope provides x-ray imaging or viewing of weapons, explosives, contraband, etc. Depending on the system operator, this equipment is considered as effective a screening and detection device as is currently available.</p>
<p>INTERCOMS</p>	<p>Provides point-to-point audio communication and identification. An intercom remote can only send and receive audio from a single location. An intercom master is able to send and receive audio from multiple point locations and connections. See page 99 for more information on intercom systems.</p>
<p>MAGNETIC LOCKS</p>	<p>Used for controlled access systems that do not accommodate electric strikes or lock sets. Ideally suited for double door applications. Access is controlled by electronic pin pads, readers, and release buttons.</p>
<p>MAGNETOMETERS <i>Walk-Thru</i></p>	<p>Magnetometers are designed to detect all metal objects (subject to programmed sensitivity levels) persons attempt to carry through the detectors frame. Metal objects that are carried past the immediate outside of the magnetometer frame will also be detected.</p> <p>A majority of the magnetometers in use today DO NOT indicate where the metal object is located other than on the person and/or article being screened. The use of a hand-held metal detector in combination with these magnetometers will assist in confirming the exact location of the metal object in question. Of note, recent technology has brought about the design of detectors that will provide general and, in some models, the exact location(s) of metal objects. This is accomplished through a Lighted Electronic Display (LED) located on the entire length</p>

	<p>of the side panel or through a monitor designed with computer graphics.</p> <p>Placement of magnetometers may be dictated by surrounding areas that potentially interfere with magnetometer readings. It may be necessary to reposition or even relocate the magnetometer altogether if this is the case.</p> <p>Preliminary site testing of the magnetometer at various intervals of your screening operations point will identify a suitable location. Even though the magnetometer is typically considered a detection device, its initial and believed continuous value, whether incorporated with a fluoroscope (x-ray machine) or not, is one of deterrence. A primary advantage of magnetometers is their desired ability to efficiently handle high traffic volume areas.</p>
<p>METAL DETECTORS <i>Hand-Held</i></p>	<p>Hand-held metal detectors are highly mobile and relatively inexpensive. They are designed to determine the exact location of a metal substance, usually on a person. They can be used as single detection devices, with a disadvantage being the reduction in the volume of persons being screened, or preferably, in conjunction with a walk-thru metal detector.</p> <p>It is recommended that, at minimum, the number of detectors of this type be purchased on a ratio comparable to the number of courtrooms and/or screening systems located within your facility. Policies will need to be outlined and implemented which reference procedures to follow when using this metal detector. For example: the proper technique to use is not a jabbing motion but one with a steady motion that outlines the body from a distance of two to three inches (subject to programmed sensitivity levels).</p> <p>If your stated objective is the detection of firearms and explosive devices, it may not be necessary to subject persons to complete screening. The professional and recurrent training of security staff personnel will allow them to initially, visually assess persons, and then concentrate the detector on those areas where firearms and explosives can be concealed. If, however, you desire detection of smaller-edged weapons, all encompassing screening of a person is required.</p>
<p>NUMERIC PIN PADS</p>	<p>Numeric pin pads are electronic or mechanical device that allows authorized individuals to enter a numeric code to gain access into a secured area. Pin pads are designed for ease of operation in facilitating employee access.</p> <p>Numeric displays that are either vertically or horizontally designed (numbers up and down or side to side) are usually mechanical devices (open doors with a door latch) while those</p>

