FILED IN THE Colorado Supreme Court SUPREME COURT 101 West Colfax Avenue, Suite 800 Denver, CO 80202 OF THE STATE OF COLORADO Original Proceeding Pursuant to § 1-40-107(2), C.R.S. Christopher T. Ryan, Clerk Appeal from the Ballot Title Board In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for Proposed Initiatives 2011-2012 #67, #68 and #69 Petitioner: Philip Hayes v. Respondents: David Ottke and John Slota, and Title Board: ▲ COURT USE ONLY ▲ Suzanne Staiert, Daniel Domenico, and Sharon Eubanks. Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Parties: Case Number: 2012SA117 Name(s): Jason R. Dunn, #33011 Michael D. Hoke, #41034

AMICUS CURLAE BRIEF FOR COLORADO CONCERN, DENVER METRO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COLORADO COMPETITIVE COUNCIL, COLORADO ASSOCIATION OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, AURORA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GRAND

MAY 1 4 2012

CLERK

COLORADO SUPREME COURT,

BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER

410 Seventeenth Street, Suite 2200

SCHRECK, LLP

Denver, CO 80202-4432

303.223.1100

303.223.1111

jdunn@bhfs.com

Address:

Phone Number:

FAX Number:

E-mail:

JUNCTION AREA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ACTION 22, NAIOP COLORADO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF COLORADO, PROGRESSIVE 15, CASTLE ROCK ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, DENVER SOUTH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP, CLUB 20, PUEBLO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, VISIT DENVER, THE CONVENTION & VISITORS BUREAU, COLORADO HOTEL AND LODGING ASSOCIATION COLORADO OIL AND GAS ASSOCIATION, COLORADO RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, COLORADO ASSOCIATION OF MECHANICAL AND PLUMBING CONTRACTORS, COLORADO CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION, COLORADO ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL BOARDS, ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS-COLORADO, COLORADO BIOSCIENCE ASSOCIATION, COLORADO'S FUTURE, COLORADO CHILDREN'S CAMPAIGN, COLORADO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, AND PIPEFITTERS LOCAL **UNION #208** 

Colorado Supreme Court 101 West Colfax Avenue, Suite 800 Denver, CO 80202 Original Proceeding Pursuant to § 1-40-107(2), C.R.S. Appeal from the Ballot Title Board In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for Proposed Initiatives 2011-2012 #67, #68 and #69 Petitioner: Philip Hayes v. **Respondents:** David Ottke and John Slota, and ▲ COURT USE ONLY ▲ Title Board: Suzanne Staiert, Daniel Domenico, and Sharon Eubanks. Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Parties: Case Number: 2012SA117 Jason R. Dunn, #33011 Name(s): Michael D. Hoke, #41034 **BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER** Address: SCHRECK, LLP 410 Seventeenth Street, Suite 2200 Denver, CO 80202-4432 303.223.1100 Phone Number: FAX Number: 303.223.1111 jdunn@bhfs.com E-mail: CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief complies with all requirements of C.A.R. 28 and C.A.R. 32, including all formatting requirements set forth in these rules. Specifically, the undersigned certifies that:

The brief complies with C.A.R. 28(g).
Choose one:
□It contains 2,088 words.
☑It does not exceed 30 pages.
The brief complies with C.A.R. 28(k).
□ For the party raising the issue:
It contains under a separate heading (1) a concise statement of the applicable standard of appellate review with citation to authority; and (2) a citation to the precise location in the record (R, p), not to an entire document, where the issue was raised and ruled on.
□For the party responding to the issue: It contains, under a separate heading, a statement of whether such party agrees with the opponent's statements concerning the standard of review and preservation for appeal, and if not, why not.
preservation for appear, and it not, why not.
☑ I acknowledge that my brief may be stricken if it fails to comply with any of the requirements of C.A.R. 28 and C.A.R. 32.

Pursuant to C.A.R. 29, the *amicus curiae* parties listed below, through their undersigned counsel, conditionally file this *amicus curiae* brief in support of Petitioner Philip Hayes, and state as follows:

### AMICUS CURIAE PARTIES

The following organizations (collectively, the "Amicus Parties"), representing a wide array of business, labor, trade and community organizations, seek leave to participate as *amicus curiae*:

## Business organizations and chambers of commerce:

Colorado Concern
Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce
Colorado Competitive Council (C3)
Colorado Association of Commerce and Industry
Aurora Chamber of Commerce
Grand Junction Area Chamber of Commerce
Action 22
NAIOP Colorado
Economic Development Council of Colorado
Progressive 15
Castle Rock Economic Development Council
Denver South Economic Development Partnership
Club 20
Pueblo Chamber of Commerce
Visit Denver

### **Trade Associations:**

Colorado Hotel and Lodging Association
Colorado Oil and Gas Association
Colorado Restaurant Association
Colorado Association of Mechanical and Plumbing Contractors

Colorado Contractors Association Colorado Association of School Boards Associated General Contractors – Colorado Colorado Bioscience Association

### Non-profit community organizations:

Colorado's Future Colorado Children's Campaign

### Labor organizations:

Colorado Education Association Pipefitters Local Union #208

### INTRODUCTION

The Amicus Parties are twenty-seven community business, labor, trade and community organizations that play an active role is shaping public policy in Colorado. They include statewide and local chambers of commerce, small business groups, the state's largest teachers' union, business advocacy organizations, three different rural advocacy groups representing all sixty-four counties, and children's interest non-profits.

While some of these organizations often work together on public policy issues, and even sometimes disagree on others, rarely do all twenty-seven of them come together on a single issue. Yet in 2011, they came together for one purpose: to draft and support a change in the way Colorado's citizen initiative process is conducted. The goal was to create greater transparency as to who is behind a

ballot measure and subsequent campaign, to ensure that initiative proponents would be held to a higher degree of accountability than under then-existing standards, and to improve the title-drafting process itself so as to ensure that the titles better reflect a measure's true purpose and effect. The result of this effort was House Bill 11-1072 ("HB 1072"), a bipartisan bill that received overwhelming support throughout the legislative process.

Because HB 1072 was successful in advancing these objectives, the Amicus Parties here seek to maintain that success through its participation in this case and by supporting the Petitioner's effort to reverse the Title Board's misinterpretation and misapplication of section 1-40-106(4)(a).

The language of section 1-40-106(4)(a) is unambiguous: it requires that both proponents attend every meeting of the Title Board in which the proponents' measure is considered. In refusing to conclude that it lacked jurisdiction in this matter based on the failure of one proponent, John Slota, to be present at the rehearing on April 19, the Title Board committed reversible error. The measure should therefore be returned to the Title Board with instruction to find that it lacks jurisdiction to set a title, and pursuant to 1-40-106(4)(d), shall afford the proponents the opportunity to each appear at the next regular meeting of the Title

Board and to have a title set, barring other defects in the measure or the proceeding.

### **ARGUMENT**

I. SECTION 1-40-106(4)(a) UNAMBIGUOUSLY REQUIRED THAT BOTH PROPONENTS ATTEND THE REHEARING.

As amicus curiae participants in this case, the Amicus Parties primary objective is to help educate the Court regarding the legislative history and intent of Section 1-40-106(4)(a), which is set forth below. However, the Amicus Parties first argue that the Court need not reach into the legislative history of this provision because its language unambiguously requires that both proponents attended each and every hearing and rehearing at which their measure is considered. As that provision states:

each designated representative of the proponents shall appear at any title board meeting at which the designated representative's ballot issue is considered.

C.R.S. § 1-40-106(4)(a) (emphasis added).

Four key words in section 1-40-106(4)(a) support this conclusion. First, rather than describing the requirement as to who must attend the Title Board meetings as "a representative," "one representative," or even "the representatives," the General Assembly elected to use the words "each designated representative." "Each" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as:

a distributive adjective pronoun, which denotes or refers to every one of the persons or things mentioned; every one of two or more person or things, composing the whole, separately considered. Each is synonymous with "all" and agrees in inclusiveness....

Black's definition is not a legal distinction differing from common usage; Webster's Dictionary defines "each" similarly as "being one of two or more distinct individuals having a similar relation and often constituting an aggregate; each one."

Third, the statute refers to the designated representatives attending any "meeting" of the Title Board, not any "hearing," which might arguably denote an intent to distinguish the first hearing of the Title Board from the subsequent rehearing. Had the legislature intended to limit the dual attendance requirement in that way, it could have easily said so, or it could have simply used the more

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 351 (abridged 6th ed. 1991).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 391 (1985).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Merriam-Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 93 (1989).

descriptive term "hearing" rather than the more generic "meeting." But the legislature instead referred expressly to "any meeting" so as to require the proponents' participation throughout the entire Title Board process.

Fourth, the statute uses the imperative "shall" in requiring each designated representative to appear. This term renders attendance at any meeting mandatory.<sup>4</sup>

Accordingly, the requirement that both proponents attend the rehearing is both unambiguous and inflexible, and is violated if *either* of the representatives is absent. Likewise, the statute is similarly unambiguous as to the effect of such failure:

The title board *shall not* set a title for a ballot issue if *either* designated representative of the proponents fails to appear at a title board meeting or file the affidavit as required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection (4). The title board may consider the ballot issue at its next meeting, but the requirements of this subsection (4) shall continue to apply.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, the Title Board simply lacks jurisdiction to set a title in such cases.

Notably, this is no different than any other jurisdictional issue raised on rehearing, such as when a Title Board finds that substantive changes were made after the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See, e.g., Colorado State Bd. of Med. Examiners v. Saddoris, 825 P.2d 39, 43 (Colo. 1992) ("The word 'shall' is presumed to indicate a mandatory requirement.").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> C.R.S § 1-40-106(4)(d) (emphasis added).

review and comment hearing, that the measure is so vague as to make setting a title impossible, or that the measure contains multiple subjects in violation of constitutional single-subject requirement. In each case, the Title Board loses jurisdiction at the rehearing and must refuse to set a title. However, unlike those situations, the jurisdictional failure caused by not having both proponents at a meeting of the Title Board is not fatal, as the Title Board may reconsider the measure at a subsequent meeting if both proponents are then in attendance.

# II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF HB 1072 AND THE PURPOSES BEHIND THAT BILL DEMONSTRATES AN INTENT TO REQUIRE ATTENDANCE AT REHEARINGS.

HB 1072 (attached as Ex. 1) was the end product of the Amicus Parties and others coming together with legislative leaders and the Governor to try and improve the initiative process in Colorado. The purpose of the legislation was to create greater transparency, accountability, and clarity in the title-setting and signature-gathering process. Requiring that both proponents attend each and every hearing at which their initiative is considered was key to achieving these goals. This is particularly true in light of the fact that it is now common practice for objectors to a proposed measure to skip the initial meeting of the Title Board and object only through a subsequent written motion for rehearing and oral argument. As such, the rehearing has in reality become the "real" hearing on a measure.

Indeed, it is often the only point in the title setting process at which a detailed discussion regarding the meaning and effect of a measure occurs. Through objections raised by opponents at the rehearing, it is often the stage at which the Title Board fully examines the single-subject of the measure, whether substantive changes were made after review and comment hearing beyond those in direct response to questions or comments, and whether the title as initially adopted best reflects the true import of the measure.

Moreover, while the legislative hearings on HB 1072 did not focus on the attendance requirement (arguably because the language was so clearly unambiguous), multiple opponents of the measure testified that the idea of requiring attendance at every meeting of the Title Board was overly burdensome. For example, one opponent of the legislation expressly objected to requiring the proponents attend "all hearings" on the measure, and another testified against requiring "both representatives to show up at every single hearing" and that to "have them both show up for all of the different hearings is a complication, it's a hurdle that is put in front of us…" Despite these protests, no one in the room—

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See Exhibit 2 (audio recording of February 2, 2011 House Committee on State, Veterans, and Military Affairs hearing on HB 1072) at pt. 2 00:09:23–00:10:12 & 00:10:26–00:11:04 (testimony of Elena Nunez) & 00:13:10–00:13:56 & 00:14:40–00:15:30 (testimony of Natalie Menten).

not the bill sponsor nor any committee member or supporter of HB 1072—objected to this interpretation or claimed that the objectors were misreading the proposed legislation. It appears simply that everyone present shared the same reading of the legislation's attendance requirement as requiring both proponents to attend every meeting of the Title Board.

Passing legislation that required both proponents to be at the rehearing not only served the Amicus Parties policy objectives, it did not take long for their concerns to become reality: at the April 26, 2012 rehearing on Initiative 2011–2012 #95, the absence of both proponents became problematic when the Title Board was left to speculate as to whether changes made to the measure by the proponents were responsive to comments made at the review and comment hearing. Proponents themselves were in the best position to answer these questions, yet with both absent the Title Board was simply left to guess, relying only on the directly contradictory statements of an objector whose counsel claimed to have listened to the review and comment hearing, and the hearsay testimony of

one Title Board member who had apparently spoken with the staff person conducting that review and comment hearing.<sup>7</sup>

# III. BECAUSE ONE OF THE PROPONENTS WAS ABSENT FROM THE REHEARING, THE TITLE BOARD LACKED JURISDICTION TO SET A TITLE.

Initiatives 67, 68 and 69 were "considered" at the April 19, 2012 rehearing. Section 1-40-106(4)(a) therefore required the attendance of each proponent. Because Proponent John Slota failed to appear at that proceeding, section 1-40-106(4)(d) prohibited the Title Board from setting a title on any of the three measures. This interpretation of the relevant provisions is not only clear in the text of the statute, it is consistent with the legislative history on this provision and the intent of the Amicus Parties who were involved in the drafting of the legislation and supported it throughout the legislative process.

Accordingly, the Amicus Parties respectfully request that the Petitioner's objection on this issue be upheld and that the Title Board be found to have lacked jurisdiction to set a title for Initiatives 67, 68, and 69 for that reason.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See Exhibit 3 (Transcript of April 26, 2012 Rehearing) at 141:25–149:4. It is also worth noting that in Initiative #95, which has been appealed to this Court by the undersigned counsel on behalf of a different objector than the Amicus Parties here (Case No. 2012SA130), the Title Board split 2–1 on whether section 1-40-106(a)(4) required both proponents to be in attendance at the rehearing. The Title Board's handling of that issue will be more fully flushed out in the Opening Brief filed in that case, and the Amicus Parties here respectfully ask that the court take judicial notice of that pleading in this case.

Respectfully submitted this 14th day of May, 2012.

### BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK LLP

Jason R. Dunn, #33011

Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck LLP 410 17<sup>th</sup> Street, #2200

Denver, Colorado 80202

(303) 223-1100

(303) 223-0914

jdunn@bhfs.com

Attorney for Amicus Curiae Parties

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 14, 2012, a true and correct copy of this

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF COLORADO CONCERN, ET AL. was delivered

via overnight delivery service to the following:

David Ottke 3308 S. Hannibal St. Aurora, CO 80013 Proponent

John Slota 2990 Shadow Creek Drive #108 Boulder, CO 80303 Proponent

Mark G. Grueskin Heizer, Paul, Grueskin LLP 2401 15th Street, Ste. 300 Denver, CO 80202 Attorney for Petitioner

Maurice G. Knaizer Office of the Attorney General 1525 Sherman Street, 7th Floor Denver, CO 80203 Attorney for the Title Board

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NOTE: This bill has been prepared for the signature of the appropriate legislative officers and the Governor. To determine whether the Governor has signed the bill or taken other action on it, please consult the legislative status sheet, the legislative history, or the Session Laws.



**HOUSE BILL 11-1072** 

BY REPRESENTATIVE(S) McNulty, Stephens, Liston, Brown, Casso, Court, Ferrandino, Gardner B., Labuda, Nikkel, Pace, Peniston, Soper, Todd, Tyler, Kerr J., Wilson; also SENATOR(S) Morse.

CONCERNING THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF A DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PROPONENTS OF AN INITIATIVE PETITION.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Colorado:

SECTION 1. Legislative declaration. According to decisions of the Colorado supreme court, an address falsely represents a person's residential address when it does not state the complete street number and name, apartment or room number, if applicable, city, and state of the place where a person makes his or her permanent domicile. The codification of the meaning of "false address" in House Bill 11-1072, enacted in 2011, is a clarification of existing law for future designated representatives.

SECTION 2. 1-40-102, Colorado Revised Statutes, is amended BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW SUBSECTION to read:

1-40-102. Definitions. As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:

(3.7) "DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PROPONENTS" OR "DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE" MEANS A PERSON DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 1-40-104 TO REPRESENT THE PROPONENTS IN ALL MATTERS AFFECTING THE PETITION.

**SECTION 3.** 1-40-106 (1) and (3) (b), Colorado Revised Statutes, are amended, and the said 1-40-106 is further amended BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW SUBSECTION, to read:

### 1-40-106. Title board - meetings - titles and submission clause.

- (1) For ballot issues, beginning with the first submission of a draft after an election, the secretary of state shall convene a title board consisting of the secretary of state, the attorney general, and the director of the office of legislative legal services or the director's designee. The title board, by majority vote, shall proceed to designate and fix a proper fair title for each proposed law or constitutional amendment, together with a submission clause, at public meetings to be held at the hour determined by the title board on the first and third Wednesdays of each month in which a draft or a motion for reconsideration has been submitted to the secretary of state. To be considered at such meeting, a draft shall be submitted to the secretary of state no later than 3 p.m. on the twelfth day before the meeting at which the draft is to be considered by the title board AND THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROPONENTS MUST COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SUBSECTION (4) OF THIS SECTION. The first meeting of the title board shall be held no sooner than the first Wednesday in December after an election, and the last meeting shall be held no later than the third Wednesday in April in the year in which the measure is to be voted on.
- (3) (b) In setting a title, the title board shall consider the public confusion that might be caused by misleading titles and shall, whenever practicable, avoid titles for which the general understanding of the effect of a "yes" or "no" vote will be unclear. The title for the proposed law or constitutional amendment, which shall correctly and fairly express the true intent and meaning thereof, together with the ballot title and submission clause, shall be completed within two weeks after the first meeting of the title board. Immediately upon completion, the secretary of state shall deliver the same with the original to the parties presenting it DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROPONENTS, keeping the copy with a record of

PAGE 2-HOUSE BILL 11-1072

the action taken thereon. Ballot titles shall be brief, shall not conflict with those selected for any petition previously filed for the same election, and shall be in the form of a question which may be answered "yes" (to vote in favor of the proposed law or constitutional amendment) or "no" (to vote against the proposed law or constitutional amendment) and which shall unambiguously state the principle of the provision sought to be added, amended, or repealed.

- (4) (a) EACH DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PROPONENTS SHALL APPEAR AT ANY TITLE BOARD MEETING AT WHICH THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE'S BALLOT ISSUE IS CONSIDERED.
- (b) EACH DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PROPONENTS SHALL CERTIFY BY A NOTARIZED AFFIDAVIT THAT THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE IS FAMILIAR WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE PROHIBITION ON CIRCULATORS' USE OF FALSE ADDRESSES IN COMPLETING CIRCULATOR AFFIDAVITS, AND THE SUMMARY PREPARED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH (c) OF THIS SUBSECTION (4). THE AFFIDAVIT SHALL INCLUDE A PHYSICAL ADDRESS AT WHICH PROCESS MAY BE SERVED ON THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE. THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE SHALL SIGN AND FILE THE AFFIDAVIT WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE FIRST TITLE BOARD MEETING AT WHICH THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE'S BALLOT ISSUE IS CONSIDERED.
- (c) THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHALL PREPARE A SUMMARY OF THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROPONENTS' RESPONSIBILITIES THAT ARE SET FORTH IN THIS ARTICLE.
- (d) THE TITLE BOARD SHALL NOT SET A TITLE FOR A BALLOT ISSUE IF EITHER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PROPONENTS FAILS TO APPEAR AT A TITLE BOARD MEETING OR FILE THE AFFIDAVIT AS REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPHS (a) AND (b) OF THIS SUBSECTION (4). THE TITLE BOARD MAY CONSIDER THE BALLOT ISSUE AT ITS NEXT MEETING, BUT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS SUBSECTION (4) SHALL CONTINUE TO APPLY.
- (e) THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHALL PROVIDE A NOTARY PUBLIC FOR THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES AT THE TITLE BOARD MEETING.

SECTION 4. 1-40-113 (1) (a) and (3), Colorado Revised Statutes,

PAGE 3-HOUSE BILL 11-1072

are amended to read:

1-40-113. Form - representatives of signers. (1) (a) Each section of a petition shall be printed on a form as prescribed by the secretary of state. No petition shall be printed, published, or otherwise circulated unless the form and the first printer's proof of the petition have been approved by the secretary of state. THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROPONENT ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR FILING THE PRINTER'S PROOF WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHALL NOTIFY THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES WHETHER THE PRINTER'S PROOF IS APPROVED. Each petition section shall designate by name and mailing address two persons who shall represent the signers thereof in all matters affecting the same. The secretary of state shall assure that the petition contains only the matters required by this article and contains no extraneous material. All sections of any petition shall be prenumbered serially, and the circulation of any petition section described by this article other than personally by a circulator is prohibited. Any petition section circulated in whole or in part by anyone other than the person who signs the affidavit attached to the petition section shall be invalid. Any petition section that fails to conform to the requirements of this article or is circulated in a manner other than that permitted in this article shall be invalid.

(3) Prior to the time of filing, the persons designated in the petition to represent the signers shall bind the sections of the petition in convenient volumes consisting of one hundred sections of the petition if one hundred or more sections are available or, if less than one hundred sections are available to make a volume, consisting of all sections that are available. Each volume consisting of less than one hundred sections shall be marked on the first page of the volume. However, any volume that contains more or less than one hundred sections, due only to the oversight of the designated representatives of the signers or their staff, shall not result in a finding of insufficiency of signatures therein. Each section of each volume shall include the affidavits required by section 1-40-111 (2), together with the sheets containing the signatures accompanying the same. These bound volumes shall be filed with the secretary of state BY THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROPONENTS.