	<p>similar to touch tone phones are usually electronic devices (open doors with an electronic strike).</p> <p>High security areas may require a scrambling pin pad which automatically scrambles (code is less likely to be compromised) the location of each number after each use.</p>
<p>SECURITY LIGHTING</p>	<p>Seven primary types of security lighting:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuous - series of continuous fixed lighting. • Controlled - lighting adjusted to meet protective requirements. • Area - illumination of all open areas. • Surface - illuminates priority structures and building surfaces. • Standby - supplemental lighting system that automatically or manually activates on alarms or suspicious activities. • Moveable - manually operated floodlights or searchlights • Emergency lighting - limited to times of power failure or other emergencies. Battery powered or hard wired. Five types of lamps: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incandescent - common type of glass light bulb. • Mercury Vapor - emits a blue/green light (interior/exterior lighting). • Sodium Vapor - emits a golden/yellow light (i.e. streets and garages). • Metal Halide - emits a bright white light. • Fluorescent - supply high light output (not to be used outdoors).
<p>SECURITY MONITORS</p>	<p>Depending on the type of CCTV and monitor, a security monitor provides black and white or color video image from a CCTV camera. Security monitors can accommodate dedicated (fixed image), sequencing (multiple CCTV video images shown at pre-programmed intervals), single (one video image at a time), dual (two video images), or quad (four images) video imaging. Standard sizing includes: 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, and 20-inch models.</p>
<p>VEHICLE BARRIERS</p>	<p>Vehicle barriers operate exactly as their name indicates; they create a barrier to vehicles. Different types include: bollards (high-impact solid construction), drop arms (impact-resistant crash beams), and electro-hydraulic powered barriers (high-impact barrier, standard for controlled access, rapid deployment models available).</p>

Intercom Systems

Intercom systems should enable the judge to communicate with the court security staff, coordinator, or dispatcher in an emergency (i.e. a medical emergency, court security officer backup, or for assistance during any emergency). To do so subtly and without jeopardizing the safety of anyone, the judge may use a telephone that is capable of connecting to a dispatcher by the push of a button.

Certain telephones or intercoms are capable of transmitting voice while the handset is still in the phone cradle. This allows someone in the courtroom to alert a sheriff's dispatcher without alarming the perpetrator or others at the calling end. It also enables the judge to continue, hands-free, to control the situation, or to leave the courtroom if a hostile environment is developing.

How It Works

- It is absolutely essential that the telephone system be connected directly to the sheriff's dispatcher or police dispatcher. With that connection in place, a phone card is inserted into the system that can accommodate up to several telephones.
- Since the wiring and connections are already in place, all that remains to be done is to install a button that is connected to the telephone, but not necessarily located on the phone. It may be connected to the telephone by wires from a location on or beneath the bench in the courtroom. It also may be located in the court reporter's area, in the court security officer's area or station (or bailiff's box), and at or beneath the court clerk or court attendant or law clerk's desk.
- Once the button is pushed and the system is activated, a red light, LED, or pilot jewel is illuminated to indicate the button has been pushed. This does not, however, indicate whether the dispatcher has picked up the receiver.
- Once the dispatcher picks up the phone in the dispatch center, a number of things can happen: The audio can be recorded, the dispatcher can hear the conversation and audible circumstances in the courtroom or chambers, and assistance can be dispatched.

Advantages of the System

- It allows the dispatcher or court security officer monitoring the telephones to have the same direct contact with the courtroom to alert to trouble.
- It has the greater advantage of allowing the monitor to hear what is going on and direct assistance to the courtroom or chambers immediately.
- It affords the monitor to select the kind of assistance that is necessary—medical, security, fire, or whatever may be needed.
- It allows the dispatcher or court security officer to continue the audible proceedings while being undetected so as to communicate with emergency responders while en route, without alerting an assailant that help is on the way.
- It also allows the dispatcher or court security officer monitoring to hear what may be displayed on a video monitor in a dispatching center or court security control room.

CHAPTER 10: COURTHOUSE BUILDING & REMODELING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

Renovation, Remodeling & New Construction

It is important to note that security is but one of the significant design issues involved when considering structural changes to a courthouse. The purpose of this chapter is to assist courts and counties as they undertake efforts to improve court security through physical changes to the courthouse. The following factors should be considered when assessing the most appropriate approach to renovating a courthouse:

- Location and site requirements;
- Existing structural or physical features that will not allow significant change;
- Life safety requirements
- Historical features;
- Area and size of the court floors;
- Multiple entries due to the facility's urban location;
- Accessibility; and
- Feasibility.

The Courthouse Security Design Process

The design process for renovation or building should involve the judiciary, sheriff, court personnel, county property management, and architectural, engineering, and security consultants familiar with the issues. The design process will generally proceed with the following tasks:

- Programming – setting goals and objectives;
- Existing Conditions - survey of existing facilities;
- Conceptual Design - development of space, function, and security needs;
- Schematic Design - design options;
- Construction Documentation - implementation of desired option; and
- Construction - construction and renovation.

The following factors should be considered in the design of the modern courthouse.

Compliance - The facility should comply with applicable Colorado statutes laws, building codes, the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), and with Colorado Supreme Court and State Court Administrator's Office guidelines and standards.

Functionality - The facility should be easy for the public to access, designed for efficient court operations, and flexible for future needs. It should be intuitive in layout, allowing the public to easily find the services they need.

Security – Design may include single point of entry and provides separate and controlled access for in-custody defendants, judges, and staff. There are no blind spots. Facility zoning separates judicial, public, jury, and prisoner circulation. Duress buttons are well placed or wireless. There is direct, secure prisoner delivery to the courtrooms. There are special victim/witness waiting areas, multiple waiting areas for separation of conflicting parties, and adequate conference rooms for parties and lawyers.

Test of Time - The courthouse should be constructed of durable materials of sufficient quality to convey the importance of the activities that take place within the courthouse. Courtrooms should be designed as generalized litigation spaces rather than over-specialized.

Technology - The design may include provisions for:

- High-tech courtrooms;
- Automation of record keeping and other court functions;
- Infrastructure for new technologies even if they are not going to be implemented immediately; and
- Automated court reporting.

Flexibility - Court design should provide courtrooms with equal access for all judges. Courtrooms and court-related spaces can be designed for multiple uses. Use modular workstations to create a flexible office layout. Standardize judicial quarters.

Judicial Image - Courthouse design should consider appropriate ceiling height and room volumes and spaces to provide traditional dignity in courtrooms, while reducing excessive formality. The design should accommodate appropriate courtroom sight lines and heights of judicial positions, encouraging judicial process and protocol. Courtrooms intended for use in family cases and cases involving children should have specialized design to match the sensitive nature of the proceedings.

Environmental - The design should include acoustical control, lighting appropriate to tasks, and ventilation appropriate to the expected occupancy of the courthouse.

Accessibility - There should be equal access to all positions in courtrooms/courthouse.

Courtroom Design

Well/gallery and courtroom participant/observer circulation areas should be clearly defined. Ideally, this is done during the design stage of courthouse construction or renovation projects. It can still be incorporated into existing facilities, as even unobtrusive separation allows judicial officers and security personnel to instantly self-assess a person's intentions, manifested or otherwise, while subsequently allowing them to respond with the appropriate action. Also, only fixed seating (benches or individual chairs clamped together) should be allowed in courtrooms. As documented and reported by the news media, a number of times during the past few years, chairs not secured are potential weapons and have been used in such a manner to create courtroom disturbances.

Courtroom exits leading to judge-controlled access areas should be secured to prevent any unauthorized entry. Those exits designated for emergency use can be equipped with delayed exiting panic hardware. This type of door hardware satisfies fire codes and will prevent anyone from entering a designated security area for a pre-programmed period of time.

To eliminate the possibility of an accidental or intentional blackout condition, standard light switches should be changed to a key-activated variety. Another option is to have separate banks of lights controlled by multiple light switches in varied locations.

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design

Space design and layout of court facilities from a security point of view is the best accomplished following the principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). As it applies to courthouses, CPTED uses building design features that deter inappropriate conduct, while at the same time encouraging the legitimate uses of the courthouse. This balanced approach reflects the need to improve court security while conveying an image of openness and accessibility.

CPTED has three overlapping concepts: natural access control, natural surveillance, and territorial reinforcement.

- **Access control** uses people, electrical and mechanical devices, and natural measures to create a perception of risk to potential offenders and deny them access to restricted areas of the courthouse. These measures are balanced by procedures and designs that guide the court's users in an understandable, efficient, and safe manner.
- **Surveillance** involves the location and use of physical features, electrical and mechanical devices, activities, and people to maximize visibility. It is intended to create a risk of detection for potential offenders and a perception of safety for the public and court staff.
- **Territoriality** delineates and allows the easy identification of certain areas as semi-private and private.

Applying CPTED Principles

Courtroom: Security may be provided with architectural barriers, technology, and operational methods. Architecturally, security is provided through the clear separation of circulation routes for participants in the proceedings and the elimination of spaces where a weapon or bomb might be placed. The public should enter the courtroom from the public zone, prisoners should enter through a secure zone, and judges and court staff should enter through a restricted or private zone. Technologically, the courtroom can be made more secure through the use of magnetometers at the entrance of the courthouse (or entrance to a specific courtroom) and duress alarms connected to security stations to transmit an audio or visual depiction of the action occurring in the courtroom.