**SECTION 5.** 1-40-117 (3) (b), Colorado Revised Statutes, is amended to read:

PAGE 4-HOUSE BILL 11-1072

1-40-117. Statement of sufficiency - statewide issues. (3) (b) In the event the secretary of state issues a statement declaring that a petition, having first been submitted with the required number of signatures, appears not to have a sufficient number of valid signatures, the representatives designated by the proponents pursuant to section 1-40-104 DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROPONENTS may cure the insufficiency by filing an addendum to the original petition for the purpose of offering such number of additional signatures as will cure the insufficiency. No addendum offered as a cure shall be considered unless the addendum conforms to requirements for petitions outlined in sections 1-40-110, 1-40-111, and 1-40-113 and unless the addendum is filed with the secretary of state within the fifteen-day period after the insufficiency is declared and unless filed with the secretary of state no later than three months and three weeks before the election at which the initiative petition is to be voted on. All filings under this paragraph (b) shall be made by 3 p.m. on the day of filing. Upon submission of a timely filed addendum, the secretary of state shall order the examination and verification of each signature on the addendum. The addendum shall not be available to the public for a period of up to ten calendar days for such examination. After examining the petition, the secretary of state shall, within ten calendar days, issue a statement as to whether the addendum cures the insufficiency found in the original petition.

**SECTION 6.** 1-40-121, Colorado Revised Statutes, is REPEALED AND REENACTED, WITH AMENDMENTS, to read:

- 1-40-121. Designated representatives expenditures related to petition circulation report penalty definitions. (1) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
- (a) "EXPENDITURE" SHALL HAVE THE SAME MEANING AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 2 (8) OF ARTICLE XXVIII OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION AND INCLUDES A PAYMENT TO A CIRCULATOR.
- (b) "FALSE ADDRESS" MEANS THE STREET ADDRESS, POST OFFICE BOX, CITY, STATE, OR ANY OTHER DESIGNATION OF PLACE USED IN A CIRCULATOR'S AFFIDAVIT THAT DOES NOT REPRESENT THE CIRCULATOR'S CORRECT ADDRESS OF PERMANENT DOMICILE AT THE TIME HE OR SHE CIRCULATED PETITIONS. "FALSE ADDRESS" DOES NOT INCLUDE AN ADDRESS THAT MERELY OMITS THE DESIGNATION OF "STREET," "AVENUE,"

PAGE 5-HOUSE BILL 11-1072

"BOULEVARD," OR ANY COMPARABLE TERM.

- (c) "REPORT" MEANS THE REPORT REQUIRED TO BE FILED PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION (2) OF THIS SECTION.
- (2) NO LATER THAN TEN DAYS AFTER THE DATE THAT THE PETITION IS FILED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROPONENTS MUST SUBMIT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE A REPORT THAT:
- (a) STATES THE DATES OF CIRCULATION BY ALL CIRCULATORS WHO WERE PAID TO CIRCULATE A SECTION OF THE PETITION, THE TOTAL HOURS FOR WHICH EACH CIRCULATOR WAS PAID TO CIRCULATE A SECTION OF THE PETITION, THE GROSS AMOUNT OF WAGES PAID FOR SUCH HOURS, AND ANY ADDRESSES USED BY CIRCULATORS ON THEIR AFFIDAVITS THAT THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES OR THEIR AGENTS HAVE DETERMINED, PRIOR TO PETITION FILING, TO BE FALSE ADDRESSES;
- (b) Includes any other expenditures made by any person or issue committee related to the circulation of petitions for signatures. Such information shall include the name of the person or issue committee and the amount of the expenditure.
- (3) (a) WITHIN TEN DAYS AFTER THE DATE THE REPORT IS FILED, A REGISTERED ELECTOR MAY FILE A COMPLAINT ALLEGING A VIOLATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE REPORT SET FORTH IN SUBSECTION (2) OF THIS SECTION. THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROPONENTS MAY CURE THE ALLEGED VIOLATION BY FILING A REPORT OR AN ADDENDUM TO THE ORIGINAL REPORT WITHIN TEN DAYS AFTER THE DATE THE COMPLAINT IS FILED. IF THE VIOLATION IS NOT CURED, AN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE SHALL CONDUCT A HEARING ON THE COMPLAINT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF THE ADDITIONAL FILING OR THE DEADLINE FOR THE ADDITIONAL FILING, WHICHEVER IS SOONER.
- (b) (I) AFTER A HEARING IS HELD, IF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DETERMINES THAT THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROPONENTS INTENTIONALLY VIOLATED THE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS OF THIS SECTION, THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE SUBJECT TO A PENALTY THAT IS EQUAL TO THREE TIMES THE AMOUNT OF ANY EXPENDITURES THAT WERE OMITTED FROM OR ERRONEOUSLY INCLUDED IN

PAGE 6-HOUSE BILL 11-1072

#### THE REPORT.

- (II) IF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DETERMINES THAT THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES INTENTIONALLY MISSTATED A MATERIAL FACT IN THE REPORT OR OMITTED A MATERIAL FACT FROM THE REPORT, OR IF THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES NEVER FILED A REPORT, THE REGISTERED ELECTOR WHO INSTITUTED THE PROCEEDINGS MAY COMMENCE A CIVIL ACTION TO RECOVER REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS FROM THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROPONENTS.
- (c) EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION, ANY PROCEDURES RELATED TO A COMPLAINT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY THE "STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT", ARTICLE 4 OF TITLE 24, C.R.S.

**SECTION 7.** 1-40-135 (3) (a), Colorado Revised Statutes, is amended to read:


Petition entities - requirements - definitions. 1-40-135. (3) (a) Any procedures by which alleged violations involving petition entities are heard and adjudicated shall be governed by the "State Administrative Procedure Act", article 4 of title 24, C.R.S. If a complaint is filed with the secretary of state pursuant to section 1-40-132 (1) alleging that a petition entity was not licensed when it compensated any circulator, the secretary may use information that the entity is required to produce pursuant to section 1-40-121 (1) SECTION 1-40-121 and any other information to which the secretary may reasonably gain access, including documentation produced pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section, at a hearing. After a hearing is held, if a violation is determined to have occurred, such petition entity shall be fined by the secretary in an amount not to exceed one hundred dollars per circulator for each day that the named individual or individuals circulated petition sections on behalf of the unlicensed petition entity. If the secretary finds that a petition entity violated a provision of paragraph (c) of subsection (2) of this section, the secretary shall revoke the entity's license for not less than ninety days or more than one hundred eighty days. Upon finding any subsequent violation of a provision of paragraph (c) of subsection (2) of this section, the secretary shall revoke the petition entity's license for not less than one hundred eighty days or more than one year. The secretary shall consider all circumstances surrounding the violations in fixing the length of the revocations.

PAGE 7-HOUSE BILL 11-1072

- **SECTION 8.** Act subject to petition effective date applicability. (1) This act shall take effect at 12:01 a.m. on the day following the expiration of the ninety-day period after final adjournment of the general assembly (August 10, 2011, if adjournment sine die is on May 11, 2011); except that, if a referendum petition is filed pursuant to section 1 (3) of article V of the state constitution against this act or an item, section, or part of this act within such period, then the act, item, section, or part shall not take effect unless approved by the people at the general election to be held in November 2012 and shall take effect on the date of the official declaration of the vote thereon by the governor.
- (2) The provisions of this act shall apply to initiative petitions submitted to the directors of the legislative council and the office of

legislative legal services for review an effective date of this act.	d comment on or after the applicable
Frank McNulty SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE	Brandon C. Shaffer PRESIDENT OF
OF REPRESENTATIVES	THE SENATE
Marilyn Eddins	Cindi L. Markwell
CHIEF CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES	SECRETARY OF
OF REFRESENTATIVES	THE SENATE
APPROVED	
John W. Hickenloo GOVERNOR OF T	per THE STATE OF COLORADO

PAGE 9-HOUSE BILL 11-1072



1 (Pages 1 to 4)

listening today, but if he were, I would thank him for

his service on the title board, so I just wanted to

MR. DUNN: Let me start with a

jurisdictional issue, and what I'd like to do is -- I

MS. STAIERT: Thank you.

make that comment.

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Also Present: Steve Ward

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**Initiative Title Setting Review Board** 1 know there's another objector with a jurisdictional 2 issue, and I'm going to step aside and let them raise 3 that, and then I would like to come back up and talk 4 about some of the substantive arguments that we have 5 before we get into the title. 6 As the board knows, and I think it was 7 raised last week, Section 1-40-105(4) and (4)(a) and 8 (4)(d) of the Colorado Revised Statutes both require 9 that both of the proponents be at the title board 10 hearings on any measure. Subsection (4)(a) states 11 "Each designated representative of the proponents shall 12 appear at any title board meeting at which the 13 designated representative's ballot issue is 14 considered," and I think there's three primary -- three 15 key words in that -- in that sentence. 16 First, it says "Each designated 17 representative." It doesn't say a designated 18 representative, it doesn't say one of the designated 19 representatives, it says each of the -- of the 20 designated representatives; and I know Mr. Staelin is 21 here as the proponent, but I believe the other 22 proponent is not here. 23 And it also says, in the provision, 24 that -- that they shall appear at any title board 25 meeting. It doesn't say the original meeting, it 1

extra sitting here?

MR. DUNN: Well, that's not true. I -although I'm not representing him here today, I do represent the Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce, who was a proponent and advocate of House Bill 11-1072 last year which put this change into law, and I can tell you it was their intent to have every designated representative at each of the hearings, and the purpose, as I recall, from last year, and in talking to them since then -- although talking to them since then, of course, is sort of a post-talk commentary, but the intent was to ensure that the proponents of a measure are involved in the title board process, that it's not merely drafting a measure and submitting it and letting it go through the title board process but that it's important for the title board to have both of the designated representatives here to answer questions and to inform the electorate about the nature of a matter and what it means.

MS. STAIERT: But once we've already set a title, then what is the -- I mean, there's no remedy provided in that portion of the statute.

MR. DUNN: Well, Madam Chair, if you mean a remedy for the proponent for failure, there -- there is. The remedy is -- is to go back and go through the

doesn't say the first meeting, it says any title board meeting; and I think, finally, the word "meeting" is important. It doesn't say hearing, which could then be argued, Well, maybe that doesn't mean a rehearing, it

says any meeting of the title board.

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So on that basis, we would argue that the title board does not have jurisdiction under subsection (4)(d), which says, "The title board shall not set a title for a ballot issue if either" of the desig -- "if either designated representative of the proponents fails to appear."

So I'd start with that issue. I can open that up for either questions or let the board discuss that, and as I said, I'll -- I'll step aside if we go forward and -- and let one of the other objectors speak.

MS. STAIERT: Okay.

MR. DOMENICO: Okay. What -- we talked about it, that basic situation last week, and I -- I guess my question is, what would -- what purpose would it serve to enforce the statute as you say it should be interpreted? Just to make it a big pain to put something on the ballot that was not a -- necessarily something that should be difficult? But, I mean, what -- what purpose does it serve to have somebody

process again.

And let me answer it this way. I guess I should have answered Mr. Domenico's question in the first instance this way. What the intent of the legislator -- legislature is or what the intent of the advocacy groups who drafted the measure was in 2011 is not really the relevant question. The -- the statutory provision is clear on its face. It says each designated representative, it says any meeting, and it doesn't refer to hearings.

I don't know how you read that provision any other way but to require both proponents be here.

MR. DOMENICO: So what part of it, then, says what we're supposed to do at a rehearing where we've already set a title?

MR. DUNN: "The title board shall not set a title for a ballot issue if either designated representative of" both the "proponents fails to appear at a title board meeting."

MR. DOMENICO: Right. So if today I say, All right, I agree with Mr. Dunn, let's not set a title today, we're not -- what we have in front of us is a motion for rehearing and we're -- that we either deny or grant the motion for rehearing, and we can amend the title, but if we just say we deny the motion for

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rehearing, we haven't set a title, the title has already been set.

And so I guess my point is, and I think the question the Chair was asking was what's the remedy? So I think we all can agree at least at some point, the proponents have to show up, and they did show up at the original meeting. That serves -- and I agree with you, the intent of whoever was advocating for this is not really relevant, and it wasn't what I was asking. The question I was asking is what would be the purpose of our interpreting what I think is a somewhat -- part of it, I agree with you, is not very ambiguous.

The consequences of failing to comply with it to me are at least ambiguous and our obligation that if -- if we think only -- if only one proponent is here, what we're supposed to do with that fact is ambiguous and where we sort of ran into I'm not sure what to do last time; and so I wonder what the purpose is of saying not only does that mean we're not going to listen to any arguments, perhaps, that the proponents make because they're not both here, but that the consequence should be that we go back and undo what we did last time when they did -- when they were both here, and so that's where I think the question is.

Why -- why does the remedy -- why is the remedy what you suggest, that we don't have jurisdiction not only -- I mean, because what we're here for is a motion for rehearing and what you want us to do, though, is go back and undo what we did last week.

Well, I would -- I would answer that two ways: First of all, section -- subsection 4(d) says, "The title board may consider the ballot issue at its next meeting, but the requirements of this Section 4 shall continue to apply." That's one option, is that you can punt the measure to the next hearing.

Second, there are a variety of jurisdictional issues that can be raised on a motion for rehearing, and of course vagueness is one; changes, substantial changes made after the review and comment hearing. And those, in principle, are the same issue that's being raised here. It's a jurisdictional question for the title board.

Either you have jurisdiction to continue this proceeding or you don't, and if you interpret Section (4)(a) as requiring both proponents to be at any title board meeting at which the measure is discussed and you find that they are not both here, then the title board simply does not have jurisdiction;

and I think the remedy, then, is either to ask the proponents to go back and start the process over or simply move into the next hearing.

MR. DOMENICO: And then what if they don't show up at the next hearing?

MR. DUNN: Then I think the title board has to make a decision about whether it has iurisdiction to hear the measure.

MR. DOMENICO: I agree with that.

MS. STAIERT: And how do you read it with the section that has to do with rehearing? Because under the section specifically with rehearing, it just says any person may bring forward a -- a petition. It doesn't say anything about their presence. I mean, to me, it appears that it might be to their detriment to not show up, but they already have a title set. If they would like to let the petitioners have the only word, take their chances, I mean, it seems to me like that's the process that's set up in that statute.

MR. DUNN: Well, I think 1-40-106 is titled "Title board - meetings," not singular, plural. It talks about all the meetings of the title board, and that section involves how the title board meetings are conducted, so the fact that a particular topic is discussed there and not in a rehearing section I'm not

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sure is dispositive -- I think it's not dispositive of the question of whether or not both proponents have to -- have to be at that rehearing.

And, again, I would just fall back on the language. I think it's completely unambiguous that the legislature intended for both proponents to be at any meeting of the title board that discusses the measure.

MS. STAIERT: Although one could argue that because rehearings is specific to rehearings, the other one being more general, that rehearings will apply.

MR. DUNN: Well, I might agree with you if it said any title board hearing, but it doesn't. It says any title board meeting, and I think in that case that was meant to be inclusive of -- of hearings or rehearings.

MR. STAELIN: May I say something?

MS. STAIERT: Sure.

MR. STAELIN: From here?

MS. STAIERT: No, you got to go up to the podium and just identify yourself again since we're taped.

MR. STAELIN: All right. Earl Staelin, one of the proponents.

3 (Pages 9 to 12)

Aye.



I agree with Mr. Domenico, where the language in that statute is shall not set a title, the title has been set. Also, Mr. Bows would be here, but he was scheduled well before this hearing was set, not realizing that we'd be in this situation and before the earlier rehearing, to be in conference in Pennsylvania; and he left early yesterday before we knew there would be any appeal.

And also he's authorized me to be his representative. We don't represent other people in this particular title. We are the people who filed it, but I'm, in that sense, his authorized representative, and I think if -- if a motion were filed and had no merit, let's say, and one of the proponents was sick, had to be out of town or even died, I think it would be, if nothing else, a denial of due process to say that the board couldn't hear it.

MS. STAIERT: Thank you. Further discussion by the board?

MR. DOMENICO: Well, I'll just sort of reiterate what I said last time. I think Mr. Dunn makes a perfectly reasonable argument about the interpretation of the requirements of that statute. I do question, though, whether the consequence of that on a petition for -- on a motion for rehearing is that we

somehow should go back and say that we no longer have jurisdiction over the entire proposal, measure, and undo what we did last time when all the procedural requirements -- requirements were met.

It may very well be that that's the better interpretation, but I think in keeping with the generally liberal interpretation of the right to petition, I am inclined to give the benefit of the doubt to the idea that whatever technical failure to comply with that -- with the first part of the statute does, in the context of a rehearing, I don't know that it means we don't have jurisdiction over the entire measure anymore.

MS. STAIERT: All right. Do you want to make a motion?

MR. DOMENICO: Sure, if that's all.
MS. STAIERT: Jason, do you have a comment?

MR. GELENDER: Yeah, there's -- I do want to comment. I think that Mr. Dunn has a very valid point. I have no doubt whatsoever that the general assembly intended to make both proponents show up at any title board meeting and the language is very clear.

On the other hand, I see Mr. Domenico's point that it's not an issue of -- I mean, we already

have set a title, so I don't know how we really undo that as a consequence. I guess I would be curious as to what should happen were we to think we needed to amend the title we've already set, if that, then, sort of kicks it back, because then that would be setting another title or a different title. I don't know if that changes things or not.

MR. DOMENICO: Yeah. I mean, I -- my view is, if my -- I think you can obviously argue to the contrary that what we're actually doing is granting, as we -- as the language of the motions we actually make and adopt at the meetings says, what we're doing is granting or denying the motion except to the extent, et cetera, et cetera, other than setting a title itself.

On the other hand, it may very well be that -- again, I go back to sort of the point if -- if the result is we can't amend the title, it would give proponents a strange incentive if they like the title we set originally, so -- and it may very well be that the consequence of failing to have both proponents at a rehearing is that the measure goes away and can't be on the ballot. I'm just not sure that it's our obligation to enforce or -- not just obligation, our right to enforce that rule, that that may be somewhat -- there may be a -- a better way to carry that out.

So I'm inclined, until told otherwise, to continue hearing these. We've never actually required the proponents themselves to speak to us directly or to hear from them directly. They can be represented, as the objector is here by counsel, and so I don't think it serves the purpose necessarily of making sure we can ask them questions if we want to.

I do think it serves the purpose, that new language, of ensuring that one person isn't just putting other people's names on something and filing it who may not actually understand or care about the proposal, but that's -- that purpose is served fairly well by having them come to the original meeting, which they're required to do. So that's where I am, and I'd like to say we didn't have to hear all these rehearings that we've heard in the last week or so, but I think we should do it anyway.

So I'll go back and finalize my motion to deny the, I guess, objection to our jurisdiction on that basis.

MS. STAIERT: Second. All those in favor?

MR. DOMENICO: Aye.
MS. STAIERT: Opposed?
MR. GELENDER: No.

4 (Pages 13 to 16)

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1 MS. STAIERT: It passes two to one. 2 If you could just introduce yourself and 3 present your petition. 4 MR. ROGERS: I will. Members of the 5 board, Thomas Rogers. I represent Barbara Walker, a 6 registered elector, and also the Independent Bankers of 7 Colorado. Thanks for hearing our motion this 8 afternoon. 9 As Mr. Dunn indicated, we have -- because 10 we raise similar arguments in our motions, we have, for 11 purpose of efficiency, divided those arguments. I'm 12 going to address the proponents' failure to comply with 13 Article V, section 1(8) of the Colorado Constitution, 14 and C.R.S. 1-40-105(4). Mr. Dunn has addressed the 15 requirement that the proponents be here and, if 16 necessary, will make some further arguments, and I'd 17 like to note for the record that we adopt those 18 arguments.

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So I listened with interest at your last meeting to the discussion about the impact of the whereas clauses in this initiative, and like you. I was puzzled until I had a chance to get back to the office and do a little research. And having conducted that research, it's my position that the manner in which this initiative has been drafted does not comply with

can't be there. It can't have any legal effect, so what do we do with it? Well, that's where we get to C.R.S. 1-40-105(4), which requires, after review and comment hearing -- sorry.

I'm sorry. Let me back up and point out that leg council pointed out precisely the argument that I've just advanced to the proponents in their -in their memo. They said, Look, if you want these whereases to be part of your measure, they need to fall under the enacting clause, so the proponents had a full opportunity to -- to cure the defects in their initiative.

So, again, what do we do with these? I think we have to go on and take look at '105(4), which requires that initiatives be filed with the SOS "without any title, submission clause, or ballot title providing the designation by which the voter shall express their choice for or against" -- I'll slow down -- "the proposed law or constitutional amendment."

So the fact that the whereases fall above the enacting clause violates this requirement, and again, violates Article V, section 1(8).

So, what do you do with this? Well, I --I think -- I think what is required is a determination -- if you don't have jurisdiction to set

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Article V, section 1(8), nor does it comply with C.R.S. 1-40-105(4) and for those reasons this board does not have jurisdiction, did not have jurisdiction to set a title and must, in fact, reject this initiative and require it to be resubmitted in a proper format.

The first authority I've cited, Article V, section 1(8) of the Colorado Constitution, requires an enacting clause at the top of any initiative. It is clear from the constitution that language that doesn't fall under the constitutionally required enacting clause cannot be part of an initiative and therefore cannot be -- cannot become part of the constitution. That provision, Article V, section 1(8), requires language to precede the language of the initiative. The form must be "Be it Enacted by the people of the state of Colorado," colon, and then on with the measure of the language.

Here, that enacting clause appears in the middle of the text that's been filed. So the answer to the question first, I think, that you struggled with last week is that anything above that enacting clause simply is not part -- properly part of an initiative and cannot become part of the constitution.

That leads to the question, what is it? What -- what do we do with it now? It's there. It a title for this measure, what if you reduce it to do something to the contrary, if you were to move forward and -- and go ahead and deny this motion for rehearing and set a title? Well, first, I think you'd open the door for the proponents of any measure in the future to put whatever the heck they want to put above the enacting clause, whatever kind of propaganda they want to include, they can include, and I suspect they would point back to this hearing and -- and suggest that you just can't remove their stuff, that even though it violates the constitution, it violates -- it violates statute, you've got to leave it in and I would suggest that's a -- that would be a complete disaster, that you guys would radically change the way that initiatives

Finally, I want to point out that -- well, two things: First, the decision about whether this initiative violates the constitution and the statute falls squarely in your court. If you look at In re Petitions on Campaign and Political Finance, which is at 877 P.2d 311, Colorado Supreme Court 1994. Let me do that a little slower, because I see Mr. Knaizer going for his pen there. That's 877 P.2d 311, Colorado Supreme Court of '94.

are drafted and filed in the state of Colorado.