Judge's Bench: The front panel of the judge's desk should be made of bullet-absorptive materials. Care should be taken not to use steel-plated, bullet-resistant materials, as this may cause bullets to ricochet through the courtroom. The judge's bench should have a concealed, silent, positive-action duress alarm that will directly alert the courthouse security station or an employee trained in emergency notification procedures. While care should be taken to avoid placement of the alarm where it could be accidentally activated, the alarm should be within easy reach of the judge and its activation should be as inconspicuous as possible. The button should also activate an audio or, preferably, video system within the courtroom, which transmits to the security station. This will enable security personnel to determine what is occurring in the courtroom and plan an appropriate response.

Clerk's Station: The court clerk's station may have the same duress alarm/intercom system as the judge, providing direct linkage with central security through a foot- or knee-activated button under the work surface.

Court Reporter's Station: As a court reporter could be sitting near a potentially hostile and violent witness, the court reporter's station should allow for an easy escape.

Jury Box: The jury box should incorporate a modest panel and shelf area to provide some distance from trial participants. A court security officer may be stationed between the jury box and the spectators to prevent any communication or intimidation.

Attorney Tables: The tables should not have drawers or concealed recesses where a weapon or bomb may be placed.

The Court Security Officer's Station (if applicable): The court security officer must have access to a duress button, which is connected to the main security office.

Placement of Security Equipment

Architectural space design and system integration proposals for security screening must revolve around the required association between security personnel/equipment and operational policies and procedures relating to judicial security. A proper design layout also recognizes and acknowledges the absolute necessity of providing security screening personnel with unobstructed sight lines of persons entering the screening area. This surveillance arrangement affords personnel an opportunity to observe, assess, and appropriately respond to suspicious persons exhibiting threatening behavioral characteristics. As screening equipment and conditions vary, it is not possible to determine exactly where personnel will be positioned. It is far more beneficial to generally state screening objectives and position responsibilities that should provide sufficient information as well as desired flexibility in finalizing a system design.

- **Magnetometers** (walk-thru metal detectors) detect all metal objects, subject to programmed sensitivity levels, that persons attempt to pass through the detector frame. Most do not indicate where the metal object is located other than on the person and/or article being screened. A hand-held metal detector must be used in combination with the magnetometer in order to determine the exact location of the metal object in question. Consequently, a discreet area of sufficient size must be conveniently located in which to screen persons for such items. To facilitate the screening process by eliminating alarms on commonly carried items, persons are directed to place all metal objects on an adjacent counter-top area. For each magnetometer, the counter-top area should be a minimum of 36 inches wide in order to adequately provide for this routine and continuous procedure.

Placement of the magnetometer(s) may be dictated by surrounding areas, or the location of a second magnetometer that may interfere with its sensitivity readings. It may be necessary to slightly reposition or even relocate the magnetometer(s) altogether if this is the case. In attempts to eliminate this problem, it is recommended that preliminary site tests be conducted on all proposed magnetometer locations.

- **Fluoroscopes** (x-ray machines) are used to detect firearms, weapons, explosives, and contraband in packages, boxes, personal items, etc. Fluoroscope conveyor belts require specific attention during architectural design to address the need for aesthetic attachments or tables to prevent multiple screened items from amassing at the end of the belt and falling to the floor.

The main responsibility for security screening personnel is to ensure all visitors, employees (as determined by security committee), and belongings are screened prior to entering the building. Personnel must be able to verbally and visually instruct persons on screening procedures. For each screening system, a total of two officers will be routinely assigned. However, any system design should also incorporate features to accommodate operation by an individual officer. Simultaneously, this officer should be able to issue instructions, operate the fluoroscope, and read the magnetometer display panel.

Additional Security Considerations

- What type and level of ballistic-resistant material and/or glazing (mylar, steel mesh, etc.) will be installed in adjacent walls and the side and front panels?
- To what extent will this material be installed?
- Will mail screening also be conducted at a separate remote location?
- Is there an adequately sized area for persons to exit the building without interfering with screening operations?
- What sensitivity levels will be programmed for the magnetometers?
- What type and number of courthouse signs are required to advise persons of screening policies and procedures? Where should these and other courthouse signs or directories be located?
- Will weapons and/or contraband be seized and confiscated? Will weapons and/or contraband be held and secured (gun lockers and lock boxes) at the screening point?
- Because weapons may be detected at screening stations, will armed personnel be assigned to security screening? Or will they be available on a response basis?

Standards for Historic Rehabilitation

A guide to sensitive treatment of historic buildings is available in *The Secretary of the Interior's Standards for Rehabilitation*, a chapter of a larger technical reference publication issued by the National Park Service of the U.S. Department of the Interior entitled *The Secretary of the Interior's Standards for the Treatment Historic Properties*. These standards are used by every SHPO in reviewing the impact of work on historic buildings, and as guidance in the recognition of significant features and the determination of sensitive treatment to respect and retain such features. The standards can be found at <http://www.cr.nps.gov/tps/tax/rhb/>.

The standards define rehabilitation as “the process of returning a property to a state of utility, through repair or alteration, which makes possible an efficient contemporary use while preserving those portions and features of the property which are significant to its historic, architectural, and cultural values.” The standards focus on ten major areas ranging from use and historic character, to retention and replication of features, to impacts of additions and new construction. When considering the intent of the definition, it is important to recognize the broad interpretation of such words as “utility,” “alteration,” “contemporary,” and “preserving.” Together they promote treatments which will continue the usefulness of the property, with sympathetic changes, to provide for a use which will satisfy the demands of today while retaining those qualities which are important to its past.

The National Register of Historic Places is the nation’s official list of properties deemed worthy of preservation. The Register is maintained by the National Park Service in the U.S. Department of the Interior and is administered by a State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) in each state. The National Register recognizes properties that have local, state, or national

significance. Properties may be listed on the Register because of their association with significant persons and events, because of their architectural or engineering significance, or because they contain important information about our history or prehistory. Their preservation may be encouraged through certain federal tax benefits and state and federal grant funds. An environmental review process also protects properties that may be affected by state projects or federally funded or licensed undertakings. National Register listing often changes the way communities perceive their historic properties and gives credibility to efforts to preserve them. Listing, however, does not interfere with a private property owner's right to alter, manage, or dispose of the property.

Threats to Colorado's County Courthouses

Unfortunately, despite their architectural and historical significance, county courthouses often fall prey to the lack of appropriate maintenance and, in some cases, abandonment. The threats facing older courthouses continue to intensify. Most county courthouses were built well before modern building codes, before rural counties urbanized and before the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, otherwise known as ADA. Ironically, while safety and administration demands continue to escalate for county government; the financing needed to maintain and restore these aging public facilities becomes ever more elusive. Although built to be permanent, an older facility can become inadequate due to either shifting demographics or newly imposed responsibilities.

A major issue facing many older, publicly owned buildings is the Americans with Disabilities Act. With the passage of the ADA in 1990, access to all public property is now a civil right. Many accessibility modifications can be readily achieved without adversely affecting a historic building's character defining qualities. These modifications include installing ramps or repositioning shelves or water fountains. Other access issues might require something more expensive, such as an addition that includes an elevator.

Appendix: Court Security Checklist

Physical Security Checklist

Court Facility _____

Date Facility
Constructed: _____

Date of Site Visit _____

Prepared by _____

Yes No

Perimeter (e.g., fences and gates)

1. Is the perimeter of the courthouse grounds clearly defined by a fence, wall, or other type of physical barrier? _____

2. Does the barrier limit or control vehicle or pedestrian access to the courthouse? _____

3. Comments: _____

Lights

1. Is the entire perimeter lighted? _____

2. Are light fixtures suitable for outside use (i.e., are they weather- and tamper-resistant)? _____

3. Is the exterior of the building (particularly entry points) sufficiently lighted to discourage unlawful entry attempts or placement of explosives against the walls? _____
 4. Are public areas (including parking spaces and walkways) sufficiently lighted to discourage attacks against persons or vehicles? _____
 5. Comments: _____
-