There an objector raised an objection to

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5 (Pages 17 to 20)



the sufficiency of a submission with the Secretary of State, a petition for initiative with the Secretary of State, and the Supreme Court said that certainly the -- the burden of proving that there's a defect falls on the objector but that the result of a defect is that it would deprive the title board of the -- of jurisdiction to set title. So this falls within your purview.

Finally, it is certainly the case that you must lean towards setting title to provide access to the ballot, and that's clear from the case law, and you are certainly aware, and if you're not, the proponents will remind you, I'm sure, in a minute, that if you refuse to set title -- if you grant this motion for rehearing, they can't be on the 2012 ballot, and I would submit to you that's not a proper consideration. It was the proponents' choice to file with leg council on the last possible day that they could file and still get a measure on the 2013 (sic) ballot, and I would suggest to you if they had filed this effective measure in January, it would have been a very simple matter for you to say, you know, you didn't comply with the constitution or the statute, we're going to reject your filing, get it right, file it again and we'll set a title for you.

mind, there is an enacting clause.

MR. ROGERS: Sure.

MR. GELENDER: And technically the constitution doesn't actually say that it has to be at the beginning of the measure, although certainly that would be the normal and expected practice, but why would it not be a -- why would we have -- why do we have to throw the whole thing out? Could we say -- would a liberal construction be we're going to keep everything after the enacting clause and toss the declaration?

MR. ROGERS: Well, you do have the power in the case law to make technical changes to an amendment. I've always read that to mean correcting a typographical error. I really don't think that that case law expands to allow you to knock out a page and a half of text, which is essentially what you'd be doing here, what you would have to do here to cure this problem.

MR. GELENDER: Well, are we knocking it out if it's never part of the initiative to begin with, if it's not after the enacting clause, which seems to be your argument?

MR. ROGERS: Yeah, I mean, it's -- it's certainly what was filed by the proponent, what was

position where that remedy is not available I suggest is not -- should not be your concern. I think you have to treat it the same way you would -- you would treat it if they had not put you in a position where refusing to set the title will preclude them from being on the 2012 ballot. So with that, I'm happy to take any questions, and I'll urge you to grant our motion.

The fact that they have put you in a

MS. STAIERT: I mean, I might already know the answer to this, but explain to me the difference of how you see our lack of jurisdiction versus someone who comes in with just a blatantly unconstitutional proposal.

MR. ROGERS: Well, you certainly can't consider a merits argument.

MS. STAIERT: Right.

MR. ROGERS: This is not a merits argument. This is a -- this is a failure to comply with a procedural requirement of the Colorado Constitution and a procedural requirement of the C.R.S., and I think that's the distinction in the -- in the scenario that you've laid out.

MR. GELENDER: Given, you know, all the case law that says the right to submit, you have to liberally construe, even if we accept your argument, anything before the enacting clause -- and keep in

submitted to you as a properly formatted initiative. So that does seem to go beyond a mere technical amendment.

You know, I'm fairly certain that the first page and a half of text was not a typographical error. They -- they had -- they had absolutely full notice from leg council that what they were doing was procedurally defective, and they -- and they chose not to fix it. And now, I think, to come to you and say, You know, that whole first page of whereases that talks about what happened in North Dakota, well, we -- just kidding. We don't really want that in the initiative. They -- they need to go back and correct this and submit it in a compliant manner.

MS. STAIERT: Talk to me a little bit about the jurisdictional issue in your discussion that -- that it falls on this board. So the approval of the petition and the format is approved by the Secretary of State.

MR. ROGERS: Right.

MS. STAIERT: And there's some case law that talks about -- I mean, I looked at this before we came in. There's nothing really on point, but there's some case law that talks about the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State's office versus the jurisdiction of

6 (Pages 21 to 24)

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the title board.

Why would you feel that this wouldn't fall in the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State's office, when they approve the petition, for them to just remove the whereas clauses?

MR. ROGERS: Well, if I might, I'd like to just read a section of the case that I've cited for you earlier, In Re Campaign and Political Finance. So this is the Supreme Court in that case at 315 (sic), so the court writes, "A presumption exists" -- "exists that the secretary of state properly determines the sufficiency of the filing of a petition to initiate a measure under the initiative and referendum statute."

Consistent with what you're saying, it was, in the first instance, the secretary's obligation. Then continuing, "Thus contrary to Mr. Bruce," darling of the title board; sorry, I inserted that last part -- contrary to his contention that the proponents have not proved that they -- they filed the petition in accordance with the statutory procedure set out in section 1-40-105(4), the same section I'm talking about here, the burden of demonstrating procedural noncompliance rests with him, not the proponents of the initiative. Because Bruce has not shown any defect in the proceedings that would destroy the board's

just say that that page of something is improper and ignore it or somehow delete it or something, and I struggle with that and, I mean, I think Mr. Rogers makes some valid points that that may not be something we can do.

I might be curious about our legal counsel's advice on that aspect of it, but it seems to me there's probably agreement here that the -- the whereas section can't really properly be part of the measure. I think.

MS. STAIERT: We're all going to look down this way.

MR. KNAIZER: Thank you. Give me an opportunity to speak --

MS. STAIERT: Here. You need a microphone.

MR. KNAIZER: I think Mr. Rogers raises a number of good points. I think the real issue, though, is what the title board -- what authority the title board has to reject the measure, and historically what has happened is that the title board has jurisdictional -- the ability to exercise jurisdictional review over a limited number of items, one is whether or not the measure went through the proper review before legislative legal services and

jurisdiction in this matter, we reject his jurisdictional challenge.

Now what I take from that language is that had Mr. Bruce met his burden, that it would have -- his argument would have, in fact, destroyed the board's jurisdiction in that matter, so that's -- so this is not a well- -- a well-trodden piece of legal ground.

MS. STAIERT: Right.

MR. ROGERS: But that's the conclusion I draw from that case.

MS. STAIERT: Okay. Thank you. Dan?
MR. DOMENICO: Well, I think it should be
pretty obvious from last time, I'm very sympathetic to
at least the substantive point that it's inappropriate
and whatever this first page is, it's not appropriately
part of an initiative.

I think the direction of the two questions -- or the questions from my two fellow board members are where my -- my only real question lies, is basically whether that means we have to say we just have something we can't deal with here, we don't have jurisdiction to set title for something that has a page of something before the initiative itself, or whether we can simply say what they gave us is a proper initiative preceded by a page of something, and we'll

legislative council. The other is whether or not there were substantive changes made that were not in response to suggestions made by legislative legal services or legislative council.

There are also some time constraints in terms of when measures have to be filed, but I don't see anything in the statute that allows the title board to reject jurisdiction based upon the form of the measure itself. There isn't any case law that I'm aware of that allows the title board to reject jurisdiction on that basis, including the citation to Article V, section 1, subsection 8. It is true that it talks about the measure commencing "Be it Enacted," but there isn't anything in the title board's statute that allows it to reject a measure because that particular format has not been used.

MR. DOMENICO: So does it allow us to do -- I mean, say someone submitted to us a measure with a "Be it Enacted" clause but it also came to us with something much more clearly advertising, a color brochure and all these great political advertisements as part of the packet we got. What -- so we may not have authority to say, well, we don't have jurisdiction. Do we have the authority to say what we have in front of us is essentially a properly formatted

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measure pursuant to the constitution with an enacted clause and we're just going to ignore all this other stuff that they sent along with it, or do we have to sort of just say -- just try to figure out what we've got and then leave it to the Secretary of State or somebody else to say, Hey, you can't put all that other stuff on the ballot?

MS. STAIERT: Or can we strike it as a technical?

MR. KNAIZER: No. I think your -- I think your jurisdiction is -- is very limited. You know, there were some issues dealing with the timing of elections, for example, and these were some titles that addressed, I believe, land use issues back in the late '90s or early 2000s, and what the court did was distinguish between what the role of the title board is and what the role of the secretary is, and those cases dealt with when a measure would be on the ballot and things of that nature; and the court basically said the title board does not have the jurisdiction to consider some of those other issues.

So in response to Mr. Domenico's issue, you know, let's assume that they started the measure with "Be it Enacted" but they had all kinds of catchphrases and let's assume pictures. That is not --

know that the title board has jurisdiction to reject the measure and not set a title based upon the form. I just don't see anything in the title board's statute 10 -- 1-40-105, '106, and '107 that gives the title board that authority.

MR. GELENDER: And it's your view that, because the title board is a purely statutory creature. that if it's not explicitly in the statute, there's no possibility of sort of inherent authority to execute the requirements of the constitution in the first instance before it has to go to the courts?

MR. KNAIZER: You know, really my view is based upon -- and I don't remember the exact case, the exact title of the case, but it had to do with, you know, when a measure is put on the ballot and what role -- what role the title board can play in terms of when a measure is set on the ballot, and in that case -- I -- I know it's a 954 P.2d, but I don't remember the -- the name of the case at this point.

But what the court did was distinguish between the title board's role and the secretary's role; and in this case, to answer your question directly, I think the title board's jurisdiction is fairly limited, it has been limited historically, and I just don't know of anything in our statute that allows

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the title board does not have the discretion to not set title because the measure itself may contain catchphrases, may be designed, you know, as a pure political document. The title board just has to go ahead and set the title.

MR. DOMENICO: Well, I agree with that, but that's not what we have. We have a -- we have a measure with something before it that I think I'm convinced is not part of the measure itself, is not part of the amendment that the constitution envisions, and so that's where I'm sort of troubled is if -- if all this were clearly part of it, if the "Be it Enacted" came in at the beginning, then I would -- it'd be simple. We would just -- this would all be part of it and I'd have no trouble, but -- for precisely that reason. But what we've got is sort of something that's part of it but supposedly not part of it and I just don't know what that -- what it is and what we can do with it.

MR. KNAIZER: I mean, my sense is, is that just given the limits over what the title board can deal with in terms of jurisdiction, it very well may be that the measure would be subject to being stricken from the ballot through some independent action taken after the title board has set the title. But I don't

1 us to make a determination not to set a title based 2 upon the form of the measure itself other than what is 3 specifically mentioned in 1-40-105(4). 4

MS. STAIERT: Go ahead.

MR. ROGERS: If I could, and I -- I've learned over the years that it's generally a fool's errand to disagree with Maury Knaizer, but I'm going to take a run at it,

THE REPORTER: I'm sorry. I couldn't hear you.

MR. ROGERS: Never mind. That's fairly extraneous.

Just a couple of points -- first, again, I think, Mr. Knaizer, the authority you're -- you're looking for is in the case I've cited, which -- which seems to make it pretty clear that where there is an alleged failure to comply with 1-40-105(4), the very statute I'm moving through here, that if the objector meets their burden of proving noncompliance, procedural noncompliance, that meeting that burden would destroy the board's jurisdiction. So I -- I would just submit that is, I think, the authority that answers the question.

I would also point out that there -- the statutes may not expressly give the title board the

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authority to reject title in this circumstance. Certainly the -- the statutes don't give an objector any other opportunity, other than a Supreme Court appeal, to raise this objection. I mean, there is certainly no opportunity between the filing of an initiative with the secretary's office and the first meeting of the title board or rehearing before the title board to raise this kind of an objection.

And it seems odd to me that the general assembly would craft a statutory scheme in which my client has to see a defective title set through the title board process and then wait -- actually, that's not true. I'd have to file a motion for rehearing, which you guys could, by definition, not bring it; and then I'd have to go to the Supreme Court to get my remedy. That doesn't make any sense to me. It seems to make more sense that the jurisdictional question is yours, and I think the case confirms that.

MR. STAELIN: May I have a -- I'm looking at what is a copy that I pulled of 1-40-105, and I don't see what language in paragraph (4) is actually being referred to. It wasn't in their motion, so it's pretty hard for me to respond. I don't see any language in what I see as (4) that would substantiate that position. The (4) I'm looking at starts out

the comments of the members of the board that what we submitted complies exactly with this, and it's very clear from the "Be it Enacted" clause that the whereas clauses are not to be part of the constitution.

MR. DOMENICO: But are they part of the initiative or the measure or however you want to phrase it?

MR. STAELIN: I guess I haven't seen a clear answer to that. That discussion came up apparently with -- if I remember correctly, at the hearing last week on Measure 91, where there was some similar material, and the -- the board approved that, set a title with that language in there.

I do think, for that reason, that -because it's not part of the actual language to be put in the constitution, it is a technical thing, as mentioned by Mr. Knaizer, that it would not in any way prevent setting a title by this board; and I'd also add that the -- the council specifically commented on two factual parts of the whereas clauses and they asked us -- raised the point whether those were actually accurate, and we double-checked and we concurred that we couldn't document that. We removed both of those -a phrase and then one of the clauses were removed. Everything else, we felt, in responding to the

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"After the conference." I'd just like to know what -what language is being referred to here.

MS. STAIERT: Very quick.

MR. ROGERS: Can I address that?

MS. STAIERT: Sure.

MR. ROGERS: Well, I-40-105(4) describes what the proponents must do after review and comment, and it kind of moves through that process and concludes with that the proponents are required to file -- "an original final draft which gives the final language for printing shall be submitted to the secretary of state without any title, submission clause, or ballot title providing the designation by which the voters shall express their choice for or against the proposed law or constitutional amendment."

I mean, the -- two arguments there: First, perhaps these whereases were intended -intended to be a title, a submission clause or a ballot title.

Second, I think it's pretty clear from that section that you don't submit anything other than the final language for printing. You submit the change you want to make to the Colorado law. So that's -that's the section that I think is operative here. MR. STAELIN: Well, I'll just concur in

legislative council, could be verified. A lot of it is from the Bank of North Dakota annual reports. So . . .

And at the hearing last week, no one signed up to speak against the measure, although I -- I know one person did speak up at that time, and very little information has been provided to us except for the motions that were filed yesterday, and I think we have responded to those.

MR. DOMENICO: If I -- I'm sorry to interrupt you. My question, I guess, was going to be if we -- if we were to decide that we could and were inclined to simply assert that this -- that the -- all the language that was presented to us that comes before the "Be it Enacted" clause is extraneous, is not part of the measure, we're not going -- we don't consider it part of the measure, we're deleting it from whatever we have in front of us as a technical change or just -just because, would you object to that or do you insist that the -- this be part of what comes out of the title board?

MR. STAELIN: Well, we would prefer that it be part of it, but we could -- you know, if it had to be stricken, we could probably live with --

THE REPORTER: I'm sorry. I didn't hear that last part.

37 39 1 MR. STAELIN: I'm sorry. We could 1 MR. GELENDER: So? 2 2 probably live with that if it had to be excluded. MR. KNAIZER: I mean -- because I was 3 There's also the -- you know, the next 3 working under the assumption that this was part of the 4 step is, you know, getting the form of the petition measure. What I'm hearing is that the recital clauses 4 5 approved. I assume that would be the place where that are not part of the measure, yet were presented to the 5 б could also be addressed, but -- although that's an 6 title board for review, which I think presents a 7 assumption. 7 substantially different issue. 8 MR. DOMENICO: Great. Mr. Knaizer wants 8 MR. STAELIN: Well --9 9 to help us out. MR. KNAIZER: It really goes to the 10 MR. KNAIZER: Can I add a comment based 10 question of whether or not, you know -- of what the 11 upon what was just said? 11 content of the measure really is, which is -- which is 12 12 what the Supreme Court has already held is the primary MS. STAIERT: Thank you. 13 MR. KNAIZER: My -- my interpretation has 13 question that the board has to answer. They have to 14 always been that whatever is presented to the title 14 define what the measure is and understand the measure 15 board is part and parcel of the measure, and so when I 15 prior to the time that the board sets the title. 16 was talking to the board before, I was working under 16 MR. STAELIN: Yeah, but we -- we 17 the assumption that the whereas clauses were part of 17 considered this part of the measure and the council did 18 the measure that was presented to the board. And if, 18 not give any indication that it could not be. Their 19 in fact, there -- the whereas clauses are not part of 19 only question was can you verify what's in it. 20 the measure and are going to be withdrawn or not 20 MS. STAIERT: So they didn't suggest you 21 intended to be printed, then I think that presents a 21 take it out? 22 whole different issue. I was working under the 22 MR. STAELIN: No. 23 assumption that the whereas clauses were part of the 23 MR. GELENDER: And they also didn't 24 measure. 24 suggest that it be numbered somehow or put after the 25 MS. STAIERT: What different issue does 25 enacting clause or anything like that? 38 40 1 it --1 MR. STAELIN: I'm not sure I understand 2 MR. KNAIZER: Well, the -- the issue, 2 the question. 3 3 then, is if they're not part of the measure, then I --MR. GELENDER: The whereas clauses are 4 I think there's a question as to whether or not what 4 before the enacting clause. 5 5 was presented to leg council and legislative legal MR. STAELIN: Absolutely. 6 services is substantially different from what was 6 MR. GELENDER: At the review and comment 7 presented to the title board and what's supposed to be 7 hearing, did they -- was it suggested to you that it be 8 8 a part of the measure. placed after the enacting clause? 9 MR. STAELIN: No, not at all. They --MR. DOMENICO: Well, let's just say that 9 10 somebody included a cover letter with their measure 10 they suggested clarification of how we worded and 11 that included this -- this kind of language and other 11 placed the "Be it Enacted" because we did that in a 12 sort of "Here is why our measure is so great," and it 12 slightly imperfect way, and the final draft corrected 13 somehow just got in with the packet and kept -- and 13 that, but the purpose all along was to have it part of 14 nobody really bothered to deal with it, and -- but 14 the measure but not have it to be part of the actual 15 everybody sort of recognized it wasn't really part of 15 constitution. 16 the measure, the measure is what comes after the "Be it 16 MS. STAIERT: It's certainly one of the 17 Enacted" clause, but it ends up in here, it ends up in 17 purposes in the legislative comment, major purposes of 18 front of leg council and then what? 18 the proposed amendment, and 1 is to make statements and 19 19 MR. KNAIZER: Well, you know, I think findings about Bank of North Dakota. 20 that's the whole purpose -- I mean, I think the 20 MR. ROGERS: Madam Chair. could I --21 argument back would be that's the whole purpose of the 21 MS. STAIERT: Sure. 22 22 hearing before leg council at least to say that it MR. ROGERS: I'm sorry to have to say 23 shouldn't have been included or leg council could 23

10 (Pages 37 to 40)

comment on it and it could have been withdrawn prior to

the time it's presented to the title board.

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this, but I think what the proponents just told you is

"Article V, section 1(8) of the Colorado constitution

not accurate. The leg council memo very clearly says,

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requires that the following enacting clause be the 2 style for all laws adopted by the initiative, 'Be it 3 Enacted by the People of the State of Colorado.' To comply with this constitutional requirement, this phrase should be added to the beginning of the proposed initiative directly above the text to be added to the Colorado Constitution."

Leg council very clearly told proponents, your initiative falls under the enacting clause, so they're really in a box here. The constitution requires the enacting clause to be at the beginning, which council told them it needs to be at the beginning. I believe Mr. Knaizer is advising you it needs to be at the beginning; and, yet, they've now told you that they want it to stay in the initiative. I -- I really struggle with your opportunity to make an amendment -- even a technical amendment to an initiative where the proponents have asked you not to do so.

MR. DOMENICO: What if we just moved the enacting clause to the beginning?

MR. ROGERS: Well, I -- I believe that would be more than a technical amendment. I think it would -- I think you would exceed your authority if you moved the enacting clause.

MR. DOMENICO: Yeah. I mean, that may be, although I think we decided last time all the whereases are essentially not material in at least one sense of the many senses we use the word "material" around here. So whether they're included -- I mean, obviously the constitution would look a lot different with a bunch of discussion of the Bank of North Dakota than it would without it, but in effect, I don't know that it would make a big difference.

> MR. DUNN: Madam Chair, may I? MS. STAIERT: Sure.

MR. DUNN: For the record, Jason Dunn for Don Childears. I thought Mr. Rogers actually argued that pretty well and I would incorporate into our motion all those arguments -- our objection, all those arguments as well; but let me make a couple points. I think Mr. Domenico asked the right question. Is it -is it part of the initiative or measure? And the proponent just said, I haven't heard a good answer to that, I think, is a fair phrase or -- or a quote, and so the proponent doesn't know.

But Mr. Domenico talked about, Well, maybe you'll put a color brochure and some campaign material. I'm just sitting here thinking, Well, maybe I'll put in some case law or maybe I'll put in a letter explaining

how I want the measure interpreted by the title board.

MR. DOMENICO: But it's pretty clear that if that came after the "Be it Enacted" clause, that that's perfectly fine, right?

MR. DUNN: Absolutely.

MR. DOMENICO: So, then, why should that be such a huge deal? I mean, that would seem to be -this would seem to be -- to the extent that's problematic, this would seem to be less problematic than that, because then at least it's not in the constitution, your -- your propaganda.

MR. DUNN: Well, the important part is that the title board understand what it's considering. That was Mr. Knaizer's point, I think. You have to know what measure you're considering. And if you -you know, if the proponent is saying, Well, to paraphrase, jeez, we'd like that to stay in, but if it's not, that's okay, too, and he's saving. Well. maybe we can move the "Be it Enacted" clause. Well, if there's a lot of material, where do you move it? Do you include some of it? Do you leave the pictures out? Do you put it in? The title board shouldn't be in a position of picking where to move the "Be it Enacted" clause.

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MR. DOMENICO: Well, it's pretty easy, right? It's either at the beginning of everything or you leave it. So that doesn't seem that -- I mean, either everything in front of us comes after it because that should be at the beginning of the initiative, or we just leave it and then try to deal with what it means if it's in the middle of what we've got. I mean, I agree with you, I would not want to get in the business of saying, Well, it should go here, here or here. It seems to me we either leave it where it is and deal with that problem or we discuss whether we can or should move it to the beginning of everything we have.

MR. DUNN: Well, if the title board has the authority to move the "Be it Enacted" clause to the beginning of a measure, then what's the purpose of the "Be it Enacted" clause? Why not just say, Look, everything that's submitted, that's the measure. The "Be it Enacted" clause requirement then becomes moot. There is no purpose to it. If -- we'll just assume that if there's anything before it in the measure, we'll just move it up to the front.