Parking Areas

1. Is a reserved parking lot on courthouse grounds? _____
 2. Is the reserved area closed or locked during nonbusiness hours? _____
 3. Are parking spaces reserved by name? _____
 4. Are parking spaces reserved by number? _____
 5. Is there direct access for judges from the garage to nonpublic elevators or restricted corridors? _____
 6. Can unattended vehicles park near or next to the courthouse? _____
 7. Comments: _____
-

Landscaping

1. Do landscape features provide places for potential intruders to hide? _____
2. Are there items such as bricks, stones, or wooden fence pickets which could be used by intruders as weapons, missiles, or tools? _____
3. Does landscaping (bollards, benches, site elevation, or declination) impede a vehicle from being driven into the building? _____

4. Are jersey-type barricades used to block access to certain exterior areas? _____

5. Comments: _____

Doors, Windows, and other Openings

1. Are all exterior doors at least 1¾-inch solid core wood, metal clad, or metal? _____

2. Are all hinge pins internally located, welded, or otherwise treated to prevent easy removal? _____

3. Are exterior locks designed or exterior doorframes built so that the door cannot be forced by spreading the frame? _____

4. Are all unused doors permanently locked? _____

5. Are windows that could be used for entry protected with:
a. locking devices _____
b. metal bars _____
c. mesh _____
d. intrusion alarms _____
e. other (specify): _____

6. Are windows on the ground floor made of tempered glass or ballistic plastic? _____

7. Is the roof accessible by means of:
a. fire escape _____
b. another building _____
c. a pole or tree _____
d. other (specify): _____

8. Are openings to the building (e.g., tunnels, utility and sewer manholes, culverts, and service ports) properly secured? _____

9. Is there a single point of entry to the court facility? _____

10. Are individuals and their belongings screened at this entry point? _____

11. If there are multiple points of entry are individuals and their belongings screened at all entry points? _____

12. Do judges and court officers have a private entrance to the building? _____

13. Is there security screening at that private entrance? _____

11. Comments: _____

Ceilings and Walls

1. Do all walls extend to the ceiling? _____

2. Are drop or removable ceilings used in the courthouse? _____

3. Comments: _____

Alarms

1. Does the courthouse have an intrusion alarm system? _____

2. Is the system regularly tested? _____

3. Where does the alarm system terminate?

a. sheriff's department _____

b. local law enforcement office _____

c. commercial controls station _____

d. other (specify): _____

4. Comments: _____

Attic, Basements, Crawl Spaces, and Air Conditioning and Heating Ducts

1. Are doors to basements, utility rooms, boiler rooms, _____

crawl spaces, and attics locked when not in use?

2. Are crawl spaces secured from unauthorized entry? _____
3. Are air-conditioning and heating vent openings in public areas secure from tampering? _____
4. Comments: _____

Elevators

1. Are private elevators provided for judges? _____
2. Are certain elevators used exclusively to move prisoners? _____
3. Are prisoner elevators marked "Not for Public Use"? _____
4. Are prisoner elevators controlled by key? _____
5. Are prisoner elevators programmed to bypass floors? _____
6. Comments: _____

Public Area (waiting areas, rest rooms, and hallways)

1. Are waiting rooms next to courtrooms? _____
2. Is the number of waiting rooms sufficient to separate parties to a case? _____
3. Are drop or removable ceilings used in waiting rooms? _____
4. Are public rest rooms routinely searched? _____
5. Are rest rooms next to courtrooms? _____
6. Are drop or removable ceilings used in rest rooms? _____
7. Do any trash receptacles allow easy concealment of contraband? _____
8. Are directions (directories and floor plans, if appropriate) clearly posted in all public areas? _____

9. Comments: _____

Offices Handling Money

1. Does the cashier's window have security features? _____
2. Who escorts the employee carrying money to the bank?
 - a. sheriff _____
 - b. local police _____
 - c. state police _____
 - d. no one _____
 - e. other (specify): _____
3. Is the bank deposit made at varying times each day? _____
4. Comments: _____

Courthouse Procedures

1. Is there a procedure for routine daily inspection of the courthouse? _____
2. Is the court facility patrolled 24 hours a day, seven days a week? _____
3. Are tenants given periodic instruction about the various emergency procedures? _____
4. Are periodic fire and evacuation drills held? _____
5. Are public, private, and prisoner circulation patterns separated and well defined? _____
6. Is there a routine inspection of packages and shipments entering the courthouse? _____
7. Is there a policy concerning personal package deliveries made to the courthouse? _____
8. Does the court have an emergency management/continuity of operations plan (COOP)? _____