MR. DOMENICO: Well -- but then that would suggest that -- that would mean that -- the requirement to have a "Be it Enacted" clause sort of envisions that

11 (Pages 41 to 44)

45 1 1 you'll have a bunch of introductory material and then 2 the measure itself, right? 2 3 MR. DUNN: No. I would say the opposite. 3 4 I would -- I would think what Mr. Rogers argued is 4 5 5 accurate, that '10 -- '105(4) specifically enumerates 6 what needs to be submitted to the title board, and 6 7 there is a purpose for that. It's to submit the final 7 8 language so there's no question, there's no doubt about 8 9 what the title board is considering and what's going to 9 10 10 wind up on the ballot. 11 11 You know, the -- I would disagree, as 12 Mr. Rogers did, that leg council was concerned about --12 wasn't concerned about this. They were. 13 13 14 As you said, Madam Chair, they put it as 14 15 one of the purposes. They raised the question about 15 16 whether it was properly above the "Be it Enacted" 16 17 17 clause, and the proponents actually made red-line 18 changes to it when submitting it here. It's -- it's 18 19 extemporaneous, additional language that has no 19 20 20 meaning, why make changes to it? 21 So I think the proponents would like it to 21 22 be part of the measure. I think that the title board 22 23 can't be choosing from measure to measure what's going 23 24 to be in -- in the measure and having to put itself in 24 25 the situation of having to figure that out on a 25 46 1 case-by-case basis; and maybe it's a little easier in 1 2 this one than it will be next time, but I think that's 2 3 opening a Pandora's box for the title board, that you 3 4 don't want to go there. 4 5 5 MR. DOMENICO: Can I try to narrow this 6 down, our discussion a little bit? 6 7 7 MS. STAIERT: Thank you. 8 MR. DOMENICO: It seems to me we have 8 9 three options. Tell me if I'm wrong. One is leave it 9 10 10 as is and try to figure out what it means just as it is. One is essentially just for us to remove the 11 11 12 recitals, and the third would be to move the -- the "Be 12 13 13 it Enacted" language. I don't -- I don't see any 14 14 other -- I don't think I see any other fourth option, 15 15 but I could be . . . 16 MR. DUNN: Well, Mr. Domenico, I --16 17 17 MS. STAIERT: We can vote it down. 18 18 MR. DOMENICO: Well, I didn't -- the 19 consequences of leaving -- of any of those -- I'm 19 20 20 setting aside whether any of those are okay or all of 21 them are okay, just we have to do one of those and then 21 22 figure out which -- whether it's okay.

MS. STAIERT: Right. I mean, I think I am

more comfortable leaving it where it is. I don't

think, given the comments by the proponent, that it

would be considered technical and as well as the fact that it's then commented on by legislative legal as sort of the purpose of the initiative. So to strike it as technical I think is a -- probably not proper.

I'm also not comfortable moving the whereas clause. I'm not sure yet that I necessarily agree that leaving it the way it is divests us of jurisdiction, but I think we have to accept it the way that it came in.

But Mr. Gelender might have a different --MR. DUNN: I would add, if I could, Madam Chair, that this very conversation is the reason why you need a bright-line rule, that it puts the title board in an untenable situation of having to figure out what's in the measure, what are we writing the title on, and -- and you can easily see this is getting into a much more complicated decision.

MS. STAIERT: Well, I have Bill Hobbs' cell phone if we can't . . . We can have a fourth vote.

MR. GELENDER: Excuse me. I do find that last point by Mr. Dunn quite persuasive in that it's -you know, it would -- it's easy to say, Well, in this case, it's sort of my initial inclination to just get rid of this line because whether it's in or it's out

doesn't really change what the title is that we set or the legal effect of the measure, as far as I can tell.

That said, I would hate to see the time when we get one with some substantive stuff in front of an enacting clause and we've set a precedent of accepting a measure in whole or in part that had that flaw.

So given that, the question seems to become is the fact that the enacting clause is in the middle of the measure rather than at the beginning of the measure a fatal jurisdictional flaw.

MS. STAIERT: I agree.

MR. GELENDER: And whether that is a --Maury is looking right through my head right now -that we have jurisdiction to decide.

MR. KNAIZER: To my mind, the question that the board has to answer is whether or not the measure is sufficiently clear and the intent of the measure is sufficiently clear to allow the board to set a title.

So -- so if the -- so if the board determines that because of, for example, the placement of the "Be it Enacted" clause, that it's -- it's not sufficiently clear to the board what the meaning of the measure is and what is included, then the board, under

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Supreme Court precedent, should not set a title.

MR. DOMENICO: Well -- maybe this is the same question, but part of Mr. Rogers' argument was that by constitutional definition, the only thing that can be a measure is what comes after -- an initiative is what comes after the "Be it Enacted" clause, and so if that's right, then the question becomes, Okay, so we've got a measure, which is what comes after "Be it Enacted," with an extra page of recitals and what does that -- what does that allow us or require us to do.

I'm not sure if that's the same basic question or a slightly different one, but, I mean, in some ways, Mr. Rogers' argument answered the question of what is the -- the initiative. It can only be what's after "Be it Enacted," and then the question is what does the fact that we have a bunch of other things in front of us do if we accept that part of his argument.

MR. GELENDER: Part of the difficulty is -- is because I don't think that this -- these whereas clauses have any substantive legal effect, then the measure is not unclear to me, because whether they're there or not, the measure, to me, does the same thing and the law will be changed in the same way.

So if that's really the question, then it

seems to me that we can set, but I also do agree with Mr. Domenico, it seems like we should be setting only on the basis of what's after that enacting clause. The rest isn't an initiative. So --

MR. DOMENICO: Well, and I guess the other question is if we accept that, that really the initiative is just what's after it, is the consequence of -- of presenting us with this extra page of recitals just for somebody else to deal with? Which it may be. And one of Mr. Rogers' arguments, I thought, was that the people who object to this don't have a lot of opportunities to have their objection heard, although I suppose they could object to the secretary of state, as it goes to the petition process, that it's inappropriate to include this sort of thing.

I mean, I -- anyway, I like the -- I do like the bright-line rule that either, as I suggested -- it seems to me we could either have a rule that says we're going to take you at your word and where you stick the "Be it Enacted" is it and we're only going to deal with what comes after that, or everything you present to us is what's going to be the initiative. It doesn't sound like there's much sympathy for that idea. But I -- I do think it's problematic, even though these are sort of

non-substantive, if we really aren't sure what's going to go on the ballot, that we can set a title, which is -- was my problem last time.

MS. STAIERT: Well -- because I think we become unsure of the purpose when purpose No. 1 is to discuss the Bank of North Dakota.

MR. DOMENICO: Right.

MS. STAIERT: And when we're hearing from the proponent that he's not sure if that's the purpose, I think it just adds some confusion and, I mean, I suppose it would be nice if we knew what was going to happen as it went forward, but I guess it's not particularly relevant whether the Secretary of State's office is going to take care of it or whether it's going to end up in the constitution.

I mean, it sounds like, from Mr. Knaizer, that he has previously advised whatever comes out of the title board is what you print on the petition, which means that all these whereas clauses go on the petition and then the petition is adopted, that's what's going to go in the constitution. So all these whereas clauses are going to go in the constitution.

I don't know. It makes it unclear to me what I'm trying to set. Should I -- should my -should my title start, "An Amendment to the Colorado

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Constitution to talk about the Bank of North Dakota and, in connection therewith, establish a similar bank in Colorado?" Is that really what I'm doing or am I doing something else?

MR. STAELIN: Well, our -- our intent, as far as what goes in the constitution, in each draft, has been what follows the "Be it Enacted" clause. That's a gratuitous statement.

MS. STAIERT: I'm not sure that's the practice.

MR. DOMENICO: So what section 1 or V, 1(8) says is the style of all laws adopted by the people through the initiative shall be "Be it Enacted by the People of the State of Colorado." So what the proponents are saying is the actual law that they wanted to have adopted does follow that particular language.

And then you've also got something else that they want the people to vote on that's not part of the law in question. I find that -- I'm just confused about what that is -- what that means. And I agree, if we were to get one that said -- that did have sort of substantive or -- discussion, as I think Mr. Dunn pointed out about here is how this should be interpreted, et cetera, et cetera, that could be fairly

13 (Pages 49 to 52)

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53 1 substantive, just what you would -- what you would be 2 asking the people to do. 3 I mean, it seems to me fairly clear that 4 any of the alternatives that I've sort of tried to work 5 through are not really consistent with what the 6 proponents wanted to try to do. The question -- so I 7

don't -- making any of these proposed changes seems improper. The question then is does that mean we can't set a title with what's in front of us? MS. STAIERT: See, and I feel like we

can't because this is the intent -- even though it doesn't say interpret it this way, if there's ever a question as to the language, the court is going to go back and it's going to say, Well, look at this whereas clause where it said small businesses have experienced great difficulties, so, you know, based on that, this must have been a measure to assist the small businesses, so we're going to err on that side or we're going to err on this side.

I mean, I think when you -- the whole purpose of these kinds of whereas clauses is to establish your legislative history, and I guess that's what I'm struggling with.

MR. DOMENICO: Well -- and I agree with that, I just -- I just wonder what -- why that -- why

the consequence of that is that we have to -- well, I guess what the consequence of that is.

MS. STAIERT: Well, I think the consequence would be if we're going to set a title, we're going to have to consider these whereas clauses and whether they have any substantive --

MR. DOMENICO: I think that's right. MS. STAIERT: But these two might have another idea.

MR. GELENDER: I'm sorry.

MS. STAIERT: You're fine.

MR. GELENDER: I think maybe this is the time to throw out a trial motion for action and see what happens.

MS. STAIERT: All right.

MR. GELENDER: All right. I'm going to make a motion that because -- for -- well, for a variety of reasons: One, as Mr. Domenico says, it doesn't seem possible to both comply with the constitution and execute the proponent's stated intent of having this preamble language included in the measure, and because while it's maybe sufficiently nonsubstantive, a tough one like this, I don't know how we can in the future -- how we can set a precedent for in the future having a measure like this come up that has

very substantive integral language in front of an enacting clause and then more of the same after it. where we can't toss it, come to a different conclusion. So I'm going to actually move that we not set a title on the basis of not having jurisdiction.

MS. STAIERT: So you're going to move -you're going to move to grant the motion --

MR. DUNN: Lack of jurisdiction.

MR. GELENDER: To grant the motion to -for rehearing.

MS. STAIERT: And strike the title? MR. GELENDER: Yes, and strike the title.

MR. STAELIN: Well, can I respond? I -our intent was not to have the whereas clause be part of the constitution. I think you've properly set title based on what we intended and expected would become part of the constitution.

We're perfectly content with not having the whereas clauses be considered part of the measure. I think that's the issue. We were not discouraged from having the material in the whereas clauses. It was simply a matter of what you plan to put in the constitution should be only what follows the "Be it Enacted" clause, and that's what we did, and that's how

1 you set title.

(At this time Mr. Knaizer left the room.) MR. STAELIN: We're not asking that the whereas clauses be part of the constitution in any way. MR. DUNN: Mr. Domenico, would this help? MR. DOMENICO: No, I've got something even better here, actually.

MS. STAIERT: I'm going to second the motion just so that we can continue discussion.

MR. DOMENICO: Yeah, I -- I know I started all this, but I just can't -- there is two steps in that analysis I'm not convinced enough of to go along with. One is, as I -- as I said, the constitutional provision just says that the laws enacted by initiative shall start with this language and, in fact, the law that the proponents want to enact does begin with it. Now, whether that causes another problem is a different question. I mean, I just -- but technically I think it doesn't violate that part of the constitution to do

So then the question is, all right, so the -- so you've got the law you want to add, amend, plus this other page, and -- and the step in getting to why that deprives us of jurisdiction as opposed to causing potential problems with what if somebody puts

14 (Pages 53 to 56)

in there some really sort of clearly obnoxious, tendentious argument, advertising propaganda or, on the other hand, some substantive things, those are certainly problems that I can see, but I don't get why that deprives us of jurisdiction. I'm not there yet. I don't -- so that's why I'm -- I would vote against the motion to grant the petition to the extent it says we don't have jurisdiction. MS. STAIERT: Okay. Let's take a vote on the motion that we approve the motion for rehearing and strike the question. All those in favor? MR. GELENDER: Aye. MS. STAIERT: Opposed? MR. DOMENICO: No. MS. STAIERT: No. Okay. So that motion failed. So we still haven't done anything. MR. DUNN: So, in other words, it's a normal title board. MR. DOMENICO: That's right. MR. DUNN: Well, let me continue with some of the jurisdictional issues, then. There were two substantive changes made to the measure after the review and comment hearing that were not discussed. Actually, I should say at least three. I would say that there were changes to the whereas clauses, I guess I'll make a record on that, 

not discussed at the review and comment.

Second, later in that -- in that
paragraph -- I'm happy to stop there and answer any
questions.

Second, later in that paragraph, the -what I think is on the one, two, three, four -- begins
at the end of the fifth line, the measure is -- is
talking about the -- well, I guess the easiest thing to
do is read the sentence. "Any such bank shall have the
same powers and authorities of other banks chartered by
the state of Colorado as well as the power and
authority to deposit public revenues and funds in its
own bank," and the original version then said, "except
as limited by the legally established purposes of the
government of the political subdivision."

The proponents, without response -- not in response to review and comment, changed that to say that the power is limited, at the end of the clause, by the general assembly -- assembly rather than the political subdivision and it can be expanded by the general assembly, two substantive changes made to the measure not in response to the review and comment hearing or questions raised therein.

Those are both jurisdictional concerns. They, of course, divest the title board of jurisdiction

I would say that there were changes to the whereas clauses, I guess I'll make a record on that, that were not discussed. But, more substantively, in paragraph 1 of the measure or what is -- what is now paragraph 1 of the final measure, there were two additions and I guess one change made to the measure, and if you look at the red-lined amended version, the -- the paragraph 1 of the measure requires that the -- or allows that the political subdivision of the state may engage in banking or establish a bank and may lend money at interest to promote development and enterprise in the state. That was the original version.

The proponents inserted "or at no interest" after the phrase "may lend money at interest." That was a phrase that was not discussed at the review and comment hearing and it substantively changes the measure. It's one thing to allow the political subdivision to operate a bank and to lend money at interest, and — which voters will think will produce revenue for the bank and for the political subdivision, and it's another to change the substantive power of the bank to lend money at no interest for whatever purpose.

So we'd raise that change, and that was

to set a title, and the measure should be sent back to legislative staff for another review and comment hearing so that those provisions can be considered by the public and by legislative staff.

I also have single subject concerns, but I'll pause there to see if there's any questions or discussion on that.

MR. GELENDER: Mr. Dunn, did you listen to the hearing or just look at the review and comment memo in terms of knowing what was discussed or not discussed at the hearing?

MR. DUNN: I attended the hearing, we had it videotaped, and I've probably watched that videotape a dozen times.


MR. GELENDER: Interesting. 'Cause I spoke to the attorney who conducted the hearing, and it was his view that these things were discussed in one form or another.

MR. DUNN: I'm not sure what that other form would be.

MR. GELENDER: Well, specifically, he indicated -- I got this motion, of course, yesterday and did not have time to listen to the tape. That there were -- there was a question asked about, you know, who had sort of authority over this kind of bank

15 (Pages 57 to 60)

		1	
	6	1	6
1	and there was a discussion of that issue to which he		1 to a suggestion by legislative legal?
2	felt that this change to having the general assembly	1	2 MR. STAELIN: If I could, I'd like to look
3	regulate versus the subdivision, for one, was a		3 at their comments again. I think
4	responsive change.		THE REPORTER: I didn't hear you.
5	MR. DUNN: I just don't remember that	!	5 MR. STAELIN: I'd like to look at their
6	discussion. I certainly don't remember it, either, as	'	6 comments again so I can address that.
7	expanding the authority of of the controlling body	'	7 MR. DUNN: Jason Dunn again, Madam Chair.
8	to regulate the bank. One said limited by the	{	8 If the purpose was to give the general
9	political subdivision, the other one says expanded or	9	9 assembly more flexibility, that, I would propose, is
10	limited by the general assembly, two different changes.	10	y
11	And I'd be curious, did did that	13	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
12	discussion include the discussion of the "at no	12	would ask why include the phrase in the original
13	interest" change, as well?	13	3 version? That makes the language meaningless, and why
14	MR. GELENDER: Yes, and I don't know if	14	4 change it on the amended version to say also "at no
15	that phrase was used specifically. I think there was	15	5 interest"?
16	comment I was told that there was discussion of sort	16	6 And as you know, common statutory rules of
17	of the general lending authority; however, like I said,	17	7 interpretation, especially in the constitutional
18	I have not listened to the tape, so	18	
19	MR. STAELIN: May I comment?	19	<b>5</b>
20	MS. STAIERT: Uh-huh, please.	20	particularly a constitutional amendment.
21	MR. STAELIN: I forget the name of the	21	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
22	attorney who was present	22	·, · · · <b>,</b> · · · - ·
23	MR. GELENDER: Yes.	23	0 0
24	MR. STAELIN: Robin Jones?	24	, -
25	MR. GELENDER: No, Bart Miller.	25	5 plain language, and because interest includes the
	62		64
1	MR. STAELIN: Okay. But I do recall	1	possibility of having interest so low that in effect it
2	discussing the issue of interest. I don't think it's a	2	does amount to no interest, it's actually more clear
3	substantive change. Interest and the ability to charge	3	and plain to add the language "or at no interest."
4	interest does not limit in any way what that interest	4	
5	rate can be. It could be 1 percent interest or .00, ad	5	*
6	infinitum, and so it's quite possible to lend at	6	1
7	interest in a way that doesn't actually produce any	7	,
8	interest. I did a quick calculation. If you have	8	conservation aproximo ac you
9	seven zeroes before your number or up to 12, depending	9	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
10	on how much you're lending, you can have interest over	10	
11	15 or 30 years that doesn't actually produce a penny in	11	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
12	interest, and so saying "or at no interest" doesn't	12	5 1
13	actually produce a substantive change.	13	<b>5</b> ,
14	And I I can't recall the the	14	•
15	specifics of the discussion about expanding or	15	
16	limiting, but I believe we were justified in doing that	16	
17	based on those discussions.	17	1 1 /
18	MR. DOMENICO: Well, why did why did	18	, 1
19	you think it was preferable to include that language?	19	2 /1 ,
20	What's the difference as you see it? Why why is it	20	
21	better?	21	9 1
22 23	MR. STAELIN: Simply to give the general	23	, .
24	assembly more flexibility.  MR. DOMENICO: Okay.	24	,
25	MS. STAIERT: But it was not in response	25	
4	Mo. 51 ATEK1. Dut it was not in response	120	with Dominico. Wen, say man 1 no, my



67 from just who makes that decision but whether or not 2 that's a limiting authority or a limiting and expanding 3 authority. 4 MS. STAIERT: Okay. And then did it take 5 the authority away from the political subdivision? 6 MR. DUNN: I -- I would certainly argue, 7 to the extent it controls the issue of whether or not 8 the political subdivision can put its own funds in that 9 bank, yes. MS. STAIERT: Maybe if the proponent can come back up, why did you make this change where the municipality couldn't put the funds in the bank? Was that in response to a question? MR. STAELIN: No. Yes. Are you talking about the capitalization? MS. STAIERT: No, I'm talking about on -in No. 1, on line 6, where it says "the authority to deposit public revenues and funds in its own bank except as expanded or limited by the" -- and then you

subdivision" and you put in the "general assembly."

MR. STAELIN: You know, frankly, I don't think I can answer that.

struck "purpose of the government of the political

THE REPORTER: I'm sorry?
MS. STAIERT: He said he can't answer

that.

substantive.

Okay. Any discussion by the board?

MR. DOMENICO: Well, I mean, I guess it's a bit of a debate between Mr. Gelender's hearsay and Mr. Dunn's watching the videotape and then us sort of trying to figure out who has the burden on a rehearing to persuade us. I'm -- I'm not entirely convinced that the first change about the interest rate is

The second one is clearly a substantive change. It's really two changes.

MR. STAELIN: Could I ask a question about --

MR. DOMENICO: Yeah.

MR. STAELIN: Could we -- are we in -- permitted to withdraw language like that?

MR. DOMENICO: No, no. I mean, as we just discussed, what you give to us has to be what ends up on the -- I mean, you could change a typo, but I don't think we can change that.

So the question for me, for sure on the second one, is whether it was in response to questions or discussion at the review and comment. I think that -- that that standard is fairly broad in response to sort of my own question, that the -- that as long as

17 (Pages 65 to 68)

just -- it didn't say -- it didn't change it from --

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Review Board

the basic ideas were triggered by the public comment, that that is satisfied.

I, too, have not listened to the video or anything like that, so we're in a little bit of a tough spot, but if Mr. Gelender's convinced that both of these changes were triggered by the discussions, I think at this stage we should accept that and deny the motion for a rehearing on that basis as not having carried their burden of convincing us, but I will say that could certainly be something they could prove in a challenge that went forward.

MS. STAIERT: Well, who defines what a comment is? I always just used the comments of -- that are in written form.

MR. GELENDER: I haven't conducted -MS. STAIERT: Is there a definition of
"comments"?

MR. GELENDER: Well, I think it's -sorry. What's in there, having done a number of review
and comment hearings before getting assigned to the
title board, I'll say that what typically happens and
not always, depending on the proponent, what happens at
the hearings is we'll ask the questions in the memo and
then there's follow-up -- there's sometimes this
follow-up where they trigger more questions and some

with the -- okay. I think it has to do with the subdivisions.

MS. STAIERT: Yeah, that question appears in this one, too.

MR. GELENDER: Yeah, well, it will. I just -- and I -- see, I don't know if it's something that came up in response. I don't know what to do here because all I know is, you know, what I was told by one of the people in my shop, and then I have contradictory here, and there's no way, absent a transcript or a videotape, to --

MS. STAIERT: Well, that's why I asked the question about what's a comment, because if the comment is this document --

MR. GELENDER: I don't think we've already treated it as limited to the review and comment.

MR. DOMENICO: Yeah. I mean, we've sort of viewed it, the purpose of this requirement is to make sure that any changes -- people have had an opportunity -- the public has had an opportunity to discuss the basic issues that are going to be presented, that essentially we're not going to be presented with a measure that is substantively -- substantively different than anything anybody's had a chance to discuss, that adds any provisions that nobody

back and forth.

My understanding from Bart Miller, who conducted this review and comment hearing, was that on the second issue about the, you know, change to the general assembly was that some sort of question was asked, and I don't know -- that had to deal with sort of who would regulate the banks -- the bank or how -- I think this is the one that says it's the bank, whose authority they would be subject to, and there was some sort of response, Well, we should probably have the general assembly doing that.

Like I said, I can't prove that, and I don't know if Mr. Dunn has a transcript of the whole thing on hand or not, but --

MR. DUNN: I don't. I want to make sure, though, Mr. Gelender, you're not talking about initiative No. 95 as it relates to state banks and regulation by the general assembly of those -- of that entity.

MR. GELENDER: Where am I?

MS. STAIERT: 95 is the next initiative.

MR. GELENDER: Right. So on the screen -oh, this is the -- okay. So here is '4. This talks
about the subdivision. What's it say? Stop.

The political sub -- okay, this has to do

got to talk about and that sort of thing.

And so I think if -- if the purpose of allowing the public to comment on what's in front of us was served by the -- by the discussion, then we'd sort of view that as kind of the comments and in response to the comments, even if it took sort of a follow-up question.

So I -- I think we have interpreted that fairly broadly in the past. I mean, we've only really rejected measures on this basis when they've sort of just made new changes, added -- changed the percentage of a tax or something like that just because they thought it was a better number, that sort of thing. And so that's kind of where that -- that is.

MR. GELENDER: Yeah, and my suspicion is -- I'm looking at question 9, which says "The Bank of North Dakota has no formal regulatory oversight of its activities" to the -- I'm skipping some language now, but "Do the proponents intend for there to be any regulatory oversight over banks created under the proposed initiative?" My position is that, you know -- or at least what Mr. Miller thought was that there was some response of, Well, maybe the general assembly should do so probably in response to that question or a follow-up to that question.

18 (Pages 69 to 72)

MR. DUNN: Well, I would say this to that: First of all, I think the response to that one was the addition of paragraph 5 in the measure. That's -- that's an entirely new paragraph entitled Regulatory Oversight. It says, "The general assembly may provide guidelines enforced by the Colorado Banking Board and the Colorado Commissioner of Financial Services for oversight of banks."

The question of whether the general assembly was discussed in the context of having general regulatory oversight, I think, is an entirely different question than whether or not the general assembly or the political subdivision should control the authority of the political subdivision to put funds in its own bank, which was expressly spelled out previously in the measure.

I have -- and you'll notice we did not raise the addition of paragraph 5 as an addition after review and comment, and the reason for that is because I recall that discussion in response to the comment and question in the memo; but the -- the substantive discussion about who controls whether the political subdivision can put funds in its own bank was not discussed, and I think, you know, if you look at the order of the questions, the fact that that's

of the sentence still modifies the whole thing and doesn't just modify the discussion of depositing public revenues. I'm not sure that changes the analysis, but it's just trying to figure out what that change is limited to.

MR. GELENDER: I think it -- to me, it does at least potentially change the analysis. I think it shows like -- we've had the question of the regulatory oversight, and I don't think we can hold the proponents to sort of this standard of a highly proficient lawyer and knowing what -- exactly what they're doing. I think the general question was raised about regulatory oversight and they respond with the subjects in 5 and then further may or may not -- may have responded by, you know, saying, Well, maybe the general assembly should be sort of in charge of their powers and authorities instead of the subdivision itself for a sort of -- that doesn't seem like an unreasonable scenario to me.

MR. DUNN: I guess I would ask the question, Mr. Gelender, is there a difference between what is the regulatory oversight? Do the proponents intend, as the question 9 asks, for there to be a financial services commission or, in the case of North Dakota and -- and whatever we have in Colorado, banking

No. 9 -- the review and comment memo obviously follows the sequence of the measure. So the fact that that was sort of at the tail end, and then paragraph 5 wound up in the tail end there, I think, demonstrates that that was not a direct question or comment, as the constitution requires, regarding something that was in the first paragraph of the measure.

MR. DOMENICO: Well, wait a minute. So are you reading the changes as modifying only the power and authority to deposit public revenues and funds in its own bank or is the change you were talking about, about expand -- expanding or limiting by the general assembly, meant to modify that whole sentence about having the same powers and authority of other banks chartered by the State of Colorado? Because if you look at the original language, he didn't have anything about this depositing public revenues, right? You had the initial language about power and authority of any other bank and then except as limited by the political subdivision, essentially, and then you both added the language about depositing public revenues and changed the end of it to refer to the general assembly and to allow for expanding authorities.

To me, I think you could read it either way, but it makes more sense to say that that last part

commissioner? Is the -- is the regulatory concept who is going to write the rules and those kind of things about what banks have to do and the question of what are the organic powers of the bank itself under the constitution? I think, you know, those are two different subjects.

MR. GELENDER: I think they're two very different subjects to you or to an accomplished administrative law practitioner. I don't know that they're that different of subjects to your average ini--- your average initiative proponent, and I actually don't know our proponent's background, but --

MR. DUNN: I think he is a lawyer, in fact, if I'm not mistaken.

MR. STAELIN: I am a lawyer, but this is not my field.

MR. DUNN: I could attest that banking is not my field, either.

MR. GELENDER: I guess -- I guess the point is -- no, in light of, you know, our general default of having to sort of promote the right of initiative unless it's perfectly clear that there is a reason not to, you know, I don't know that -- I don't know that you're wrong, but I don't know that -- I don't think you've convinced me that you're right, and

19 (Pages 73 to 76)

19 (Pages 73 to 76



I think it is your burden to do so.

MR. DUNN: I have an idea, but I'll wait
to see what Mr. Domenica might have to say

to see what Mr. Domenico might have to say.

MS. STAIERT: We're just looking at the

questions. You can go ahead.

MR. DUNN: Okay. I should be careful your can go ahead.

MR. DUNN: Okay. I should be careful what I ask for here, but we have -- the videotape that we have of the hearing I will make a copy of before I -- I offer this. The first couple minutes of it are missing because our videographer didn't get there at the start of the meeting with leg council, but we have it available online. We use Dropbox, which I've now become familiar with in -- in how to use and to view the video and the quality is good and the sound is good. We can make that available to you and the proponent this evening and the hearing can be continued on the limited basis for the question of whether or not there were changes made to the review -- after review and comment and can be decided tomorrow.

I actually think we have other wonderful reasons that you can use to reject the measure that we have yet to talk about, but on that one, I'm -- I'm happy to make the video available to -- to the board and -- and the proponents.

MS. STAIERT: I think Mr. Domenico might

Colorado has an extensive statutory scheme called the Colorado Deposit Protection Act. I'm told that's close.

MR. DOMENICO: Exactly, and that's what this is trying to deal with, right, to say that, Yeah, you've got all these -- so they say, you know, Colorado's got all these complicated rules about public funds, so don't you need to do something, and then maybe they said it should stay the same, but they also -- I mean, the first part of this that you don't object to clearly is in response to that, and so in the end, the part you object to is this -- allowing "expanded" in addition to "limitation" and then "general assembly," which also strikes me as directly in response to the point made in 5(b) that you might need to get the general assembly to do something, and so maybe they responded initially by saying, No, we don't think so, but it looks like it turns out they were convinced perhaps during the discussion that they did need to amend it.

I mean --

MR. DUNN: Well, first of all, I would say the proponent was up here and had an opportunity to express that and did not.

But, second, the Public Deposit Protection

be ready to make a motion.

MR. DOMENICO: I'm guess I'm pretty satisfied that this is in response to 5(b) or at least that it seems to be in response to 5(b) of the questions that discusses whether it would be necessary for the general assembly to change the system to account for governments depositing public money in their banks, and then -- so the response is to say something about allowing people to deposit -- governments the power to deposit public revenues and clarifying that the general assembly, as the question refers to, has the authority to allow that.

MR. DUNN: Well, Mr. Domenico, I'll answer that in two ways: One, the proponents answered that question on 5(b) by stating that it was -- saying that the -- the system would stay as is, to use their language.

MR. DOMENICO: Right.

MR. DUNN: So they felt that no change was needed.

Second, that question doesn't have anything to do with regulatory oversight of the bank; what that question is about, what No. 5 is about in general is about the -- the regulation of banks differently when public funds are deposited, and

Act has -- has extensive requirements for what banks must do to actually be listed as a bank that can accept public deposits, and it makes sense, if you think about it, that they need heightened protections for public funds; and so any bank that wants to be registered as a bank authorized to accept such -- such funds has to meet higher requirements in terms of capitalization and all kinds of other things.

So adding in that a bank can deposit funds in its own bank doesn't answer that question. The question here is, is would they fall under the Public Deposit Protection Act if they did so, and the proponents said yes, the -- the act appropriately covers that.

One of our single subject arguments that we have yet to make is that this measure completely voids that statutory scheme. It -- no longer is there a requirement in statute that public funds deposited in -- in a bank need to comply with a higher requirement, that the bank needs to comply with a higher requirement.

MR. DOMENICO: Yeah, well -- and I appreciate we put -- everybody's in kind of an awkward position when we get to the end of the process because we're sort of asking you to prove a negative if we put

20 (Pages 77 to 80)



the burden on you to show us that this wasn't in response to something; on the other hand, you know, you submit something yesterday and then if we put the burden on the proponents to refute what you say 16 hours later, that's also unfair, but I'm inclined to lean towards the burden being more strongly on the movants for a rehearing, and to me, it's not clear enough that -- that this was just made up out of whole cloth and not in response to 5(b) or the discussion that 5(b) probably engendered. 

So I would move that we probably just can move to the other arguments Mr. Dunn has. I don't know that we need a motion on every issue, but...

MR. DUNN: Well, I mean, I don't want to -- I don't want to get in the way of anyone who would like to say anything contrary to Mr. Domenico.

MS. STAIERT: I mean, I just think that since we've spent time on the issue, we ought to vote on it for purposes of the record, so --

MR. DUNN: If we're going to -- if the -- if the board is going to vote on the question of whether changes were made after review and comment, then I -- I would like to circle back to the "at no interest" addition. I don't believe that was in any way discussed in direct response to question or

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MR. GELENDER: Aye. MR. DOMENICO: Aye.

MS. STAIERT: Opposed, no. So we get to hear your next argument.

MR. DUNN: Let me turn now to single subject. It is our argument that the measure contains -- this is on page 2 of the memo, or, excuse me, the motion. The measure contains at least five distinct subjects. Of course, the primary one is, as the proponent suggests, authorizing certain political subdivisions of the state to establish and operate a bank.

In addition and -- well, I'll take them in order. Number one, obviously, is an amendment or actually, I was thinking about this morning, perhaps overruling the requirement of TABOR by allowing political subdivisions to engage in multiyear fiscal obligations. Of course, Article X, section 20 of the constitution prohibits political subdivisions of the state from -- from incurring multiyear fiscal obligations, and I don't think it's hard to envision a scenario where, because the purpose of this measure is stated as promoting development and enterprise in the state, or, excuse me, for -- yeah, for the state, that banks could or the state could use this mechanism, the

comment, as the statute requires or the constitution -- or statutory provision requires.

Mr. Domenico said, Well, I'm not sure that's a substantive change. You know, I -- I outlined already why I think that is substantive. A public entity that is capitalized with public funds which is backed by the full faith and credit of the institution of the -- of the political subdivision to be able to operate it ostensibly as a business and eliminate the primary source of revenue for that business through a change to the measure has to be substantive. I don't know how you can interpret it to say interest or no -- at no interest is not substantive.

MS. STAIERT: All right. You want to make a motion?

MR. GELENDER: I think Mr. Domenico has the motion.

MS. STAIERT: He doesn't want to make the motion.

MR. DOMENICO: I'm happy to move that we deny the motion for rehearing to the extent it argues that we don't have jurisdiction based on changes made after review and comment.

MR. GELENDER: Second.

MS. STAIERT: Okay. All those in favor?

ability of the bank to lend funds or to incur debt, as a means of getting around that requirement of the state.

So the -- so the bank could take on multiyear debt and use that for the state's benefit, whether it's to promote economic development and enterprise, whatever that means, or simply put it in the general fund for those purposes and to allow the state to borrow funds for that purpose.

I think a good example of that, actually, is -- if you've been reading the newspapers, the state has been struggling over how to come up with, I think it was, \$5.7 million for the state strategic fund. That is a fund that resides in the state Office of Economic Development and is used as an incentive program to give cash awards to employers to move jobs here, and the joint budget committee refused to include that line in the budget, and the governor's office was pushing hard to put that back in.

You can envision a scenario where the governor's office pushes for the state bank to incur multiyear debt to bring in those funds so that the governor's office can promote economic development, and that would clearly be in violation of TABOR but for this not being a constitutional provision, which would

21 (Pages 81 to 84)

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1 Mr. Childears runs the Colorado Banking Association, then supersede that or conflict with it. 2 2 MR. STAELIN: I have a response. that typically a bank is funded 80 percent by borrowed 3 3 MS. STAIERT: Uh-huh. funds. Banks routinely borrow money for their purposes 4 4 and for presumably lending at higher rates. So I don't MR. STAELIN: In lending money, the state think a bank can operate without -- without engaging in 5 5 would not be taking on debt. It's lending money. The 6 party undertaking the debt would be the party at the 6 multi- -- in multiyear debt. 7 other end. In North Dakota, as -- we envisioned here 7 MR. STAELIN: The political subdivisions 8 8 actually, the -- the subdivision banks would ordinarily have a power that the banks don't have and that is they 9 9 be entering into correspondent-type relationships with can levy taxes and assess fees. The basis for the 10 community banks to lend money. That would be done 10 funding, the capitalization of the bank is the tax 11 through the bank, through the community banks. 11 money and fees that come in, and all of that becomes available, then, to lend out. There's no need to 12 And also there is no requirement that in 12 13 amending the constitution -- because we have a 13 borrow. 14 14 superseding clause, there's no requirement that we MR. DUNN: Jason Dunn again. I would -- I spell out every provision of the constitution that 15 15 would direct the title board back to the language we 16 might be in conflict with it. That's more the nature 16 discussed a moment ago where it says the bank has 17 of cleanup that can be done later, but we make it clear 17 the -- all the powers -- let me make sure I get the 18 18 the single issue is to authorize political subdivisions right language. "Any such bank shall have the same 19 to establish their own banks and generally what 19 powers and authority as other banks chartered by the State of Colorado." Banks have the authority to incur 20 those -- what the guidelines for -- for doing that will 20 21 21 debt, multiyear debt, for purposes of the operation of 22 22 the bank. MR. GELENDER: I have a question or two 23 for the proponent briefly. 23 MS. STAIERT: Mr. Dunn, when you say 24 24 MS. STAIERT: That's you. You. superseding TABOR to allow the state to retain excess 25 MR. STAELIN: Oh, okay. I'm sorry. I was 25 revenue, where is that in the proposal? Where does it 86 1 1 thinking the proponent of the motion. say that they can keep the revenue? 2 MR. GELENDER: I'm sorry. So is -- in 2 MR. DUNN: I'm sorry? 3 your view, is TABOR a conflicting state constitutional 3 MS. STAIERT: Well, in your memorandum. 4 amendment that would be superseded by this or would --4 you state that one of the violations of the single 5 for example, if one these banks, and assuming it didn't 5 subject is that it -- it supersedes TABOR and that it qualify for enterprise status, was going to take on 6 6 allows -- am I on the right one? 7 a -- was going to incur a multiple fiscal year 7 MR. DUNN: Are you on 95? obligation, that they would not need a vote of the 8 MS. STAIERT: I may not have the right 8 people? Would they or would they not need a TABOR 9 9 one. Yeah, I'm on 95. Or 94. 10 vote? 10 MR. DUNN: Unfortunately we're not to 95 11 11 MR. STAELIN: I don't think so. I don't yet. 12 think it conflicts with TABOR. This -- this isn't 12 MR. DOMENICO: Well, what -- what -- I 13 authorizing the bank to borrow money. So . . . 13 mean, what difference does it make? Why is it --14 14 MR. GELENDER: So if it -- if the bank that's not a separate subject, right? I mean, running 15 chose to, your assumption is that would be subject to 15 a bank -- if running a bank means that certain other 16 TABOR requirements? 16 provisions can't be applied to you, then that doesn't 17 17 MR. STAELIN: If the bank chose to -seem to be a -- maybe it's a separate -- a second 18 MS. STAIERT: Borrow. 18 implication, a fact. I don't even know if I would call it a purpose, but the -- the question is whether it's a 19 MR. GELENDER: To incur multiple -- to 19 borrow, to issue bonds or something like that. separate unrelated subject, and to me, it -- it's not. 20 20

22 (Pages 85 to 88)

MR. STAELIN: I believe so.

MR. GELENDER: Thank you.

MR. DUNN: Jason Dunn again.

the -- the objector on this. He indicated to me, and

I was just speaking with Mr. Childears,

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MR. DUNN: Well, what's, I think, a

separate subject is not whether so much the bank has

debt, that the stated purpose of the bank is to promote

the authority now to generate revenue through multiyear

the authority, it's that the political subdivision has

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89 1 economic development and enterprise in the state so the 2 political subdivision, or in the case of 95, to jump 3 ahead a little bit, can then incur multiyear debt 4 through the bank and use that for economic development 5 purposes. 6 MS. STAIERT: Okay. I'm going to rely on 7 hopefully your memory a little bit better than mine. 8 The case that talks about -- and it might specifically 9 reference TABOR, but that you can't have a spending 10 restriction in the same initiative as you have another 11 type of restriction, that those are two subjects, do 12 you know which case I'm talking about? 13 MR. DUNN: I don't -- I do, but I don't 14

have a citation for that.

MS. STAIERT: Okay. Is that similar to the argument you're making here?

MR. DUNN: It is. I think we do have a measure that -- well, let me back up. I think -- I'm trying to remember the case that it was in, where the Supreme Court said or implied that if TABOR were to be -- to be enacted today, it would -- it would violate the single subject requirement.

MS. STAIERT: Right.

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24 MR. DUNN: And I think it's along that 25 lines that if you have a measure that were to impact

1 both the spending limitation in TABOR and the revenue 2 limitation, that that would violate the single subject 3 requirement. 4

MS. STAIERT: And you think this does that?

MR. DUNN: Absolutely.

MS. STAIERT: Okay. And how?

MR. DUNN: It allows the state of the political subdivision to incur multiyear debt which would then presumably allow it, if it chose to exceed spending limitation -- revenue limitations and then of course exceed the spending limitations of that revenue.

MR. DOMENICO: But those, as you pointed out, are just sort of natural implications of establishing a bank by a -- that is a regular old bank but run by the government. I mean, that's an implication, as you pointed out, of -- of having the authority of other banks, it's not some special additional thing snuck in there that -- that if they just established a bank, they wouldn't have the power to do and that should shock everyone. I mean, banks are highly leveraged, typically, institutions and it's not as if they said let's start a bank and let's carve

a chunk out of TABOR. To the extent that's true, it

seems to me it's just an implication of -- of the subject here, which is authorizing banks and the only way to remedy what you say is a problem would be to have to specifically limit these banks in a way that just naturally they wouldn't be limited.

MR. DUNN: Well, I think I would agree with you. If the -- if the revenue and income to the bank was somehow exempted from TABOR as part of this measure, I would agree with you. But what this does is it guts the TABOR requirements that apply to the -- not the bank, but the political subdivision. The bank now. by use -- or, excuse me, the political subdivision, by using the bank as the vehicle, has a means to just circumvent TABOR completely.

MR. GELENDER: That seems, Mr. Dunn, to be a possibility but by no means a certain consequence of this thing. It seems to me, for one, the bank could be funded just with tax revenues in that way. If it's not funded with tax revenues, it's not entirely clear to me that it couldn't possibly be an enterprise and fund itself by issuing its own bonds, in which case it's not subject to TABOR.

So I -- I don't disagree with you that there might be -- there might be TABOR consequences. but I don't see clearly in the language or the measure

or in the way courts might interpret it, that it 1 2 necessarily would implicate TABOR. And then 3 secondly -- that necessarily would, as you put it, gut 4 TABOR.

And then secondly, even if it did have some of those effects, I think I agree with Mr. Domenico, that, you know, they're -- they're results and consequences, but I don't know that they're purposes or subjects.

MR. DOMENICO: It also seems to me, and we had this discussion last time, although it didn't, I don't think, focus directly on the ability to issue debt, but the proponents said, and this seems like a fairly reasonable reading of it, that -- that TABOR sort of is a filter that before the money gets into the -- the bank, it has to go through TABOR, and so to the extent it might apply, it's not, again, clear to me that you could sort of use this, for example, to get to your second point, to raise taxes. We specifically discussed that last time, and I think I -- I ended up being convinced that, no, you still have to comply with TABOR to get your revenue, and so I'm not quite sure that I agree with the premise, even if I did think it was a second subject. So I don't know. I -- I definitely don't

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93 1 think we need a motion on every (a), (b), (c), (d). MS. STAIERT: No. We can take them all 2 3 when we're done. 4 MR. DOMENICO: I mean, the second -- the 5 second point strikes me as just being a -- III(b), I'm 6 talking about -- not a likely interpretation of the 7 measure, just as a matter of fact, whether it would be a second subject or not. I don't see anything that 8 9 says you have the authority to cover your related 10 losses by raising taxes without complying with TABOR. 10 11 MR. DUNN: Well, I -- I would answer that 11 12 12 by asking a question. I guess what happens when -- if the bank fails and it's pledged its full faith and 13 13 14 credit for the measure -- for the failure? 14 15 MR. DOMENICO: Well, it would just be just 15 16 like anything else. The full faith and credit of a --16 17 17 of an institution only extends as far as its assets. 18 And if --18 19 MR. DUNN: And its credit. 19 20 MR. DOMENICO: And if the constitution 20 21 21 requires that you get a vote to come up with more 22 22 assets, that doesn't seem to -- I mean, that seems 23 23 far-fetched to me to say, Well, that means you just get 24 24 to -- that basically the creditors of this bank enforce 25 a tax increase on the -- on the people of the 25 94 1 subdivision. I just don't see it. MR. GELENDER: What, in fact, they could 2 3 do -- I mean, it could just have a municipal default, 4 it seems, or a county default, I suppose, in lieu of 5 the raising of taxes if they can't get voter approval. 6 I mean, that's a horrific consequence to be sure, but I 7 don't know that it's -- it's not an impossibile . . . 8 MS. STAIERT: See, I disagree with that,

of people -- people's personal bank accounts because it wants it, because -- just because anything else would be a limit on its -- on its revenue. I mean, that --I'm convinced that the best way to read that is once you get through TABOR, this is not a -- you can't limit it in this -- in any other way besides these ways.