9. Does the court have a safety and security committee? _____

10. Comments: _____

Courtrooms: Location

1. Do spaces above, below, and next to the courtroom present a security hazard? _____

2. Comments: _____

Courtrooms: Doors, Windows, and Other Openings

1. Are all unused doors secured? _____

2. Are there separate entrances into the courtroom for:
a. judges _____
b. in-custody defendants _____
c. spectators _____

3. Is the prisoner entry door far enough from the public seating area to prevent passing contraband? _____

4. Are all windows draped to obscure vision (particularly of the bench) from outside? _____

5. Comments: _____

Courtrooms: Lights

1. Is there emergency lighting? _____

2. Comments: _____

Courtrooms: Furnishings

1. Is the main area or well separated from the spectators by a barrier? _____
 2. Is there a physical barrier between the well and the judge's bench? _____
 3. Is the judge's bench closed at both ends to restrict access from the well? _____
 4. Are potential weapons, such as drinking glasses, water carafes, and ashtrays, kept out of the defendant's reach? _____
 5. Comments: _____
-

Courtrooms: Security Devices

1. Is the bench reinforced to make it bullet resistant? _____
 2. Is there a duress alarm in the courtroom? _____
 - a. Does the duress alarm also indicate location? _____
 3. Are duress alarm buttons installed at:
 - a. the bench _____
 - b. clerk's station _____
 - c. bailiff's station _____
 - d. chambers _____
 - e. judge's secretary's desk _____
 - f. other (specify): _____
 4. Does the courtroom have a telephone? _____
 5. Does the courtroom have a public address system? _____
 6. Does the courthouse have a public address system? _____
 7. Comments: _____
-

Courtrooms: Security Procedures

1. Is there a policy for firearms to be carried into the courtroom by:
 - a. court security officers _____
 - b. law enforcement officer witnesses _____
 - c. law enforcement officer spectators _____
 - d. other (specify): _____
 2. Are court security officers armed in the courtroom? _____
 3. How many court security officers provide court security on a daily basis?
 - a. Fixed post _____
 - b. Roving post _____
 4. Courthouse security is provided by: (check all that apply)
 - a. Sheriff _____
 - b. Private Security Agency _____
 - c. Other (specify) _____
 5. Are there procedures for the emergency evacuation from the courtroom of:
 - a. prisoners _____
 - b. judges _____
 - c. jurors _____
 6. Is there a policy to secure weapons and other contraband offered as evidence? _____
 7. Comments: _____
-

Judges' Chambers and Related Offices

1. Is visitor access controlled by clerks, court security officers, or secretaries? _____
2. Do these chambers have more than one means of entry and exit? _____
3. Are the chambers routinely locked when the judge is not present? _____

4. Are outside views, particularly of judges' desks, obscured? _____
 5. Do chambers have duress alarms? _____
 6. Comments: _____
-

Witness Waiting Room

1. Are witness waiting rooms provided? _____
 2. Is it possible to separate prosecution and defense witnesses? _____
 3. Is public access to waiting rooms restricted? _____
 4. Comments: _____
-

Jury Deliberation Room

1. Is the jury deliberation room next to the courtroom or accessible through a controlled passage? _____
 2. Are the windows draped? _____
 3. Are rest rooms provided as an integral part of the deliberation area? _____
 4. Is the deliberation room routinely searched for contraband before occupancy? _____
 5. Is the deliberation room locked when unoccupied? _____
 6. Comments: _____
-

Data Processing and Court Records

1. Is a back-up record made for electronic court records each day? _____

- 2. Is electronic court data stored off-site? _____
 - 3. Has a "black bag" containing valuable court documents, orders, and computer information been assembled? _____
 - 4. Is the door to the location in which computer servers are located locked at all times except for authorized users? _____
 - 5. Is the fire suppression system for the computer server location zoned (if sprinkler type) or chemical? _____
 - 6. Comments: _____
-

In the event of a courthouse emergency requiring relocation what is the alternate location's address and phone number?