It doesn't mean that -- that it can print its own money or that it can go around robbing people because any other limit would -- would conflict, and so I'm -- I'm not convinced. In fact, I'm convinced of the contrary, that TABOR still would apply to the money coming in and that reading it otherwise, even though I raised this very question last time is --

MS. STAIERT: Well, what if you put all the tax into the bank and your tax revenue that year was 10 percent above your cap? Then would you refund?

MR. DOMENICO: Right. No. So my -- so it seems to me if your tax revenue is excessive, then TABOR applies and you have to refund it, and --

MS. STAIERT: But then it's going to affect the --

MR. DOMENICO: -- you put it in the bank -- sure.

MS. STAIERT: It's going to affect the revenue, income and assets of the bank, which cannot be

because it says the revenue, income and assets of such banks shall not be limited, nor shall expenditures and management of its revenues be restricted except upon sound financial public policy considerations. All provisions of this section are self-executing, and severable and supersede any conflicting state constitution.

So this supersedes TABOR, it doesn't go with TABOR because the revenue, income and assets are not limited. That means that they can go above the cap.

MR. DOMENICO: Yeah, but that's only to the -- that's only to the extent they conflict, and this is exactly what we talked about last time. The -the revenue is the revenue that comes into it. It doesn't mean that none of the rest of the constitution applies and this bank can go around and take money out restricted.

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MR. DOMENICO: Right, but that doesn't --I mean, again, that doesn't mean that no other law applies and that just the bank can do whatever it wants.

MR. GELENDER: Actually, it won't, because you'll refund in the next year, and what they'll do is they'll just take half -- let -- the refund, over the next year and not deposit as much to the bank in the next year.

MS. STAIERT: Yeah, but those deposits shouldn't be restricted.

MR. GELENDER: Well, but it's always -- I believe -- I feel a little concerned that we're getting into the merits of the measure here, which is --

MS. STAIERT: Well, I'm just trying to get to the subject.

MR. GELENDER: -- not -- it says that --MR. DOMENICO: I mean, the fact of the matter is that --

MR. GELENDER: -- a political subdivision doesn't have to put -- I mean, it -- I think it has to be read as a whole with the language, which is sort of -- I believe it's "may" language as to what assets -- a political subdivision may put assets in the

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
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people. It doesn't seem like a separate subject, though. I mean, as I sort of understand it, I could be wrong, partly for some of the reasons you pointed out before, these banks, because of kind of some of the inherent limits or the fact that they're going to be lending at very low interest rates to places that normal banks might not, if they couldn't get governmental deposits, would have trouble succeeding, I suppose, and so wouldn't kind of the whole point of this be that this is a place for local governments to put their money and if you don't make it so they can put their money in there, the whole project fails? MR. DUNN: That may be a question that I think the proponent is better suited to answer about the intent of the measure. I think the -- the bank could be established with having -- either it's subjected to the act or distinguishing between public funds and private funds, but it doesn't do that. I

measure allows it to operate as a private -- as a private bank would, that it -- that it -- for purposes of allowing it to -- the public entity to deposit those funds in its own bank would not comply with that.

think then it, by its own terms, supersedes any

conflicting provisions that allow -- because the

MR. DOMENICO: I guess it's not even

Certainly the provision has to be read to supersede that act, and I don't think that's a natural consequence, is I think the language Mr. Domenico may have used, of the measure, but, rather, a separate purpose because all the public funds -- not all, a large percentage of the public funds of political subdivisions will likely be deposited in these banks, and the statute providing the heightened regulatory scheme increase -- is eliminated for purposes of these banks; and as the proponents said at the review and comment hearing, it was not their intend to -- to change that requirement, but the requirement in the provision and the measure gives them the authority and powers of other any state-chartered bank and -- and does not require any adherence to the Deposit Protection Act.

MR. DOMENICO: I think I agree with that,

and that may be a fairly important point to -- to some

totally clear to me that that's true. I mean, what -- is this the provision you cited earlier that we were discussing that you think does this?

MR. DUNN: Actually, are you talking about the statutory provision?

MR. DOMENICO: No. What provision of the measure would have the effect of voiding this act?

MR. DUNN: Well, I don't know if there's a -- you can pinpoint a specific provision. As I said, the measure, in paragraph 1, allows it to operate, shall have all the same powers and authority of banks chartered by the state and then only limits them as, then, the general assembly chooses to do so, and then goes on at the -- at the conclusion of paragraph 1 to say all provisions of this section are self-executing, and severable and supersede any conflicting state statutory provisions.

MR. GELENDER: Mr. Dunn, could the measure be interpreted to say that, okay, has the same powers and authority except as expanded or limited, and one of the limits that it's subject to is the existing limit on, you know, the cap -- the higher capitalization requirements you were talking about for having public funds deposited in it? I mean, it doesn't say, you know, except as subject to future limits.

25 (Pages 97 to 100)

MS. STAIERT: Okay.

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MR. DUNN: Well, I think that's a question for the proponents as to whether or not they believe the bank, if it accepts public funds, has to be capitalized to the same extent and meet the other registration requirements of the protection act. I don't think it does that, because it sets up a scheme for the operation and regulation of a -- of the political subdivision banks that are chartered.

MR. GELENDER: And I -- and it says that, you know, on average, they should be essentially -granted, it says it on the authority side, not regulated side, but it does say same powers and authority, so there's the suggestion that they should be treated like other banks, and to the extent they're similarly situated seems to me that maybe that should include that reserve requirement. Now, I don't know that act. I don't deal -- it may be the act has definitions that say a bank only includes a private bank. I have no idea. It probably doesn't, because we don't have public ones --

MR. DUNN: Exactly.

MR. GELENDER: So it's -- the problem I'm having is with the law being silent on it, again, I can't say that the measure won't do what you say, but I -- I can't say that it will, either, and I think, you

valid question I won't ask of the proponents, because I don't think that's -- that's appropriate for me to do here, but perhaps the board wants to ask the proponent if they intend for the act to apply to these types of banks.

Turning, I guess, to the last one, and this was an issue that was raised by legislative staff at the review and comment hearing, that Article XI of the constitution prohibits a political subdivision from pledging its credit. That was an issue that was raised and the proponents said that they did not see that as an issue. In fact, I think the -- the memo said would the proponents consider amending Article XI to conform with the authority granted in the proposed initiatives, and the proponents said that that was not necessary.

We would argue that the authority necessary for the operation of the banks here is for the political subdivision to pledge the credit of the political subdivision through the bank and that that's impermissible through -- by Article XI or as a separate subject to strike that constitutional provision as it applies to all political subdivisions.

MS. STAIERT: I mean, I agree it's a conflict. Clearly it's established law, you can't pledge credit, but, again, I don't know that it makes

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know, there's a lot of room for interpretation, further action by the general assembly, et cetera.

MR. DOMENICO: Well, section 3 also says that these banks may be capitalized by the same means available to and subject to the same minimums prescribed for banks that are privately owned, and it seems to me that sort of tries to say these kind of background rules, for the most part, still apply and avoid this -- this potential interpretation, but I don't know. I'm certainly not a banking lawyer, and so I don't know that I can say for sure that this isn't true, but again, it doesn't strike me as a separate subject. It's just sort of part of establishing a government-run bank.

MR. GELENDER: Right.

MS. STAIERT: Okay. So the last one is pledging credit?

MR. DUNN: And I -- if I could ask in advance, perhaps before we get on to title, if we get there, if we could take a couple-minute break.

MS. STAIERT: Yes.

MR. DUNN: And I may have one other issue to raise on the single subject requirement.

And just to finish the discussion on the public deposit protection, I mean, I think that's a

it a separate subject. I mean, it makes it a problem that the proponent believes that it's not effective, because it clearly is effective, but having chosen not to change that language, there will just be a conflict in the constitution and it sounds like from the language in sub 1, he's trying to say that we won't be limited in any other restrictions.

MR. DUNN: Well, I think the question is, then, at what point does an effect of the measure become so substantive that it's a separate subject? And if the board is in agreement that Article XI is voided as it applies to every political subdivision in the state, and that we have a --

MS. STAIERT: That would have a bank. MR. DUNN: That establishes a bank, you're right.

MR. DOMENICO: Yeah, it's not voided. I mean, it just means that if a -- one of these subdivisions creates a bank and chooses to forgo FDIC insurance and self-insure, that to that extent, Article XI wouldn't apply to that particular form of pledging credit. It doesn't mean that Article XI doesn't apply to them anymore, it's just that this one particular form of pledging of credit is okay.

MR. DUNN: Except that, as I discussed

26 (Pages 101 to 104)

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earlier, a political subdivision bank could then use the bank as a vehicle to incur debt for all kinds of things as long as they could tag it to development -to promoting development and enterprise, and you could see, especially in a downturn like we've had recently, where a political subdivision uses that as a vehicle to fund all kinds of things when revenues are down and to pledge its credit through the bank to do that.

MS. STAIERT: Well -- and fundamentally the problem is we may agree with you, but what you're making are policy arguments and --

MR. DUNN: I don't know -- I think the point is that -- as I started to say, at what point if the substantive impact of the measure, I guess, is so substantive, to be repetitive -- at what point is that a separate subject?

MR. GELENDER: And I'm sorry. I had my nose in my statute book. I believe -- did I hear you make the argument that sort of for these banks to function, they would kind of have to pledge their faith -- their full faith and -- the subdivisions would have to do this pledging of the credit in Article XI, section 1, that you couldn't see them functioning without that?

MR. DUNN: That's correct.

unusual for a bank, right? This is -- all these things are just made -- are just making the oddity of a government-run bank within the extreme oddity of our state constitution operate more and more like a regular bank and -- and that, to me, is a little bit strange. that you think you have to make a very -- that you can't make this operate like a regular bank, that it has to be -- that you have to have all these exceptions or it's a single subject violation.

MR. DUNN: Well, I mean, and our argument is not that each element of the way the bank operates is a separate subject, but when you have provisions in the Colorado constitution that are particularly fundamental provisions in the constitution like TABOR or the ability of -- of governmental -- governmental entities to pledge credit and the measure strikes those as they apply to all those governmental entities and that is a significant change in the way our governments operate, then that has to be a separate subject.

MR. DOMENICO: Yeah, but see, that -that, to me, shows what really would be problematic. If what we had was a measure that said, Hey, you can create a bank that's a government-run bank and, oh, by the way, any subdivision -- we are also repealing Article XI, period, and because it would help run the

106

MR. GELENDER: Okay. Then, to me, it seems like we have two different kind of issues, because to me that says, Well, then, if you want to establish this sort of bank, then it's necessarily and properly connected that you do this, which I think works against you as a single subject argument.

Now, what -- what I'm trying to get my head around is whether, in lieu of that, you just sort of have a broadness argument that, Well, that may be true but you've connected so many things that it's just too big, you know. It's like concerning water or some of the things that the courts have ruled on that it's just too big to be one subject.

MR. DUNN: Yeah, I think -- I think that's right. If you're going to have a measure that has impacts that are so -- impacts that are so significant to the operation of -- of governmental entities, then that's a separate subject.

MR. STAELIN: Well, I -- I'll repeat what I said before. I don't think this requires a subdivision to pledge its credit, and the overall -the vision, purpose, and intent is very much a single purpose, to establish the authority of political subdivisions to operate and run a bank.

MR. DOMENICO: None of these things are

bank, we're also going to repeal half of TABOR and -that would strike me as sort of using the bank as a way to sneak in these separate subjects.

But here they've -- they've not done that. They've just created the bank and to the extent creating the bank requires specific bank -bank-specific exemptions to the various constitutional provisions, that's what they've tried to do and this doesn't seem like a separate subject to me. It seems like potentially serious policy problems, but, again, I don't see it's a separate subject like I would if it really did say in addition to this bank, everybody's exempt from Article XI, everybody's exempt from section 7 of TABOR, et cetera.

Can we take a break?

MS. STAIERT: You want to make a motion? MR. DOMENICO: Well, can we take our

break? I think he wanted to take a break first.

MS. STAIERT: Okay. We'll take a break.

MR. STAELIN: For what it's worth, this comes first, but because of the hearing, I rescheduled a flight myself from 7:05 this morning to 7:33 this evening, thinking we'd have time, and I don't know if there's time. I'll certainly stay if I have to.

MS. STAIERT: Sure. Well, as you know,

27 (Pages 105 to 108)

Board	INITIATIVES 94 and

109 1 1 that'll be your choice based on -- you know the state that means, but it occurred to me that I don't think 2 of the law. 2 the average voter will understand what that really 3 3 MR. DOMENICO: Yeah, I mean, I think we're obligates the political subdivision to, that it could 4 4 mean a bank failure, at an extraordinary level, that going to proceed, right? 5 MS. STAIERT: Yes. 5 the political subdivision would have to account for; 6 MR. DOMENICO: And I think you can --6 that particularly with the broad nature of this 7 7 MR. DUNN: If we can just take five measure, which allows it to use funds for economic 8 8 development and enterprise purposes throughout the minutes. 9 MS. STAIERT: Yes. 9 state, you could have a political subdivision winding 10 10 (Recess taken, 5:18 p.m. to 5:32 p.m.) up in a -- in a -- as Mr. Gelender said, even in a MS. STAIERT: All right. We're back on 11 11 municipal failure, and to pledge the full faith and 12 the record. We were -- we had just got done talking 12 credit and to use that phrase, I think, will not --13 about (d), III(d) of the petition. Did you have 13 does not convey the true extent of that obligation and 14 something you -- oh. We're back on the record, sorry. 14 is more of a -- a phrase that us in the legal business 15 15 Now we're back on the record, and we're on know that the average voter would not understand. 16 III(d) of the petition for No. 94, and when we took a 16 MS. STAIERT: So what would you propose? 17 break, you indicated you might have a --17 MR. DUNN: I think the measure needs to 18 MR. DUNN: All right. We have nothing 18 articulate that all the potential revenue and credit of 19 19 further. the municipality could be at risk should it be 20 MS. STAIERT: Okay. All right. You want 20 necessary to -- to cover bank losses. 21 to make a motion on III? 21 MS. STAIERT: So would it be good enough 22 22 MR. DOMENICO: I will move that we deny to strike "full faith" and just say "with their 23 the motion for rehearing on the single subject issue. 23 credit"? 24 MS. STAIERT: Second. All those in favor? 24 MR. DOMENICO: Or just to say to 25 25 self-insure deposits? 110 112 1 MR. DOMENICO: Aye. 1 MR. DUNN: I think the title needs to 2 2 MR. GELENDER: Aye. reflect that the bank -- that the political subdivision 3 MS STAIERT: Okay. And moving on to 3 could be liable for all losses of the bank. Or 4 No. 4, that's the title. 4 potentially a bank failure. 5 5 MR. DOMENICO: May I make a suggestion MS. STAIERT: So it could be self-insured 6 that to the extent -- we can go through the details of 6 deposits with liability for losses or -- I mean, what 7 this later, but to the extent that the same objections 7 would --8 and issues are raised in the motion for rehearing on 8 MR. DOMENICO: Well, what if --9 9 No. 95, that we kind of -- everybody incorporate what's self-insured deposits with the subdivision' --10 already been said and ruled upon, and then to the 10 MS. STAIERT: Assets? 11 extent that helps with the fact that now we've begun 11 MR. DOMENICO: -- assets. I mean, I think 12 12 the rehearing already on 94 and 95, in case the that's sort of fairly included in the concept of 13 proponent feels the need to leave, I think he's been 13 self-insurance, but if we want to add a little bit of 14 here for both hearings. 14 extra, that's fine, too. 15 MS. STAIERT: Okay. All right. The first 15 MR. STAELIN: My only comment is that that 16 16 point -- and maybe you want to just go ahead and talk language, "full faith and credit," is old language. I 17 about it. 17 mean, that appeared on --18 MR. DUNN: Sure. Thank you. Turning to 18 MR. DOMENICO: Yeah, but -- it's in the 19 the title, our first objection is that the title 19 constitution, but it has a totally different meaning in 20 20 contains an impermissible catchphrase in that it the constitution, right? Doesn't it mean like -- that 21 describes that the bank will be backed by the full 21 I get to use my driver's license in Wyoming? 22 faith and credit of the political subdivision, I think, 22 MR. STAELIN: Oh, okay. I'm thinking of 23 23 is -- actually, as Mr. Gelender already articulated, I the -- the Greenbacks issued by --24 think some of us who work in the legal profession or in 24 MR. DOMENICO: Yeah. 25 municipal finance or municipal government may know what 25 MR. STAELIN: -- the Lincoln

113 115 1 administration, the dollar. It says right on it, full 1 MR. DUNN: I like "insure." 2 2 faith and credit MR. GELENDER: One -- one question I would 3 3 have is are they actually required to issue one way or MR. DOMENICO: It's used a lot of 4 4 another? I mean, it's like when I deposit -- if I -different ways, but I think that's part of Mr. Dunn's 5 5 excuse me. I'm sorry. If I happen to have more than point is that it sort of has some meaning but maybe not 6 6 the sort of technical meaning that it has here and that 250,000 -- say I wanted to borrow money, theoretically 7 we should avoid potentially misleading people about 7 you could have part of your stuff uninsured, correct? 8 what it might mean. I don't -- I wouldn't be okay 8 MR. DOMENICO: Well, but that's -- I don't 9 9 leaving it there. quite understand that part of it. How is the -- the 10 MR. GELENDER: We're just slightly 10 political subdivision insuring its own deposit with its 11 11 grammatically off because we have a "political own assets? subdivisions" and then we have a singular 12 12 MS. STAIERT: Right. 13 "subdivision." I just would suggest maybe just to say 13 MR. DOMENICO: It doesn't really make "with all of their assets." I think that conveys the 14 14 sense to me. The question here is insuring other --15 meaning of it, because I don't -- I think the "all of 15 other deposits, right? MR. GELENDER: Right. 16 their" is -- more clearly communicates what's really 16 17 17 MS. STAIERT: Well, it depends whose going on. 18 MR. DUNN: We would support that change, 18 deposits --19 and I think this sort of ties in with the -- with the 19 MR. DOMENICO: I'll -- I'm willing to take 20 20 second title -- concern we have, that the title sort of Mr. Dunn's word about the practical reality, 21 21 erroneously states that the measure allows the but I'm not willing to write it into the title, not -not because I don't believe him but just because, Well, 22 political subdivision to self-insure. There's only two 22 23 23 kinds of insurance. It's self-insurance and it's FDIC we're supposed to write a title about the measure, not 24 insurance, and it is a practical -- practical 24 about its consequences, necessarily, and I would leave 25 impossibility that any political subdivision bank would 25 it as is on that point. 114 116 1 1 be able to meet the requirements of the FDIC to be MS. STAIERT: Okay. 2 insured, and maybe the proponents have a -- have a 2 MR. STAELIN: Just to clarify, this 3 comment on that, but if that's the case, then we would 3 provision does not authorize private depositors, 4 argue that it should say, "The political subdivision 4 individuals or private entities to put money into this 5 5 will be required to self-insure deposits with all" -bank. I mean it clearly contem -- or these banks. It 6 "with all subdivision assets." 6 clearly contemplates public money from that subdivision 7 7 MR. STAELIN: The FDIC only insures only going into the bank, 8 8 deposits up to \$250,000, which would mean nothing to a MS. STAIERT: Right. Okay. 9 political subdivision. The work would -- and not only 9 MR. DOMENICO: That would be a pretty neat 10 that, the -- the FDIC, as of August 2010, was 10 trick, then, if you could get the FDIC to insure you, 11 essentially bankrupt. That's not a significant factor 11 bring your own deposits, and then blow it all and get 12 12 the federal government to back it up. We should see if here. 13 MS. STAIERT: So you would agree --13 we can pull that off. MR. STAELIN: And -- and political 14 14 MS. STAIERT: Or you could loan it all out 15 15 subdivisions could, at least, for the outset, until at zero interest and then --16 16 they establish their, you know, full financial MR. DOMENICO: Right. Exactly. 17 17 viability, they could go to the Lloyds or someone like MS. STAIERT: We had another one? that and provide some insurance to back them up. I 18 18 MR. DUNN: Sure. It's the same issue 19 would prefer the provision as it's -- it's written, but 19 we've talked about with regard to the Public Deposit 20 20 I think in any event, that there's no problem Protection Act and that -- that the bank would, in our 21 21 with -reading of the measure, no longer -- would not be 22 22 MS. STAIERT: Well, I mean, we could say subject to those requirements for purposes of the 23 requiring political subdivisions to insure or 23 political subdivision deposits. 24 24 self-insure deposits. I don't know if that makes a lot MR. DOMENICO: So what do you think it

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of difference.

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would have to say to address that?

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117 1 MR. DUNN: I think it would need to state 2 that allowing political subdivision deposits to be 3 exempted from the requirements of the Public Deposit 4 Protection Act, or there may be some other colloquial 5 way of describing the act, but I think the key is that 6 the public needs to understand that this measure allows 7 public funds to be put into a bank that does not have 8 the same security level that a traditional bank would 9 have for such deposits. 10 Maybe the thing to do is to say allowing political subdivisions to self-insure deposits with all 11 12 their assets excluding public deposits in such banks 13 from protections otherwise afforded to public funds in 14 private banks. 15 MS. STAIERT: Well, I didn't think there 16 are going to be any public funds. 17 MR. DOMENICO: Let's don't do that. 18 MR. GELENDER: You know, I think the 19 difficulty, I believe, a little while back we had sort 20 of a substantive discussion of this in deciding that it 21 wasn't entirely clear that it would in fact do that. So it's hard to include it in the title if we're not 22 23 sure it does it. 24 MS. STAIERT: And I'm fine with it, 25 though. 118 1 MR. DOMENICO: I don't think it -- I 2 don't -- I don't think it does that, frankly, and to 3 the extent it does, I think it's kind of captured by 4 the point that --5 MS. STAIERT: Right. 6 MR. DOMENICO: -- it specifies the 7 governance and capitalization requirements. 8 MR. STAELIN: Yeah, I'll -- I'll repeat 9 what I said before, that these publicly owned banks 10 have a -- a right and a power, a responsibility that 11 private banks don't, and that is they -- they have the power of taxation. They have receipts coming in that 12

are basically, if not guaranteed, are a sure thing, but

private banks don't have that. This is a much more

Dakota, for example, is the only bank in the country

that -- the only state in the country that has not had

a bunch of deficits for the past four years, going on

to the state of North Dakota in the last fiscal year.

a little bit, since they found the whole state is

similar oil in Alaska and Montana and --

over ten years, actually, and turned back \$61 million

MR. STAELIN: Well, there's -- there's

MR. DOMENICO: Isn't North Dakota cheating

secure institution. That's why the Bank of North

MR. DOMENICO: It's harder to get at, though. MR. STAELIN: -- they have high unemployment and they have budget problems, so it -it's not the oil. MS. STAIERT: We're not helping you catch your flight. So -- all right. MR. DUNN: Can I ask Mr. Childears, the objector, to come up? He's going to explain why he thinks the title should reflect that the political subdivision has the option of being -- going uninsured, which obviously would be significant and should be reflected in the title. His knowledge of that is significantly beyond mine. MR. CHILDEARS: Don Childears with the Colorado Bankers Association. There are two ways that this state and any other state protects public deposits. That's with the primary layer of FDIC insurance and then requiring collateral above and beyond that, and that is the only instance in federal banking law that allows a bank to pledge collateral to a particular depositor. In no other case may a bank do In this case, you effectively would have no FDIC insurance or you submit to all the regulation 120 of the federal government if you have FDIC insurance, and I'll explain in a second why I think you will never be able to obtain FDIC insurance, but that means you don't have that initial layer, so the alternative way of having the deposits of the public entity protected is by pledging collateral, but effectively this entity will not have any collateral that is pledgeable. It's

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basically backing its own deposits or the deposits of its parent so that you end up with this kind of self-insuring there and you've got the assets going in a circle.

The state law specifies the kinds of collateral -- collateral that are acceptable, and it's basically U.S. treasuries and other kinds of federal securities, and those are closely monitored by the division of banking. I don't believe that this entity, if it is able to operate, would have the excess funds to put into those kinds of securities that would be available for pledging, so in essence, when you remove both of those options for protecting public deposits, they go uninsured and unprotected.

MR. DOMENICO: But it's -- it's its own money, right? The deposits are the government's money, so the real -- the -- you know, you get -- FDIC insurance is meant to protect depositors. When I go

30 (Pages 117 to 120)

floating on a pool of oil?

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Review Board

put my money in a bank, if the bank screws up and spends -- and loans my money out to people building all these subdivisions that no one lives in and then my bank fails and they can't pay me back, that's what FDIC insurance is for.

This is -- there aren't -- the -- the money in here is basically tax money, and it sort of seems not surprising, if I'm going to say -- if I'm authorizing a bank to hold all of my subdivision's assets, that if the bank fails because it lends it out to people it shouldn't have loaned the money to or that -- that it just, for whatever reason, couldn't pay it back, that then my subdivision won't have that money anymore.

I mean, I guess that's my confusion is -is the -- if the -- if the bank screws up, it seems not
surprising that your subdivision is going to have
trouble and -- and it seems very different than if the
bank is going to be insuring other people's deposits.

MR. CHILDEARS: I think that's the very point we're trying to make, that those deposits of the local government would not have any protection, they would not have any insurance or collateral to back them, and so they basically go uninsured, and that's such a key concept that we believe it ought to be in

that is inherent in that. I think that you're basically going with self-insurance or uninsured deposits.

MR. DUNN: Is it -- my client may correct me if I'm wrong. Is the way to describe it to say allowing political subdivisions to insure deposits only with the assets of the subdivision?

MS. STAIERT: Oh, they could go get an insurance policy, somebody to underwrite it, I suppose. Maybe they can get their intergovernmental risk people to underwrite their banks, I don't know, you know, but --

MR. DUNN: I don't know if that's possible or not.

MS. STAIERT: Yeah, I mean, I don't know. They offer insurance for other things, maybe they'd offer for that. But I think the point is that that really is what self-insurance is. I mean, I guess we could have a debate about whether that really means no insurance, and I guess it really does mean no insurance, but for most people, they understand that to self-insure means you pledge your own credit.

MR. DOMENICO: Maybe, to me, the important point that the title doesn't really reflect is that these -- these banks can hold all those -- all the

the title.

MR. DOMENICO: Yeah, and I guess I'm just saying that sort of seems inherent to me in running -- if you're putting all your money into your own bank, as opposed to if this were authorizing them to deposit it in private banks and exempting them from insurance, that what we have there kind of -- is sufficient to say what the measure does, and to the extent that exposes these municipalities to really bad risks, which it very well might, then that strikes me as a matter for the public debate.

MS. STAIERT: And I don't see it a lot differently than municipalities deciding not to take out insurance for claims and deciding to self-insure. That's what they're self-insuring with is their assets. If they get an \$8 million lawsuit and they lose it, then that was a bad policy decision, you know. They didn't have insurance. I mean, it's sort of the same thing. If they loan out \$8 million to a developer and they go bankrupt, then you're right, there is no insurance, but that is basically what's known as self-insuring.

MR. CHILDEARS: Correct, but you're not asking voters to make a decision on a provision where I don't believe self-insurance truly reflects the risk

1 money of the subdivision.

MS. STAIERT: Right.


MR. DOMENICO: To me, this could be we're just going to set up our own little community bank and take deposits and money --

MR. DUNN: Well, I was going to say one of the things I think needs to be reflected in the title, and I was going to bring this up in '95, but I did not realize until the proponent said it a moment ago that it was part of this measure as well, is that individuals and private entities cannot deposit funds in this bank. I think most voters who read this, when they think establish and operate banks, it means, oh, great, I have a -- a government bank that I can go put my money in and probably get either higher a interest rate or borrow money at a cheaper rate from like a credit union or even at lower rates and that that ought to be reflected in the title because I think people will assume that they could -- they would -- could avail themselves of -- of these types of banks.

MS. STAIERT: Or maybe in connection therewith, allowing only the subdivisions to deposit or some language like that, allowing deposits from only the subdivision of the bank.

MR. DOMENICO: Yeah, I guess I'm not

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125 127 just -- I don't know if that language actually limits 1 totally clear that this actually forbids other people 2 2 from depositing. It does say that it may include -them at all. If it does, it might be worth noting. 3 3 MS. STAIERT: Well, what other the capitalization can include all the assets and the 4 4 collateral --revenue of the municipality and that it may accept its 5 own public revenues, and it may be that if you're -- it 5 MR. DOMENICO: I mean, I'm sure you could 6 would be hard to convince other people to put their 6 imagine perhaps some assets that couldn't be designated 7 7 as collateral, but I'm not sure it's material enough money in there for some of the reasons we've discussed, 8 8 but I don't see an actual prohibition on it. for the title. MS. STAIERT: Is there? 9 9 MS. STAIERT: No. 10 MR. DOMENICO: You know what I mean? Does 10 MR. STAELIN: I think you're right. 11 11 There's not an actual prohibition. The -- the measure this make sense? 12 12 does specifically talk about all of the money of the --MS. STAIERT: Let me read it. "An 13 what goes in there, and that's the money of the taxes 13 amendment to the Colorado Constitution concerning 14 14 and revenue of the city, but it doesn't authorization for political subdivisions to establish 15 15 and operate banks, and, in connection therewith, expressly prohibit --16 16 MS. STAIERT: Okay. specifying requirements for the governance of such 17 MR. DOMENICO: So -- but I do think that 17 banks, including capitalization requirements; allowing political subdivisions to deposit all revenues, funds, 18 18 the point that's maybe best stated in II(b) about --19 and other assets into the bank and to self-insure 19 that the bank -- banks -- that the municipalities can 20 deposit all their revenues, funds and other assets into 20 deposits with all of their assets; and authorizing the 21 general assembly to provide regulatory guidelines for 21 the bank is an important one that the title doesn't 22 22 the oversight of these public banks by the state reflect as it's written, I don't think. 23 banking board and the commissioner of financial 23 MS. STAIERT: No. 24 services." 24 MR. DOMENICO: And that is sort of 25 25 necessary to -- to go with the concept of MR. STAELIN: Yeah, no. I think that's 126 128 1 self-insuring, that -- that they -- it's not -- to me, 1 okay. 2 the question of them insuring themselves is not as 2 MR. DOMENICO: I have one suggestion. problematic, necessarily, as the fact that all their 3 3 MS. STAJERT: Okay. 4 money can be in this institution that they are running, 4 MR. DOMENICO: Deposit all of their 5 and if they don't do a good job of it, they can lose 5 revenue or all of the subdivision's --6 6 MR. STAELIN: Of its revenues? their assets. 7 7 MS. STAIERT: So maybe allowing political MR. DOMENICO: Yeah, well, if you wanted 8 8 subdivisions to -to change it to say allowing a political 9 9 subdivision --MR. DOMENICO: To deposit --10 10 MS. STAIERT: -- to deposit --MR. STAELIN: Oh, I see, yeah. 11 MR. DOMENICO: -- you'd have to change 11 MR. DOMENICO: -- all revenues, funds and 12 that, which might work better, but the way it is now, 12 other assets of the county --13 13 MS. STAIERT: Right, or of the that strikes me as an improvement. 14 14 subdivision. MS. STAIERT: Okay. 15 MR. DOMENICO: -- into the -- the bank and 15 MR. DUNN: Are we -- this is Jason Dunn. 16 Are we -- are we discussing just those changes or --16 to self-insure deposits. 17 17 MS. STAIERT: Do you have others? MS. STAIERT: Yeah. 18 MR. DOMENICO: You do have one more. 18 MR. DOMENICO: Revenues, funds, and other 19 19 right? assets. 20 20 MR. GELENDER: I can help. MR. DUNN: I do. The last one that I 21 MR. DOMENICO: And to self-insure. 21 think is -- is relevant to, I think, how the average 22 22 MR. GELENDER: It limits it to revenues, voter will view what a bank does, and I know it was 23 23 funds and other assets that would normally be deposited surprising to me when I learned this that -- that banks 24 or held in a financial institution designated as 24 have the -- have powers beyond just accepting deposits

collateral. Is there anything else out there? I'm

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and lending funds, but as we cite in the -- in the



129 131 1 motion, banks have the authority to invest in real 1 purposes of the subdivision, and for that reason we 2 estate, to manage 401(k) plans, and a variety of other 2 wouldn't want to require all money to be considered as 3 3 powers, one of which I was unaware of, that banks can capitalization. 4 4 set up loan -- what's the phrase for the branch --MS. STAIERT: Okay. Thank you. 5 MR. CHILDEARS: Loan production offices. 5 MR. STAELIN: So if I may have all my 6 MR. DUNN: -- loan production offices, 6 comments applied, and as you've indicated earlier, 7 7 which are essentially branch banks set up only for the their -- the board's comments be applied to 95, with 8 purposes of -- in other states -- for the purpose of 8 your permission. 9 9 making loans. They don't accept deposits at those --MS. STAIERT: We'll do that. 10 at those offices, and I think the average voter would 10 MR. STAELIN: Thanks very much for your 11 want to know that -- that the powers of the bank go way 11 time 12 beyond just accepting deposits and lending, that it --12 MS. STAIERT: Thank you. 13 with it comes substantial risks. 13 MR. DOMENICO: Good luck. 14 14 MR. DOMENICO: Well, to me, we might want MR. STAELIN: Thank you. 15 15 to include something mentioning that, in general, they MR. CHILDEARS: I hope you catch your have all the powers of any other bank, but specifying 16 16 flight. 17 what they are seems inappropriate. 17 MR. STAELIN: Thanks. 18 MR. GELENDER: I agree. 18 (At this time Mr. Staelin left the room.) 19 19 MR. STAELIN: I agree with that, and they MR. DUNN: I think I'll wait to address 20 20 mentioned a 401(k) and IRAs. That -- that really any comments on 95 until we -- until we get there. I applies to individual depositors and does not apply 21 21 guess I should ask the question, for purposes of the 22 22 here. record, is -- you made a comment earlier, is this 23 23 MS. STAIERT: Well, they could have a hearing applicable to 95, or are we going to sort of 24 pension in there, right? 24 incorporate comments when we get to 95? 25 25 MR. STAELIN: And with real estate, MS. STAIERT: It's -- we are doing them 130 132 1 ordinarily that would be done as a correspondent bank, 1 together, was my understanding. Is that yours? 2 2 and the Bank of North Dakota has enabled North Dakota MR. DOMENICO: Yes. 3 to avoid a foreclosure problem, but they've done that 3 MS. STAIERT: Okay. 4 4 as a correspondent bank, with private community banks MR. DUNN: Well, obviously I'll have an 5 5 rather than directly. opportunity to go address -- go back and address 6 6 jurisdictional requirements and that --I'm a little concerned about my time and 7 7 MS. STAIERT: Oh, certainly, yes. we're getting close here. 8 8 MR. DUNN: The only other comment I'd make MS. STAIERT: Well, it's really your 9 choice. They are -- you know, they have already made on the title is that I think what might make sense is 9 the argument that you needed two, so to the extent 10 10 to say that specifying requirements for the governance 11 that, you know, you've taking that risk, I don't 11 of such banks, granting such banks all powers and --12 12 know. MS. STAIERT: All powers? 13 13 MR. DOMENICO: We won't be offended if you MR. DUNN: All. 14 14 MS. STAIERT: All powers. leave. 15 15 MR. STAELIN: Okay. Could I say something MR. DOMENICO: Well, I -- I can make a 16 16 about 95? suggestion, you know, when we do use these -- the 17 17 MS. STAIERT: Sure. traditional subject and then action part of the title 18 MR. STAELIN: There is a comment in II(b) 18 after "in connection therewith," we've gotten into kind 19 19 of the motion for rehearing, "changing the mandatory of this habit of skipping the main point because it's 20 20 requirement that the capitalization of the bank 'shall' part of the subject, but what we could do is -- is 21 21 include all tax and other revenues and funds of the after "in connection therewith," say something like 22 state, to the permissive 'may' exclude such sources," 22 authorizing subdivisions to create banks with what 23 23 that's really a response to paragraph 6 of the are -- however we worked it out, the powers and 24 legislative council's comments, and they were pointing 24 authorities of -- however the language we --

33 (Pages 129 to 132)

out that some of the money may be used immediately for

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MR. DUNN: The point I was trying to get

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Initiative Title Setting Review B 1 at is I think it's important to reflect that banks not 2 only have the powers of private banks but also the 3 risks and that they -- that voters need to know that 4 there's substantial risk in the operation of a bank and 5 those are at least --6 MS. STAIERT: Okay. 7 MR. DUNN: -- as -- as strong as the 8 private bank. 9 MS. STAIERT: How about authorizing the 10 formation -- authorizing the political subdivision to operate such bank with all the powers and risks 11 12 associated with -- well, how does the language read in 13 the actual --14 MR. DOMENICO: It doesn't say anything 15 about the risks. I think that was pretty close. It 16 just said such banks shall have the powers and authority of other banks chartered by the state as well 17 as the such-and-such power and authority to deposit --18 19 MR. GELENDER: Something like granting 20 such banks similar powers to a private bank? 21 MR. DOMENICO: Yeah, I mean, we still 22 haven't sort of addressed my issue about -- I mean, I 23 would suggest starting it out by just saying allowing 24 subdivisions --25 MS. STAIERT: You can read that in it. 1 MR. DOMENICO: -- to establish banks with 2

consider moving up the language about allowing deposits, because I -- do you think it's -- it's more important than the kind of boilerplate business about require -- specifying requirements for governance?

MS. STAIERT: Right. I would agree. MR. DOMENICO: So then I would sort of

suggest deleting the highlighted language and moving --

MS. STAIERT: Yeah, there to -- yeah. MR. DOMENICO: All the way up, yeah. Moving that to after "banks" on line 3.

MS. STAIERT: Okay. So now we have "An amendment to the Colorado Constitution concerning authorization for political subdivisions to establish and operate banks, and, in connection therewith, allowing subdivisions of the state to establish banks with the same power and authority of other banks; allowing political subdivisions to deposit all of their revenues, funds and other assets into the bank and to self-insure deposits with all of their assets; specifying requirements for the governance of such banks, including capitalization requirements; and authorizing the general assembly to provide regulatory guidelines for the oversight of these public banks by the state banking board and the commissioner of

134

the same powers and authority of other banks or --MS. STAIERT: Yeah.

MR. DOMENICO: -- I think something like

MR. DUNN: My point is that I think it needs to reflect that they're also taking on the risks of such banks.

MR. DOMENICO: Right. I know, and, I mean, I think that to the extent that it takes on the risks, our job is to lay out the provisions that do so and it's your job, if this gets on the ballot, to explain why those are really bad risks. And I think we added that sentence or that clause on 4 and 5, because I do think that before it -- it wasn't clear what some of the risks were: but, I mean, I think -- I don't think we can write into the title sort of our understanding that this creates certain risks because that's just sort of our understanding.

MS. STAIERT: What was your language? MR. DOMENICO: Mine would have been that in connection therewith, allowing subdivisions of the state to establish banks with the same power and authority of other banks, and then I think I would go straight to -- I mean, personally, I would probably

financial services." Okay.

MR. DOMENICO: I like that.

MR. GELENDER: The only thing -- I think we should use sort of consistent terminology. I'd suggest maybe saying -- if we're going to say "political subdivisions of the state," it should say it in the single subject and then just say "political subdivisions" every time down the line.

MR. DOMENICO: That's fine.

MR. GELENDER: I think you just want to add "political" before "subdivision."

MS. STAIERT: Right, on 3.

MR. DOMENICO: My only other suggestion is after "establish," to say, "to establish and operate banks" on line 3.

MS. STAIERT: Okay. All right. And the final version, "An amendment to the Colorado Constitution concerning authorization for political subdivisions of the state to establish and operate banks, and, in connection therewith, allowing political subdivisions to establish and operate banks with the same power and authority of other banks; allowing political subdivisions to deposit all of their revenues, funds, and other assets into the bank and to self-insure deposits with all of their assets;

34 (Pages 133 to 136)

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
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that.

136



35 (Pages 137 to 140)

that's all I've got on 95.

MR. DUNN: Give me a moment, please.

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his objections and incorporated them. We have, if I'm

not mistaken, a slightly different issue to dis -- one

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143



of the same issues about changes made after review and comment but one new one; is that correct?

MR. DUNN: We do. Let me -- let me back up for one second. I think, since we are starting No. 95 now, that we would renew and incorporate the objections raised previously in No. 94 with regard to the requirement that -- that both proponents be here, and I would note, for the record, that as we start No. 95, neither proponent is here.

And I only make that distinction because I would think it a possibility that you could have a court at some future time say as long as one of the proponents was there, you're okay, but having neither there is not okay. I don't think that distinction is supportable by the -- the statute, but just in case that's made, I want to note that for the record.

And, of course, on behalf of Objector Don Childears, we'd note the same objection with regard to the -- the whereas clauses, as well.

And as you know, in the motion we raised the issue, again, that changes were made after the review and comment hearing. The language "at no interest" was included. We've discussed that, and -and I'll assume the board will vote the same this time.

The other one is raique to No. 95, and

able to do that.

Certainly paragraph 2 discusses capitalization, but it's not relevant to this issue. and I cannot find another paragraph that -- that deals with that, so I'm not sure how it was responsive. I don't recall - again, I have watched the -- we videotaped it, and I've watched it numerous times to check these arguments, and I did not see anything in there that talked about the mandatory permissive nature of capitalization by the state.

MR. DOMENICO: How about paragraph 4? Or question 4 or whatever you want to call it?

MR. DUNN: Again, I think that has to do with the protection of public deposits in terms of likely the -- the Public Deposit Protection Act, but if that were the case, I'm not sure if he was trying to if you -- if you wanted to insure public protection and the measure said "may" be capitalized and you changed it to "shall," I don't know, maybe that would apply; but this goes the other direction. It makes the capitalization permissive, not mandatory.

MR. DOMENICO: All right. But question No. 4 was since the proposed initiative leaves in place Colorado's existing public deposit protection system, do the proponents intend to require all state revenues

142

be deposited in the state bank? Couldn't they have responded by saying, Well, let's just say it may

MR. DUNN: But -- unless I don't understand the measure, the section has to do with just simply the capitalization of the bank, not whether state funds have to be deposited in the bank.

include all the state revenue and then we avoid that?

MR. DOMENICO: The prior part -- the section before the alteration said the capital -capitalization of the bank shall include all tax and other revenues of the state. The question was do you intend to require that all state revenues be deposited in the state bank. Altering the language to say no, that the capitalization may -- doesn't have to but may include all state revenues seems directly responsive to that question.

MR. DUNN: One second.

MS. STAIERT: Or even the question 3, where it says the proposed initiative calls for the state bank to be capitalized by the state treasury.

MR. DOMENICO: Yeah, currently it's a combination of 3 and 4 --

MS. STAIERT: Current practice -- yeah, current practice in Colorado requires the appropriation of the entire state treasury.

that is that in — in new particular the capitalization of the see bank, it originally said that the capitalization of the bank "shall" include all tax and other avenues and funds of the state and was changed to may" and as we were getting charted have and I'll note that the record that the started here, and I'll note for the record that the proponent did raise that a few moments ago before he left and cited to something in the review and comment hearing that he felt that we being responsive to, and I've tried to figure out whe that is and I haven't been able to, so I don't know if anybody wrote that down.

MR. DOMENIO Paragraph 6. MR. DUNN: We that's what I thought he said, and paragraph 6 only relates to whether or not the employees are subject to the state personnel system, and I'm reading it suickly, but I don't think it covers anything other than that.

And I do not see how changing the

permissive or mandatory ature of capitalization of the bank by the state is responsive to a paragraph discussing whether or not employees are part of the state personnel system; are giving the proponent the benefit of the doubt, I trie to figure out if it was - if he meant another paragraph, and I was not

36 (Pages 141 to 144)

148



145 1 MR. DUNN: Well there's a -- there's a 1 difference between deposit sand capitalization.

MS. STAIERT: Retht.

MR. DUNN: Your ould require all the assets -- all the assets of the state or all the cash 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 of the state to be deposited at the bank but not 6 require the -- the bank to be capitalized.

MS. STAIERT: Yeah, but he's just -- I think when you take the type together, he's saying you 7 7 8 8 9 9 may do this, you may choose to have some of your money 10 10 11 somewhere else. 11 12 12 MR. DOMENICO Right, and if you were -if you were writing the met o and you read Section 4 and it says the capitalization still include all tax and 13 13 14 14 other revenues and funds, bu say, Do you really mean that every penny the state lings in has to go into the bank? And that's why you write that question and then they write section 4 to not live such a substantive i15 15 16 116 17 17 18 18 19 19 requirement. MR. DUNN: But, gain, I think the question of whether all stat cassets have to be deposited in the bank, all safe funds have to be deposited in the bank is a trailly different subject 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 than how the bank is capitalized. In other words, how 24 24 25 25 it's protected. 146 MR. DOMENICO The capitalization is the assets that the bank has to ave or the bank does have.

MR. DUNN: To potect deposits.

MR. DOMENICO Well, I mean, sort of its capitalization are the asset of the bank, and before, it said it had to include all the revenues and funds of 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 it said it had to include all the revenues and funds of the state. Someone asked tem, Do you really mean that all the funds and revenues tave to go in there? And 6 6 7 7 8 8 they said no, let's just say may." I mean, the substantive change, I agree with you, may not be exactly what is a good idee or what they intended, but it—it seems pretty clearly response to that sort of a question, especially fit owing 3, where they sort of—the questions kind of semed to be aimed at pointing out that as it was written, this kind of was more mendatory than they sight have intended, so 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 more mandatory than they night have intended, so 16 16 17 17 anyway. MR. DUNN: I think No. 3 has to do with the surplus funds of the state, and as the memo says, current practice in Colorad requires -- requires the appropriation of the entire atte treasury to pay the expenses of operating the sate government. So the 18 18 19 19

question is how would sure us funds be available in the bank for lending, et cetera f there -- if there are

no excess funds to be deposited for lending purposes?

I'm not sure what that has to do with whether the bank is capitalized with state assets or not. Again, capitalization being different than deposits. And then I -- again, I said -- I think

No. 4 has to do with, you know, whether or not, just as a general matter -- see, and I think it's actually -that question is addressing the last part of paragraph 4 where it says "specifically allocated funds and other assets of the state normally held by financial institutions shall be deposited and held by the bank." Those questions are related to that line. Do you really mean that all the al - specific allocated funds and other assets of the state shall be deposited and held by the bank?

MR. GELENDER: Let me ask a question of the difference between deposits and capitalization, and part of my ignorance of banking, but are -- can capitalization, the monies put in the bank for capitalization then be used or, I mean, do they just sit there? Is this a reserve we're talking about?

MR. DUNN: I'll let Mr. Childears answer -- answer that.

MR. CHILDEARS: Don Childears again. It basically is the safety cushion for the bank. It is the net assets after you subtract deposits. Deposits

are assets to businesses and individuals. To a bank, they're a liability. We owe that money to the depositor; in this case, to the public entity.

So deposits are debt to the bank. Capital is the net assets that are left after you subtract deposits and other debt from total assets. They're, if you will, at opposite ends of the financial spectrum.

MR. GELENDER: Okay. Then reading this. it seems to me that the proponents don't necessarily understand that distinction any better than I did before you explained it to me.

It says the capitalization of the bank would include all tax and other revenues and funds of the state. I mean, it seems like an absurdity, because that's -- the only money this bank has, right, is state money?

MR. DOMENICO: Right, and that's what Question 3 is kind of trying to point out. If your capitalization has to include all the money, how can you lend it out or operate the government, right?

MR. GELENDER: Right. So that's a good point. "May."

MR. DOMENICO: Or they may have been thinking like the initial capitalization, how do you start it up. I don't know. But I -- I mean, it seems

37 (Pages 145 to 148)

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pretty clearly to have been in response to 3 and 4 or 3 -- or one or the other, at least. 1 2 3 MR. DUNN: If the we had the proponents 4 here. 5 MR. DOMENICO: I'm not sure that would 6 help us all that much. So, let's see, so we already 7 dealt with II(a). Now we've discussed II(b). 8 MS. STAIERT: So you want to make a motion 9 on II? 10 10 MR. DOMENICO: So I -- we've already dealt 11 11 with all of Mr. Rogers' issues. 12 MS. STAIERT: Right. 12 13 MR. DOMENICO: Yeah, so what's that mean? 14 MS. STAIERT: I don't know. What does 14 15 that mean? 15 MR. DOMENICO: So then I will move that we 16 16 17 17 deny the motion for the -- the motion for rehearing on 18 point 2 relating to changes allegedly made after review 18 19 19 and comment. 20 20 MS. STAIERT: Second. All those in favor? 21 21 Ave. 22 22 MR. GELENDER: Aye. 23 23 MR. DOMENICO: Aye. 24 24 MR. DUNN: Looking at the single subject 25 challenges, I think there are several that are 25

slightly different version of the arguments we had on the last one, but I'm not sure substantively it's different in the sense that I can -- I guess I don't quite see if the -- if the bank somehow is itself just making so much money that it goes -- that it puts the state over the TABOR revenue limits, the bank's revenue -- I guess my point is the bank's revenue seems very unlikely itself, setting aside the fact that the bank seems likely to be an enterprise, to violate the TABOR requirements.

Now, if the bank's revenues plus tax revenue and other revenues of the state combined somehow go over the TABOR revenue limit, then it's not -- then I -- then I could see how this issue could arise, but there it sort of seems to me that -- that the -- the bank's revenue could still be -- there's not necessarily a conflict. The way to resolve that problem would be to limit the state's non-bank revenue under TABOR while the bank stays within its limits, I think. At least that's the way I -- I think I got through this basic issue last time.

MR. DUNN: If I -- if I hear that right, Mr. Domenico, then you're saying that the -- there would be a separate analysis for the bank's revenue cap --

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duplicative of No. 94 and I won't repeat those, but will incorporate them here with regard to No. 95.

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I think, Madam Chair, you raised the issue earlier about what's in No. III(b), which I think is -is a little bit different than what was in 94, so I want to make sure we articulate that, that the measure now -- or this measure will supersede TABOR to the extent it allows the state to retain excess revenue that would otherwise be in violation of -- of TABOR if the bank operates and does make revenue that exceeds the TABOR limitations, and that would apply -- that's a little bit different than the political subdivision argument because there you could say, Well, that's -- I think the argument Mr. Domenico made was that's a natural effect, perhaps, of -- of what would happen with a municipal bank, to finally use the phrase I've trying to use, been wanting to use the whole time.

But here you have the state revenue, one state bank, and it could then operate to exceed TABOR's prohibition on the state having a revenue cap. That's not just a cap for some entities and not others or those who have an established bank; this is a mandatory bank, and through the bank now the state can exceed TABOR's revenue limitations. MR. DOMENICO: You know, this is a

MR. DOMENICO: Well, I mean, I --MR. DUNN: -- and whether it exceeds that versus the rest of state revenues?

MR. DOMENICO: Well, I think your arg -- I guess my question is, is your argument that -- that there should not be, that there -- that -- I mean, I guess is your point that if you're going to be putting all the state revenue into the bank and this provision says the revenue of the bank shall not be limited, then there can be any limit on the revenue of the state since the bank's revenue is the state's revenue? Because if that's your argument, that's the same thing we just talked about about the taxes, and I don't agree with it.

But the better argument or the argument that seems possible would be that if somehow you had regular state revenue and then you have a bank operating off to the side and the state is itself bumping up against the revenue limit and you're bringing in income from the bank that would -- would otherwise put you over the top, then it might trigger a slightly different analysis.

But the idea that this somehow just exempts the state from TABOR revenue limits because the revenue of the bank can't be limited and the state's

38 (Pages 149 to 152)



	153	3	155
1	revenue turns into the bank's revenue is I worked	1	me what happened is that the bank's revenue would I
2	through that in my head last time and it seems to me	2	mean, if we say that it can't be limited means they get
3	it's backwards because the state's revenue can be	3	to keep it all, so the bank, say, keeps all its
4	limited and then the state's revenue, to the extent it	4	revenue, which counts against the state TABOR cap and
5	goes into the bank, would already have been limited by	5	the state refunds it in the next year to the general
6	TABOR before you get to that. So I don't know if	6	fund before it gives money to the bank or because, you
7	anybody else	7	know, just because it's because the bank's not
8	MS. STAIERT: But then if the bank does	8	limited I mean, I don't know that to deposit the
9	loans at 10 percent and it goes over, then it's not	9	state's money in the bank I mean, it's still the
10	subject to TABOR and I don't see how the bank could be	10	state's money. I don't know the benefit if it becomes
11	an enterprise because it's going to get more than	11	a bank asset. At any rate, I mean, it seems to me that
12	10 percent of its money from tax, right? It's not a	12	that's how it would work, assuming that it's not
13	fee system bank.	13	somehow an enterprise, which seems likely.
14	MR. DOMENICO: Well	14	MR. DOMENICO: But
15	MS. STAIERT: How is it going to be an	15	MR. GELENDER: That's, I think, how I
16	enterprise?	16	would interpret it.
17	MR. DOMENICO: Well, first, I mean	17	MR. DOMENICO: So are we done
18	MS. STAIERT: I mean, enterprises are	18	MS. STAIERT: You want to vote?
19	generally based on fees.	19	MR. DOMENICO: with the discussion? So
20	MR. DOMENICO: The operating the first	20	let's see. So we've incorporated our comments on all
21	year, obviously, there's money, but once you're sort of	21	the rest of these that are similar to 94, so I will,
22	in an operating system I don't know.	22	then, move that we deny the motion for rehearing on
23	MS. STAIERT: Yeah.	23	point 3 about the single subject requirement.
24	MR. DOMENICO: But, I mean, setting aside	24	MR. GELENDER: Second.
25	the enterprise issue	25	MS. STAIERT: All those in favor?
	154		156
1	MS. STAIERT: Right, but	1	MR. DOMENICO: Aye.
2	MR. DOMENICO: the revenue limits would	2	MR. GELENDER: Aye.
3	still seem to apply to the state to me.	3	MS. STAIERT: Opposed? No.
4	MR. DUNN: But that, I think, that would	4	So it passes 2 to 1, and we're left with
5	require a separate calculation for the bank and the	5	title?
6	state, and I don't recall any situation where a part of	6	MR. DUNN: Is it I'm sorry. There
7	a governmental entity was counted separate from the	7	was was that Mr. Gelender who voted no?
8	rest of the entity for purposes of calculating TABOR	8	MS. STAIERT: I voted no.
9	revenue limits. So, you know, it won't surprise you	9	MR. DUNN: Oh, you voted no? And was
10	that I say this, but I actually think it's true that	10	that could you help me understand for the record,
11	the point I'm trying to make is your second argument,	11	was that based on on the revenue limitations
12	that if the bank's revenue pushes the state over the	12	argument?
13	TABOR limit, then argument one of this measure, TABOR	13	MS. STAIERT: The TABOR, yes.
14	does not apply.	14	MR. DUNN: Thank you.
15	MR. DOMENICO: Right. And and I think	15	I guess, then, we're turning to the title.
16	that is the better argument, but it still seems to me	16	Again, we'd argue that "full faith and credit" is a
17		17	catchphrase, that the measure needs to reflect that the
ا م م	that the way to deal with that would be to the way		
l	you could apply both TABOR and this measure would be to	18	state is obligating its general treasuries to cover any
19	you could apply both TABOR and this measure would be to say that the the state's revenue has to be at that	18 19	state is obligating its general treasuries to cover any losses. It might be easier to have 94 up there to
19 20	you could apply both TABOR and this measure would be to say that the the state's revenue has to be at that level and the bank's is separate. I mean, the	18 19 20	state is obligating its general treasuries to cover any losses. It might be easier to have 94 up there to compare, but I don't know if that's possible.
19 20 21	you could apply both TABOR and this measure would be to say that the the state's revenue has to be at that level and the bank's is separate. I mean, the revenue the revenue the bank brings in through its	18 19 20 21	state is obligating its general treasuries to cover any losses. It might be easier to have 94 up there to compare, but I don't know if that's possible.  MS. STAIERT: It is. We've done it
19 20 21 22	you could apply both TABOR and this measure would be to say that the the state's revenue has to be at that level and the bank's is separate. I mean, the revenue the revenue the bank brings in through its lending activities, et cetera, and investing, to the	18 19 20 21 22	state is obligating its general treasuries to cover any losses. It might be easier to have 94 up there to compare, but I don't know if that's possible.  MS. STAIERT: It is. We've done it before.
18 19 20 21 22 23	you could apply both TABOR and this measure would be to say that the the state's revenue has to be at that level and the bank's is separate. I mean, the revenue the revenue the bank brings in through its lending activities, et cetera, and investing, to the extent it should do that, would be smaller than the	18 19 20 21 22 23	state is obligating its general treasuries to cover any losses. It might be easier to have 94 up there to compare, but I don't know if that's possible.  MS. STAIERT: It is. We've done it before.  MR. DOMENICO: Well, you could just
19 20 21 22	you could apply both TABOR and this measure would be to say that the the state's revenue has to be at that level and the bank's is separate. I mean, the revenue the revenue the bank brings in through its lending activities, et cetera, and investing, to the extent it should do that, would be smaller than the state's budget.	18 19 20 21 22	state is obligating its general treasuries to cover any losses. It might be easier to have 94 up there to compare, but I don't know if that's possible.  MS. STAIERT: It is. We've done it before.

Initi	ative Title Setting Review Board INITIATIV	ES 94	and 95 4/26/201
	157	7	159
1	think. Just change "full faith and credit" to "assets"	1	MR. DUNN: That's right. Yeah,
2	on line 4.	2	and that's one sec. Yeah, I wrote notes on that.
3	MR. WARD: You said "all of the assets"	3	That, I think, is a central feature that should be up
4	last time, I think.	4	front. I think voters need to know that this is not a
5	MR. DOMENICO: I think we did.	5	bank that they can go put their paycheck in and get a
6	MR. DUNN: I would suggest, in the single	6	car loan for.
7	subject clause, that it needs to say "establishment of	7	MS. STAIERT: I don't have a problem with
8	a bank owned and operated by the state of Colorado."	8	that.
9	MR. DOMENICO: That's not a bad idea.	9	MR. DOMENICO: So where does this happen?
10	Mr. Hobbs would have objected.	10	MS. STAIERT: 7.
11	MS. STAIERT: Yeah, he didn't like "and."	11	MR. DOMENICO: If it were me, what I would
12	MR. DOMENICO: He didn't like conjunctions	12	do is take the authorizing language on line 8 and
13	in a single subject, but I'm not quite I never was	13	the not all that.
14	convinced that was a problem.	14	MR. GELENDER: Just "to practice."
15	Yeah, that's a little bit simpler than my	15	MR. DOMENICO: Just "to practice" is on
16	suggestion which was going to be to add the to add	16	line 9 and put that either before or after the "full
17	that concept on the end of line 2 now. It would say	17	faith and credit line" that we just changed and then
18	"establishing and authorizing the state to operate a	18	probably right after that, putting the the
19	bank," and I think you could get rid of "state owned"	19	clause I think the clause Mr. Dunn was just talking
20	since it's	20	about, which now starts at the end of line 8, makes
21	MS. STAIERT: Up above?	21	more it doesn't really make sense or it makes
22	MR. DOMENICO: So it would be	22	more sense after the discussion of the tax and revenue
23	"establishing and authorizing the state to operate a	23	funds of the state, so I would put that after what you
24	bank," but I don't know I think Mr. Dunn's	24	just added on line 6.
25	suggestion might be slightly better, if we're okay with	25	MR. DUNN: So I would suggest that that
	158		160
1	the conjunction.	1	should be after the initial clause "establishing a bank
2	MS. STAIERT: That's fine with me. I	2	authorized to lend money for various specified
3	don't think owning it and operating it make two	3	purposes" and then prohibiting the bank from accepting
4	subjects, so	4	deposits from any individual or private entity.
5	MR. GELENDER: I don't.	5	MR. DOMENICO: So backing the debts
6	MR. DOMENICO: All right. So the other	6	would you you would move that down somewhere?
7	sort of major change we made on 94 was clearly stating	7	MR. GELENDER: Probably after the the
8	that the subdivisions could put all their revenue in	8	capitalization clause, maybe?
9	there.	9	MR. DOMENICO: Yeah, you could move that
10	MS. STAIERT: In this one, do they have	10	to the after what we just added in.
11	to?	11	MR. DUNN: I would suggest that both of
12	MR. GELENDER: Yes. I believe.	12	those clauses would go in front of the capitalization
13	MR. DUNN: Okay. Before we get too far	13	clause, so I would move "authorizes the bank to be
14	down into the measure, I think one of the most	14	capitalized with all tax and other revenues and funds
15	important features of the measure that needs to be	15	of the state," et cetera, after the next two.
16	reflected early on is that this bank is established	16	MS. STAIERT: Would you switch those two?
17	only for the purpose of accepting state deposits as	17	MR. DUNN: Well, I would move it I
18	opposed to individual and commercial deposits.	18	would take that clause and move it down after the next
19	MS. STAIERT: Right.	19	two, so after the after all that red lining, on
20	MR. DUNN: I'd have to look at how the	20	line 7.
21	proponents phrased that, but	21	MR. DOMENICO: Yeah. I mean, those all
22	MR. DOMENICO: Well, we have that in there	22	seem to be sort of intertwined and very important to
23	on line I think it's starting there on line 7,	23	figure out what what can and can't go into the bank,
24	prohibiting the bank from accepting deposits	24	so which one goes first and second and third, I don't
25	from any	25	know.

40 (Pages 157 to 160)

161 163 1 MR. DUNN: Well, I'm trying to think of -everything, in front of line 5. 2 think of it from the perspective of the voter and which 2 MS. STAIERT: Okay. Take it out. 3 3 elements they would consider as most important. MR. GELENDER: I guess on line 7, just 4 MS. STAIERT: Let me read it. "An 4 want to -- 'cause I did the same thing with the state, 5 5 if we just want to say "specifying that bank revenue, amendment to the Colorado Constitution concerning the 6 establishment of a bank owned and operated by the State 6 income and expenditures" and get the "the" out of "the 7 of Colorado, and, in connection therewith, establishing 7 bank" out. 8 8 a bank authorized to lend money for various specified MS. STAIERT: Okay. I'm going to read it 9 9 purposes; prohibiting the bank from accepting deposits one last time. 10 from any individual or private entity; backing the 10 "An amendment to the Colorado Constitution debts and obligations of the bank by" -- take out 11 11 concerning the establishment of a bank owned and "the" -- "by all of the assets of the State of operated by the State of Colorado, and, in connection 12 12 13 Colorado; authorizing the bank to be capitalized with 13 therewith, establishing a bank authorized to lend money 14 14 all tax and other revenues and funds of the state for various specified purposes; prohibiting the bank 15 15 subject to sound banking practices; specifying from accepting deposits from any individual or private 16 requirements for oversight, governance and management 16 entity; backing the debts and obligations of the bank 17 17 of the bank; specifying that the revenue, income and by all state assets; authorizing the bank to be 18 expenditures of the bank shall not be limited or 18 capitalized with all state tax and other revenues and 19 restricted except for financial and public policy 19 funds; specifying requirements for the oversight, 20 considerations; and authorizing the drafting of rules 20 governance and management of the bank; specifying that and regulations of the bank subject to approval by the 21 21 bank revenue, income, and expenditures shall not be 22 advisory board of the bank, the board of directors of 22 limited or restricted except for financial and public 23 23 the bank, the Colorado general assembly and the policy considerations; and authorizing the drafting of 24 24 rules and regulations of the bank subject to approval governor." 25 Can you show us how it would look? 25 by the advisory board of the bank, the board of 162 164 directors of the bank, the Colorado general" --1 MR. DUNN: And I won't -- I won't repeat 2 some of the points we made on 94, but we'll renew those 2 "general assembly and the governor." 3 You want to make a motion? 3 here with regard to this -- the measure needs to 4 MR. GELENDER: Sure. I move we deny the 4 reflect the risks being taken on by voters for bank 5 motion for rehearing and adopt the staff draft as it 5 failure, et cetera. 6 appears on -- as amended as it appears on the screen. 6 MS. STAIERT: Okay. 7 7 MS. STAIERT: Second. MR. GELENDER: The only thing I would say 8 8 is if we want to save a few words, instead of saying All those in favor? 9 9 "all of the assets of the State of Colorado," do we MR. DOMENICO: Aye. 10 want to say "all the state assets"? 10 MR. GELENDER: Aye. 11 MS. STAIERT: Aye. 11 MS. STAIERT: Oh. What do you think? 12 All right. That's unanimous, and the MR. WARD: All the state assets? 12 13 changes reflected in the ballot title will also be 13 MR. DUNN: Line 5. 14 changed in the questions, and it is 6:47 and we are 14 MR. GELENDER: I think we can do similarly 15 15 on the next clause. It's "all state tax and other 16 16 revenues and funds," maybe -- and get rid of the "of WHEREUPON, the within proceedings were 17 concluded at the approximate hour of 6:47 p.m. on the 17 the state." 18 26th day of April, 2012. 18 MR. DUNN: I would ask that I think you 19 19 should strike "subject to sound banking practices." 20 20 I'm not sure -- I'm not sure what that means in the 21 21 measure itself, let alone in the title, but I think 22 22 arguably it could be a catchphrase. 23 23 MR. GELENDER: What if it just says 24 24 authorizing, not requiring? I mean, I think that the 25 impression they don't necessarily have to have

## Initiative Title Setting Review Board

	165
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE	
STATE OF COLORADO )	
) ss.	
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER )	
I, LORI A. MARTIN, Registered Merit	
Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter, and Notary	
Public, State of Colorado, do hereby certify that these	
proceedings were taken in machine shorthand by me at	
the time and place aforesaid and were thereafter	
reduced to typewritten form; that the foregoing is a	
true transcript of the proceedings had.	
I further certify that I am not employed	
by, related to, nor of counsel for any of the parties	
herein, nor otherwise interested in the outcome of this	
litigation.	
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my	
signature this 9th day of May, 2012.	
My commission expires June 2, 2012.	
Reading and Signing was requested.	
Reading and Signing was waived.	
X Reading and Signing is not required.	
	1